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Summary 
This dissertation provides a comprehensive account of the role of national 
parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance. It examines 
national parliaments in the European Semester, in relation to the European 
Stability Mechanism and the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance and challenges the view that the 
Euro crisis has only reduced the influence of national parliaments.  
The analysis moves beyond prerogatives and institutional capacities to 
actual parliamentary involvement. Scrutinising the different stages of the 
European Semester remains a challenge for many national parliaments that 
have been marginalised by this multilevel coordination and surveillance 
process. In case of the third rescue package for Greece, the overall 
involvement by national parliaments exceeded what legal provisions would 
have demanded. But both economic governance domains suffer from 
asymmetries between those national parliaments that are willing and able to 
become actually involved and those that are not. One possible remedy against 
these asymmetries would be to involve national parliaments into economic 
governance collectively. The provision of Article 13 TSCG and the 
Interparliamentary Conference established on this basis, however, fall short 
of collective involvement or joint scrutiny and the experience of negotiating 
the institutional design of the new Conference even suggests that any kind of 
joint parliamentary body for the Euro area would be very difficult to realise.  
As a general overhaul of the Economic and Monetary Union seems 
indispensable to make the common currency weather-proof, a more 
symmetric involvement of national parliaments is necessary to strengthen 
the legitimacy that they supply. In the European Semester this could be 
achieved via minimum standards for parliamentary involvement, but the 
tangled web of procedures for ESM rescue packages is likely to persist and 
interparliamentary cooperation can only be developed incrementally. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Decisions by one national parliament –– be it in 
Germany or Ireland, in Slovakia or Portugal –– are 
watched all over Europe. Maybe not formally speaking, 
but at least politically speaking, all national parliaments 
have become, in a way, European institutions.” 
Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council  1
Chapter 1: 
1   Introduction 
European integration has created an arena of international policy-making 
beyond the nation-state. Member states of the European Union (EU) have 
given up sovereignty through a shift of power from the national to the 
European level. Intergovernmental negotiations and intergovernmental 
decision-making at the EU level mean that another shift of power has taken 
place at the domestic level: from national parliaments to their governments.  
In reaction to these power shifts, national parliaments were able to 
strengthen their prerogatives in EU affairs and obtained rights and 
capacities to participate in EU policy-making (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015; 
Winzen 2017). They reacted to European integration by setting up European 
affairs committees, by controlling the decisions of their national government 
in the Council and by participating in the Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC).  
From 2010 onwards, the Euro crisis was tackled ad-hoc and stepwise in an 
approach of “exploratory […] policy-making” (Enderlein 2015a: 16). The EU 
agreed and adopted various economic governance reforms, such as the Treaty 
on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG), the Treaty establishing 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and a set of legislative measures. 
This period has often been portrayed as a period during which the EU 
embarked on a path of “executive federalism” (Crum 2013; Habermas 2012). 
 European Council (2012), Speech by President Herman Van Rompuy to the 1
Interparliamentary Committee meeting on the European Semester for Economic Policy 
Coordination..Brussels, 27 February 2012 (EUCO 31/12).
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The Euro crisis has probably been one of the biggest challenges for 
national parliaments: New tasks and new challenges emerged for them. On 
the one hand, emergency bailouts required from Euro area members to 
commit loans and guarantees to other members in financial difficulties. On 
the other hand, the surveillance and coordination of national fiscal and 
economic policies was tightened in the European Semester. Both ways, in 
which the Euro crisis touched upon member states, affected the “power of the 
purse” (Wehner 2006) of national parliaments. Hence, the question arises if 
they have once again been able to “fight back” (Raunio and Hix 2000) –– or 
not –– and what role(s) national parliaments play in the post-crisis economic 
governance. 
National parliaments’ involvement does not only take place individually, it 
also takes place collectively (Crum and Fossum 2013a; Lupo and Fasone 
2016): The basic foundations for interparliamentary cooperation can be found 
in the Lisbon Treaty; national parliaments had to fill them with life in the 
context of the Euro crisis when Article 13 TSCG provided for setting up a 
conference that became the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance (SECG). 
The first chapter of this dissertation introduces the topic “National 
parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance”. It is structured as 
follows: The next two sections discuss the debates on democracy and 
legitimacy beyond the nation-state (section 1.1) and on national parliaments 
in the EU (section 1.2). After that, this chapter explains why the post-crisis 
economic governance is different from general EU affairs (section 1.3) and 
introduces the overarching research question as well as the structure of this 
dissertation (section 1.4) that analyses how national parliaments are involved 
in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance.  
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1.1  Democracy and legitimacy beyond the 
nation-state 
The question of whether and, if yes, to what extent there is a democratic 
deficit in international politics has been at the centre of normative and 
theoretical debates about democracy and legitimacy beyond the nation-state. 
This section revisits these debates and their contribution to the topic of this 
dissertation, for instance with respect to a possible parliamentary 
counterbalancing at the national or international level (see also Freyburg et 
al. 2017). The EU’s democratic deficit has been intensively discussed since 
the 1990s, but the global governance debate has tended to be less interested 
in the specific role of parliaments and their potential contribution to 
legitimising international politics (see Beisheim and Brunnengräber 2008: 
75) than in broader considerations about legitimacy or accountability in 
global governance (e.g. Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005). 
Decision-making under the conditions of global governance  
International cooperation to tackle problems of globalisation empowered 
international institutions to take decisions independently or jointly with 
representatives of the national governments. As a consequence, the political, 
economic, social and cultural autonomy of nation-states has been reduced 
(Dahl 1994: 26). Parliaments are “the democratic institutions that have 
suffered most from the shift of authority [from states to international 
organisations]” (Freyburg et al. 2017: 3). 
Domestic democratic or parliamentary control over decisions at the 
international level often only takes place ex-post (after decisions were taken) 
and national parliaments then face a take-it-or-leave-it dilemma between 
approval and rejection. Since international negotiations are usually 
conducted by government representatives, the executive branch is 
strengthened compared to the legislative branch. Governments benefit from 
the so-called “two-level game” (Putnam 1988) as only they act at the 
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international and the domestic level. Parliamentarians lack possibilities to 
become directly involved at the international level: Opportunities for MPs to 
participate in international politics are limited, since the few parliamentary 
assemblies that exist in international organisations have varying degrees of 
powers (Marschall 2006).  
Is there a democratic deficit? 
The democratic deficit of international politics has been widely discussed 
with different answers to the question of whether it exists or not. Some have 
argued that there is no democratic deficit in international politics (e.g. 
Keohane et al. 2009; Moravcsik 2004). In their reasoning, international 
institutions can be evaluated by “less demanding standards of legitimacy or 
accountability” (Fossum and Crum 2012: 74; Grant and Keohane 2005) and 
may even enhance domestic democracy (Keohane et al. 2009: 2). The EU, 
viewed by them as a limited-purpose organisation, does not suffer from a 
democratic deficit either –– as long as it is limited to non-redistributive and 
regulatory issues (Majone 1998, 2014).  2
According to others, global governance is characterised by executive 
multilateralism and governments coordinate their policies internationally 
“with little national parliamentary control and away from public 
scrutiny” (Zürn 2004: 264). Dani Rodrik argues that it is impossible to 
simultaneously pursue “hyperglobalization, democracy, and national self-
determination” (Rodrik 2011: 200). In the EU, many policies negatively affect 
national welfare states (see Scharpf 1999) and despite the creation and 
strengthening of a supranational parliamentary assembly, the European 
Parliament, the EU might need more politicisation in order to remedy its 
democratic deficit (Follesdal and Hix 2006). Rodrik’s political trilemma of the 
world economy also highlights the difficulties of ensuring proper democratic 
 See section 1.3 (Why Economic Governance is different) on redistributive effects of the post-2
crisis economic governance.
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control in European integration and has been applied to the Economic and 
Monetary Union (see Crum 2013).  
Parliamentary counterbalancing at the international and the national 
level 
Legislatures can react to policy-making beyond the nation-state by 
introducing domestic reforms to strengthen their position in the multilevel 
system (Beisheim and Brunnengräber 2008). They would then follow Robert 
Dahl who argued that, in reaction to the development of a transnational 
system, democratic institutions need to be improved at the national level in 
order to “maintain the vitality of the democratic process” (Dahl 1994: 33). 
Thus, the debate about legitimacy and democracy beyond the nation-state is 
linked to legislative studies and research on legitimate and democratic 
decision-making within the nation-state. 
The challenges for national parliaments that can be observed in global 
governance (still) exist in a similar way in European integration which means 
a shift of power from the national to the international level as well as a 
domestic shift of power from national parliaments to their governments (see 
Moravcsik 1994). It is for this reason that the European Parliament has been 
empowered gradually and that national parliaments have intensified their 
involvement into EU policy-making. By now, a “growing consensus that the 
European integration process affects national democratic systems” (Fossum 
2015a: 45) has emerged in research on democracy and legitimacy beyond the 
nation-state. 
1.2  National parliaments in the European 
Union 
Since the 1990s, the role of national parliaments in the EU has been the 
subject of major research projects (Hefftler et al. 2015; Maurer and Wessels 
2001) and widely covered in the literature (see reviews by Crum 2017; Goetz 
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and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015; Winzen 2010). This 
dissertation contributes to this broad strand of European integration 
research which has also received significant attention in the most recent 
literature (for instance Auel and Christiansen 2016; Hefftler et al. 2015; 
Jančić 2017; Rozenberg 2017).  
In addition, numerous studies address the role of national parliaments in 
EU economic governance (Auel and Höing 2014, 2015; Crum and Curtin 
2015; Crum 2018; Fromage and van den Brink 2018; Hallerberg et al. 2012; 
Höing 2015b; Maatsch 2016; Rittberger and Winzen 2015). When analysing 
national parliaments in the post-Lisbon and post-crisis EU, however, many 
authors tend to focus on the ratification of related measures in national 
parliaments and the adoption and implementation of parliamentary reforms, 
not on the actual involvement of national parliaments.  
The effect of European integration on national political systems 
Over the years, the analysis of national parliaments moved away from the 
research focus of many integration theories that took domestic politics as an 
explanatory factor of the integration process, but started to view European 
integration as an explanatory factor in domestic continuity or change (see Hix 
and Goetz 2000). “Europeanisation” has been defined by Robert Ladrech as  
“an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics 
to the degree that […] political and economic dynamics become part of 
the organizational logic of national politics and policy-
making” (Ladrech 1994: 69).  
National parliaments have adapted their procedures to European 
integration and, for example, established European affairs committees to deal 
with EU issues. As a consequence, national parliaments have become 
Europeanised just like other institutions at the member state level (see 
Kassim 2013). European integration affects policies and politics of EU 
member states as well as their polities (Schmidt 2006: 7). 
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De- or Reparliamentarisation of EU affairs? 
Two partly contradicting assessments have been made in the literature about 
the role of national parliaments in the EU and the question whether there is 
a de-parliamentarisation or a re-parliamentarisation of EU affairs.  
The first accounts of de-parliamentarisation emerged in the analysis of 
political systems and comparative political science, but processes of 
globalisation and Europeanisation led to new wave of literature that followed 
the de-parliamentarisation thesis (e.g. Norton 1996). National parliaments in 
the EU were seen as threatened by a de-parliamentarisation of (national) 
politics when European integration expanded after the Single European Act 
and the Maastricht Treaty. The introduction of qualified majority voting for 
legislation in the Council, even though balanced by a greater role for the 
European Parliament, created the possibility to overrule the concerns or 
objections of individual national governments or parliaments.  
The de-parliamentarisation thesis was challenged in the 2000s when 
national parliaments were seen as having started to become “competitive 
actors” (O'Brennan and Raunio 2007), but it re-emerged in the Euro crisis. In 
that context, the key question has been  
“whether the new structure of economic governance has involved a 
shift in executive power and, if so, whether that shift has been 
matched by an appropriate and effective shift in parliamentary 
prerogatives at the national and/or the European level” (Crum 2018: 
271).  
In 2015, John E. Fossum argued that it was “too early to tell” (2015a: 56) 
whether the Euro crisis had led to a general pattern of de-
parliamentarisation. It may again have taken some time for parliaments to 
“fight back” (Raunio and Hix 2000). The underlying question of de- or re-
parliamentarisation must not be considered in relation to individual national 
parliaments, but must take the overall system of representative relations in 
the EU into account (Fossum 2015a).   3
 The next chapter, Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance, 3
develops the theoretical framework on which this dissertation relies.
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Executive federalism, de-politicisation and technocratisation in the 
Euro crisis 
National parliaments have not only been affected by general trends regarding 
their role in national political systems and EU affairs, but also by the 
economic and financial crisis. In the EU and its member states, fiscal and 
economic policies became (further) depoliticised and a technocratic order 
emerged. Between 2008 and 2013, the various measures against the crisis led 
to an ad-hoc technocratisation of economic policy-making: Decisions that were 
formally legitimised in parliament de facto corresponded to executive decrees 
(Enderlein 2013: 732). But fiscal and economic policy, the area of taxation 
and expenditure, is “fundamental to any democratically accountable political 
system: it sits at the heart of the relationship between parliament, 
government and the public” (Fox 2012: 465).  
Jürgen Habermas has called the EU’s new governance model 
“Exekutivföderalismus” or “executive federalism” (Habermas 2011: 48; 2012). 
It is based on macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance that takes place via 
“depoliticised procedures and technocratic institutions” (Crum 2013: 615). 
The policies and measures that were adopted against the economic and 
financial crisis were achieved “at a high cost to democratic ideals” (Sánchez-
Cuenca 2017: 354).  
Viewed from the perspective of the political trilemma of the world economy 
(Rodrik 2011), the path of “executive federalism” as the immediate crisis 
response implied that monetary integration was preserved, that the nation-
state remained at the centre of decision-making and that democracy was 
sacrificed (Crum 2013: 625-26). As a consequence, national parliaments are 
also seen as having suffered from the economic and financial crisis and the 
response to it. 
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Prerogatives, capacities and activities of national parliaments 
The literature on national parliaments in the EU has examined the 
prerogatives and institutional adaptation (i.e., the development of 
institutional capacities) of national parliaments in EU affairs have been 
examined in great depth. Such studies provide valuable insights, but shed 
only little light on whether parliaments actually use their prerogatives (Auel 
2007). Parliamentary activities have only received limited attention: 
“[M]ost studies have emphasized formal parliamentary rights, 
measuring institutional opportunities rather than behaviour in 
practice, with the result that there is an incomplete account of the 
performance of national parliaments in EU politics.” (Auel et al. 
2015a: 60; see also Raunio 2014a) 
Some recent exceptions covering individual parliamentary activities in 
economic governance are studies by Auel et al. (2015a, 2015b), Hallerberg et 
al. (2012, 2018) and Wessels et al. (2012). 
The general findings reveal a certain mismatch between existing 
classifications of national parliaments in general EU affairs and the 
adaptation of national parliaments to EU economic governance (e.g. Fasone 
2015; Höing 2015b; Rittberger and Winzen 2015). Existing indices about the 
parliamentary strength of European affairs committees (Auel et al. 2015a; 
Karlas 2012; Winzen 2012), for instance, only partly explain parliamentary 
involvement in EU economic governance (Auel and Höing 2015; Hallerberg et 
al. 2012, 2018; Rittberger and Winzen 2015; Winzen 2017). It is furthermore 
important to take the broader field of legislative studies and budget issues 
(Hallerberg et al. 2009; Wehner 2014) into account when studying the 
involvement of national parliaments in EU economic governance.  
National parliaments do not only act individually, they also cooperate 
among each other and with the European Parliament. This does not 
constitute an autonomous channel of parliamentary legitimation and 
representation in the EU (Fasone and Lupo 2016a: 9), but national 
parliaments can use interparliamentary cooperation in order to reduce 
information gaps (Benz 2011; Neunreither 1994). National parliaments and 
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the European Parliament interact and respond to each other, but there is “no 
automatic way in which their voices cohere or can be aggregated” (Crum 
2016: 9) and the relationship between the two parliamentary levels has never 
been fully defined. It is (still) characterised by conflict rather than 
cooperation (Costa and Latek 2001; Herranz-Surrallés 2014; Kreilinger 2013; 
Neunreither 2005). 
1.3  Why Economic Governance is different 
Compared to EU affairs in general, post-crisis economic governance has 
several distinct features. Five main features explain why the European 
Semester, the ESM and the SECG Conference differ from normal EU affairs: 
the legal framework, the procedures under which the instruments operate, 
the “inability to rely on existing mechanisms of parliamentary 
involvement” (Fromage and van den Brink 2018: 241), depoliticised rules and 
redistributive effects. These features are now examined in greater detail.  
Legal and procedural differences of Economic Governance 
First, the legal framework is particularly complex in the post-crisis economic 
governance. Instruments for providing financial assistance to Euro area 
members in financial difficulties (the ESM and its predecessor, the EFSF) 
were set up in 2010 and 2012 on the basis of international agreements by 
those member states whose currency is the Euro. Besides the adoption of two 
sets of regulations and directives that reinforced the Stability and Growth 
Pact and created additional surveillance procedures (the Six-Pack and the 
Two-Pack) by the Council and the European Parliament in 2011 and 2013, 25 
EU member states signed another international agreement, the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), in 2012 (see Kreilinger 
2012b). The TSCG provided for transposing balanced-budget rules into 
national law via “provisions of binding force and permanent character, [which 
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are] preferably constitutional.”  These international agreements create a 4
“largely self-standing” (Fromage and van den Brink 2018: 241) legal 
framework outside the EU Treaties.  
Second, decision-making itself differs. It relies on distinct decision-making 
procedures that are mostly non-legislative. The ESM works on the basis of 
separate intergovernmental decision-making structures and procedures. The 
decision-making processes in the European Semester are also different from 
general EU affairs: They produce reports and recommendations, allow EU 
institutions “to examine national budgets earlier and in a more systematic 
manner than before” (Maatsch and Cooper 2017: 651), facilitate the adoption 
of guidance (and sanctions) via reversed qualified majority voting (RQMV) 
and make political responsibility difficult to locate, because “at every stage it 
is possible for the actors involved to refer to the preceding step as 
conditioning their actions” (Crum and Curtin 2015: 83).  
Third, national parliaments find it more difficult to control and shape the 
post-crisis economic governance than to control and shape general EU affairs. 
This is related to the legal bases and the decision-making processes : Many 5
scrutiny procedures in national parliaments are well-adapted to the EU 
legislative process (scrutinising draft EU legislation, questioning ministers or 
voting resolutions), but they are to some extent inadequate for economic 
governance (see de Wilde and Raunio 2018; Fromage and van den Brink 
2018: 241-42). On top of that, the fundamental parliamentary right to decide 
on the budget –– a core prerogative of many legislatures in the world –– is 
reduced in the European Semester and by the ESM. Economic governance, 
however, also provides for new ways of parliamentary involvement: The 
TSCG contains a specific provision that gave the impetus for setting up a 
policy-specific interparliamentary conference  and in the European Semester 6
 Article 3(2) TSCG.4
 They are not based on the Community method. See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary 5
involvement in Economic Governance (section 2.1 Contemporary perspectives on European 
integration).
 Article 13 TSCG.6
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direct exchanges take place between the European Commission and national 
parliaments. 
Fourth, EU economic governance is characterised by depoliticised rules 
and norms (see Fromage and van den Brink 2018: 242; Schmidt 2015). This 
applies to rescue packages where the Troika adopted a technocratic crisis-
management approach. The Stability and Growth Pact also imposes debt and 
deficit constraints (Scharpf 2002: 648) and takes away the possibility to 
rebalance a national economy in case of an economic downturn by a 
significant expansion of public spending. Fiscal and economic policy decisions 
in the EU’s economic governance often follow only numeric rules and are not 
political choices (see Schmidt 2015).  
The redistributive impact of Economic Governance 
The last of the five main differences is that the measures under Europe’s 
post-crisis economic governance are generally assumed to have signifiant 
redistributive effects (Börzel 2016: 15; Chalmers et al. 2016; Frieden and 
Walter 2017). Their impact on national economies and their (possible) impact 
on national budgets are another feature that makes post-crisis economic 
governance different from general EU affairs, where redistributive effects of 
regulation are rather small.  
In the early years of existence of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
assumptions about its welfare or redistributive effects had diverged 
(Enderlein 2006: 1136-39), because in a monetary union that is not an 
Optimal Currency Area several distinct welfare and redistribution effects 
occur (see Enderlein and Verdun 2009: 493-97): On the one hand, there are 
overall welfare enhancing effects, but on the other hand, the real interest rate 
has redistributive consequences under a logic of “one size fits 
none” (Enderlein 2015b: 29) and when welfare states adjust, this also leads to 
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redistribution.  If it has not already happened before, the Euro crisis 7
“definitely turned EMU into a redistributive issue by increasing the scale and 
visibility of redistribution” (Börzel 2016: 15).  
The redistributive effects of the European Semester and the ESM exceed 
those of the EU budget  or from the EU’s regulatory policies: “The EU is 8
[now] engaged in massive redistribution among member states. This occurs 
most explicitly through the European Stability Mechanism” (Chalmers et al. 
2016: 3).  
Policy-makers often stressed the limited character of this “capacity-
building”, but the ESM affects and relocates core state powers: Distributive 
implications and costs become visible, while the long-term benefits are more 
abstract. Under the fiscal and economic policy coordination and surveillance 
of the European Semester, however, core state powers remain national 
assets: Exercising these powers is only constrained by European rules and 
the distributive implications are concealed (see Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 
2014: 262). For some member states, however, it is more difficult to comply 
with the rules than for others –– “this horizontal redistribution is not directly 
visible” (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016: 173). (Re)distributive implications 
might also be an explanation behind the difficulties in setting up the SECG 
Conference: 
“[I]nter-parliamentary coordination cannot be premised on the 
assumption that the interests of parliaments naturally align. 
Certainly on issues with distributive implications, the interests of 
national parliaments may well conflict and, hence, national 
parliaments may prefer to operate on their own or in coalitions that 
involve smaller subsets of the parliaments in the system.” (Crum 
2016: 15) 
 Over the years, the lack of economic convergence between the Euro area members increased 7
the interest rate effects and (in some countries) the economic and financial crisis eradicated 
the accumulated welfare-enhancing effects that the common currency has had since its 
creation.
 The EU budget amounts to approximately 1% of the EU’s GDP while the guarantees of a 8
country to the ESM are the equivalent of about a third of the amount of the annual budget.
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Finally, other key features of the post-crisis economic governance are 
differentiated integration and emergency measures (Fromage and van den 
Brink 2018: 242; White 2015). Compared to general EU affairs, these two and 
the previous five features have created or reinforced specific traits of EU 
economic governance. Some policy areas in general EU affairs have some of 
these features, too. But the combination of all of them makes EU economic 
governance different from general EU affairs.  
Economic Governance: Different, but also fragmented 
These specificities of economic governance challenge national parliaments, 
because “parties, parliaments and the process of electoral competition […] are 
wedded to the old style of majoritarian redistributionalism [at the national 
level]” (Hix and Goetz 2000: 9) and because governments use the budget to 
“exercise their redistributive and stabilisation functions in the 
economy” (Laffan 2014: 282). But any redistribution at the European level 
should still be controlled by national parliaments: 
“[It] requires the involvement of national parliaments since the 
European Parliament alone is unlikely to have sufficient democratic 
legitimacy to generate social acceptance of EU redistributive policy 
among Europeans.” (Börzel 2016: 26) 
Two broad conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these considerations 
about the nature of Europe’s post-crisis economic governance: Firstly, it is 
different from “normal” EU affairs and has a distinct way of functioning. And, 
secondly, what this dissertation calls “post-crisis economic governance” is 
quite fragmented itself: The coordination and surveillance of fiscal and 
economic policies differs from the mechanisms that were set up to offer the 
possibility of providing “stability support” to Euro area members in financial 
difficulties. 
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1.4  Research questions and outline of the 
thesis 
Analysing the role of national parliaments and their involvement in Europe’s 
post-crisis economic governance can provide insights into issues that are 
relevant in the multilevel governance system of the EU, in particular the 
democratic legitimacy of decisions taken at the EU level. Have national 
parliaments once again been able to “fight back” (Raunio and Hix 2000)? Is 
there thus continuity in a stronger role of national parliaments? Or do 
relevant procedures at the national and the European level suffer from 
shortcomings that prevent national parliaments from effectively holding the 
executive(s) accountable (Curtin 2014; Dawson 2015)? This section introduces 
the research questions, the objectives of the analysis and the structure of this 
dissertation.  
The overarching research question and three sub-questions 
Beyond prerogatives and legal provisions, it is important to know how exactly 
procedures in national parliaments are used in practice. This dissertation 
addresses the overarching research question of how national parliaments are 
involved in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance.  
Each empirical chapter adjusts the overall research question of this 
dissertation (How are national parliaments involved in post-crisis EU 
economic governance?) to a more precise sub-question. These sub-questions 
are now briefly presented one after the other.  
▪ First, the chapter on the European Semester (Chapter 3) analyses how 
national parliaments are involved in practice and asks what are the drivers 
of parliamentary involvement in the European Semester? In order to assess 
why and how national parliaments are involved in the European Semester, 
it is necessary to identify the factors that trigger parliamentary scrutiny 
and, if national parliaments scrutinise, how exactly this scrutiny is 
organised. 
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▪ Second, the analysis of national parliaments and the ESM (Chapter 4) 
turns to the third rescue package for Greece which was negotiated in 2015. 
It defines parliamentary involvement as substantial if a national 
parliament voted at least once in plenary or committee in relation to that 
rescue package, and examines under what conditions national parliaments 
get a substantial say on ESM rescue packages.  
▪ And third, studying interparliamentary cooperation in economic 
governance (Chapter 5) allows to ask how and in what direction the legal 
basis, rules and practices shape the functioning of the SECG Conference 
and to examine the parliamentary preferences and negotiations concerning 
the institutional design of this new arena of interparliamentary 
cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
Objectives of the analysis  
Researching national parliaments under the lens of “parliamentary 
involvement” follows objectives that are conceptual, descriptive–explanatory 
and comparative: First, this dissertation aims at making a contribution to 
understanding the post-Lisbon and post-crisis role of national parliaments in 
the EU on the basis of a framework that allows for an all-encompassing 
analysis of their involvement in EU economic governance (conceptual 
objective). Second, the empirical chapters want to uncover the asymmetries 
between national parliaments in their involvement and to explain different 
paths and drivers of parliamentary involvement in EU economic governance 
(descriptive and explanatory objective). And, third, this dissertation aspires to 
compare parliamentary involvement in different domains of EU economic 
governance, to analyse variation between these domains on an aggregate 
level and variation in parliamentary involvement between national 
parliaments (comparative objective). 
With respect to the conceptual objective of contributing to research on the 
role of national parliaments, Chapter 2 situates the national parliaments of 
EU member states in the chain of delegation from voters to the ultimate 
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policy makers. The chapter follows the concept of the Multilevel 
Parliamentary Field (Crum and Fossum 2009) which stipulates, based on the 
EU Treaties, that national parliaments and the European Parliament 
constitute a two-channel structure for democratic representation and 
legitimacy in the EU. The characteristics of the Multilevel Parliamentary 
Field are discussed in detail. Subsequently, driving factors of parliamentary 
involvement and ideal types of national parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs 
developed by Olivier Rozenberg and Claudia Hefftler (“Policy shaper”, 
“Government watchdog”, “Public forum”, “Expert” and “European player” ) 9
are adapted to EU economic governance and the chapter further develops 
how this dissertation sets up the three studies of national parliaments and 
EU economic governance.  
The descriptive and explanatory objective of uncovering asymmetries and 
explaining different paths of parliamentary involvement is related to the 
national level (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) and to interparliamentary 
cooperation (Chapter 5).  
Finally, the comparative objective concerns each empirical chapter and the 
dissertation as a whole: This dissertation compares asymmetries in the 
involvement of national parliaments in EU economic governance.  
Outline of this dissertation 
The question how national parliaments, situated in the Multilevel 
Parliamentary Field of the EU (see Crum and Fossum 2009), can be studied 
in the particular context of the Euro crisis and post-crisis economic 
governance is tackled in the next chapter (Chapter 2). After developing the 
theoretical and methodological framework, the three empirical chapters of 
this dissertation examine the European Semester (Chapter 3), the ESM 
(Chapter 4) and interparliamentary cooperation under Article 13 TSCG 
 See Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015 for these five models. In Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary 9
involvement in Economic Governance (section 2.3 Not just involved: Driving factors and ideal-
typical models), the models are applied to EU economic governance.
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(Chapter 5). Finally, the Conclusion (Chapter 6) offers an extensive summary, 
connects the individual chapters and discusses the theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings. 
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Chapter 2: 
2   Assessing parliamentary 
involvement in Economic 
Governance 
The second chapter develops the overall theoretical and methodological 
framework of this dissertation. It provides the basis for the assessment of 
national parliaments in three empirical chapters and for linking these 
findings to the normative debates about the EU’s democratic legitimacy in 
the area of economic governance and the prospects for representative 
democracy beyond the nation-state.  
The first section (2.1) reviews the main assumptions about the role and 
place of parliaments in the current theoretical debates about EU integration. 
Subsequently, section 2.2 discusses executive-legislative relations, the 
principal-agent theory for the relationship between national parliaments and 
national governments as well as the need for an overarching analytical 
framework to study national parliaments in EU economic governance: The 
theoretical concept of the “Multilevel Parliamentary Field” (Crum and 
Fossum 2009) offers such a framework for the assessment of parliamentary 
involvement in EU economic governance. After that, section 2.3 presents the 
different driving factors for parliamentary involvement and applies the ideal-
typical models of national parliaments’ scrutiny of EU affairs (Rozenberg and 
Hefftler 2015) to EU economic governance.  
The final section of this chapter (2.4) explains how the three comparative 
studies of national parliaments and EU economic governance in this 
dissertation are set up: Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide mostly qualitative in-
depth analyses based on numerous written sources about the individual and 
collective involvement of national parliaments into EU affairs in the decade 
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after the Lisbon Treaty as well as semi-structured interviews and 
participating observation. 
2.1  Contemporary perspectives on European 
integration 
Any assessment of parliamentary involvement in Europe’s post-crisis 
economic governance takes place in the context of the current theoretical 
debates in European studies and on-going reflections about the methods of 
European integration by policy-makers and academics. This section reviews 
these debates and reflections, turns to the economic governance powers of the 
European Parliament and national parliaments and finally calls for 
connecting the different strands of current thinking on EU-institutional 
issues, because a number of key assumptions are complementary rather than 
incompatible. 
Current theoretical debates about European integration   
The long-standing dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational 
perspectives on European integration has led to renewed theoretical debates 
in the context of the Euro crisis (see Joerges and Kreuder-Sonnen 2017 for a 
review), between the “new intergovernmentalism” (Bickerton et al. 2015; S. 
Fabbrini 2016b; Puetter 2014) and the “new supranationalism” (Bauer and 
Becker 2014; Dehousse 2015). Neither of the theoretical perspectives assigns 
a particularly important role to national parliaments, but the fact that actors 
who follow either federal-supranational or intergovernmental “polity 
ideas” (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998) have different constitutional preferences 
about the role of national parliaments and the European Parliament is useful 
for considering the findings of this dissertation: This affects their views on 
institutional reforms (see Winzen 2017) and possibly their views on actual 
parliamentary involvement, too.  
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Besides these two perspectives, there is also emerging theoretical thinking 
about a “new parliamentarism” (Schmidt 2016), which basically refers to a  
“continuous parallel process in which parliaments at different levels 
(national and European) and in different configurations are involved 
to make […] EU executive decisions visible and to hold those who take 
them to account” (Crum 2017: 835).  
The “new parliamentarism” essentially analyses the empowerment of the 
European Parliament (Héritier 2017; Hix and Høyland 2013), but there is 
also a rich body of literature on the empowerment of national parliaments.  1
The competences and the influence of both, the European Parliament and 
national parliaments, have grown in a process of “parliamentary co-evolution” 
(Winzen et al. 2015) during the process of European integration. 
The EU’s integration methods 
Two major components of EU economic governance that are both under 
investigation in this dissertation, the European Semester and the ESM, 
operate under two different methods of European integration, under a new 
“Coordinative method” and the Union method. 
On the one hand, the European Semester made EU macroeconomic 
governance more supranational when it significantly empowered the 
European Commission (Dehousse 2016), but in its day-to-day functioning it is 
without sufficient control by the European Parliament and not based on the 
Community method (although the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack were adopted 
under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure). Under a new sort of “Coordinative 
method” (Dawson 2015), parliamentary control of the European Semester is 
particularly difficult: Actors can always refer to the preceding step as 
conditioning their actions (Crum and Curtin 2015). But although the 
European Semester constrains, the real sanction mechanisms have never 
been used. In 2015, for instance, the EU institutions shied away from 
imposing financial penalties against Spain and Portugal.  2
 See Chapter 1 Introduction (section 1.2 National Parliaments in the European Union).1
 See Appendix A Scrutinising the European Semester (section A.4 on Portugal).2
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On the other hand, rescuing the Euro was predominantly an 
intergovernmental affair with key decisions taken by the European Council, 
national governments acting under the Union method  and establishing the 3
EFSF, the ESM and the TSCG on the basis of international law (Puetter 
2014). This approach marginalises the European Parliament and creates 
“executive federalism” (Crum 2013; Habermas 2012).  
Limited powers of the European Parliament in Economic Governance 
In the development of European integration, the European Parliament was 
continuously able to extend its legislative powers and some scholars claim 
that the Euro crisis has not fundamentally altered the longstanding logic and 
practice of the EU’s parliamentarisation (e.g. Rittberger 2014: 1181), but 
challenges from economic governance affecting the EU’s parliamentary 
institutions have mainly been non-legislative: The European Semester is not 
placed under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and the ESM and TSCG are 
based on international treaties outside the EU’s legal framework.  
In those areas where this dissertation examines national parliaments’ 
involvement, the role of the European Parliament is limited. The European 
Parliament did not obtain any effective powers to intervene and is only 
consulted through an “extensive web of economic dialogue[s]” (Crum 2018: 
279). Many scholars therefore argue that the EU’s democratic deficit now 
matters even more than before (e.g. Hix 2014) and that the European 
Parliament has been the “major victim” (F. Fabbrini 2016a: 189) of the 
management of the Euro crisis. The European Parliament has repeatedly 
criticised the lack of parliamentary involvement in economic governance and 
insisted that only itself can provide legitimacy.  4
 College of Europe, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of 3
the 61st academic year of the College of Europe, Bruges, 2 November 2010.
 For instance, European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012 4
with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European 
Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup “Towards 
a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, point EE./13. (P7_TA(2012)0430).
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Constrained powers of National Parliaments in Economic Governance 
National parliaments have developed effective ways to control EU affairs, but 
these are mainly targeted at activities of the national government in the 
Council (see de Wilde and Raunio 2018). When policy coordination takes 
place (as in the European Semester) or when decisions on ESM rescue 
packages are taken in the ESM Board of Governors, many normal procedures 
in national parliaments are inadequate.   5
The coordination and surveillance of fiscal and economic policies at the EU 
level has preserved the ultimate right to adopt the budget at the national 
level (Crum 2018: 270), but this right has been limited by balanced-budget 
rules (F. Fabbrini 2016a: 27-42), by guidance and recommendations from the 
EU level which are not subject to sufficient parliamentary oversight (Maatsch 
and Cooper 2017: 650) and adopted in the Council by reversed Qualified 
Majority Voting (RQMV). Thus, the “high consensus requirements of EU 
legislation” (Scharpf 2009: 182) do not apply to fiscal and economic policy 
coordination and surveillance.  
As a consequence, budgetary sovereignty, regarded as the “crown jewel of 
parliaments” (Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013: 565) or “the most 
important and symbolic prerogative of national parliaments” (Dawson and de 
Witte 2013: 827), has been affected by the EU’s new economic governance. Its 
“policies with strong distributional effects” (Fossum 2015a: 57), however, 
would require legitimation by national parliaments.  This dissertation takes 6
the initial parliamentary strength in the annual budget procedure 
(Hallerberg et al. 2012: 70; Wehner 2014) into account when it assesses 
national parliaments’ “power of the purse” in the area of EU economic 
governance.  
 See Chapter 1 Introduction (section 1.3 Why Economic Governance is different). The 2017 5
Reflection paper of the European Commission on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary 
Union also points out that “the interplay between the Eurogroup, the European Commission 
and the European Stability Mechanism […] in practice […] means complex decision-making, 
criticised for not being understandable and transparent enough” (European Commission, 
COM(2017) 291 final, 31 May 2017, p. 17). 
 See also Börzel (2016) and, in this dissertation, Chapter 1 Introduction (section 1.3 Why 6
Economic Governance is different).
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Individual or collective counterbalancing? 
Although the institutional logic of the Economic and Monetary Union is one 
of a “reinforced two-level game” (Crum 2018: 273-75) in which national 
parliaments find themselves on the losing side, this does not exclude that 
national parliaments managed to adapt and become involved into EU 
economic governance (see e.g. Auel and Höing 2014; Auel and Höing 2015). 
Some national parliaments, for example the German Bundestag, were able to 
reinforce their role in the Euro crisis. If a national parliament is involved 
before the start of negotiations on an ESM rescue package and if this 
parliament must also approve the result of the negotiations, parliamentary 
double veto power provides a country with additional leverage in 
international negotiations (Bellamy and Weale 2015; Benz 2013; Moschella 
2017; Putnam 1988). This follows the “Paradox of Weakness” (Schelling 
1960).  
Furthermore there is collective involvement of national parliaments in EU 
affairs, based on coordination among themselves and cooperation with the 
European Parliament (Crum and Fossum 2009; Lupo and Fasone 2016). The 
specific institutional preferences of national parliaments have a direct 
influence on and shape interparliamentary cooperation between them and the 
European Parliament. Even though parliaments have a common interest in 
holding the executives accountable, they have often failed to be a collective 
actor via interparliamentary cooperation (Kreilinger 2013: 17).  
In the scrutiny of EU economic governance, the Interparliamentary 
Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (that was 
established on the basis of Article 13 TSCG in 2013) could play an eminent 
role, but cooperation between national parliaments and the European 
Parliament has met significant challenges in this area. The Rules of 
Procedure of the Conference were only agreed in October 2015, two years 
after the Conference had met for the first time.  7
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 7
Governance.
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Connecting a variety of contemporary perspectives on European 
integration 
Although the different perspectives diverge in their attention paid to national 
parliaments, “[i]t is quite likely that, if the euro crisis has fed a greater 
centralisation of economic governance in the EU, this is reflected in both the 
intergovernmental and the supranational institutions” (Crum 2018: 274). 
Taking the widely shared assumption that the post-crisis economic 
governance constrains national parliaments and reduces their “power of the 
purse” as a starting point, national parliaments (and the European 
Parliament) have different options to react to this two-fold trend: 
Intergovernmental tendencies could be addressed at the domestic level 
through stronger oversight by national parliaments (Patzelt 2014: 90-93), 
with new interparliamentary bodies or via empowering the European 
Parliament as a counterweight to intergovernmental institutions at the EU 
level. Supranational tendencies could be addressed through the European 
Parliament to which the European Commission is accountable (Patzelt 2014: 
87-88) or with EP-led scrutiny in interparliamentary committee meetings 
related to EU economic governance. The assessment of parliamentary 
involvement in the post-crisis economic governance in this dissertation 
examines the extent of the problem (lack of parliamentary control of economic 
governance) and looks at national parliaments’ actual involvement and the 
driving factors behind it.  
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2.2  National parliaments as multilevel actors 
National parliaments are either “multi-arena players in the making” (Auel 
and Neuhold 2017) or, they might, as this sections argues, already be 
multilevel actors. Above all, they interact with their government and face 
opportunities and constraints in this principal-agent relationship when it 
comes to EU affairs (sub-section 2.2.1), but they are also active directly at the 
European level. This calls for an overarching analytical framework to assess 
national parliaments in EU economic governance (sub-section 2.2.2). 
2.2.1  Executive-legislative relations, principals and agents 
Among the many different conceptualisations of the role of legislatures, the 
ones advanced by Antony King (1976) and Kaare Strøm et al. (2003a) have 
been particularly influential (see Rozenberg 2018b: 330). This sub-section is 
structured as follows: First, it presents the different modes of executive-
legislative relations (King 1976) and then discusses the principal-agent 
theory (Strøm et al. 2003a). After that, this sub-section introduces the notions 
of “police patrol” and “fire alarm” oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) 
and points to the limits of the principal-agent theory in explaining the role of 
the opposition (Rozenberg 2018b: 330-33). 
First of all, different modes of executive–legislative relations, most 
importantly the intra-party mode and the opposition mode, can be 
distinguished (King 1976; Saalfeld 2000: 363). Monitoring by the 
parliamentary majority following the intra-party mode of executive–
legislative relations takes place behind closed doors and is mostly invisible, 
but potentially very effective, because the government usually depends on the 
support of (its) backbenchers. Opposition MPs can instead force the 
government to defend its policies (opposition mode of executive–legislative 
relations). Conflict is the dominating feature of this mode (see King 1976: 18) 
in which the opposition tries to hold the government accountable. Other 
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modes are the non-partisan mode (a parliamentary body like a committee 
functions by consensus) and the trans-partisan mode which can exceptionally 
emerge inside a committee (Rozenberg 2018b: 330-31). 
Principal-agent theory 
Many contributions that analyse the involvement of national parliaments in 
EU decision-making follow rational choice institutionalism and, in particular, 
the principal-agent theory. This kind of research is theory-driven and 
situates national parliaments in a two-fold role as agent of the citizens and 
principal of the government (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 18).  
Initially only an economic model of the relationship between “principal” 
and “agent” under incomplete contracts, it was introduced into studying 
parliamentary control by Bergman, Müller and Strøm in 2000: Those 
authorised to make political decisions conditionally designate others to make 
political decisions on their behalf (Strøm 2000: 266). The former are called 
“principals” and the latter are called “agents”. 
There are several distinct steps in the chain of delegation from voters to 
the ultimate policy makers (Bergman et al. 2000: 257): Voters delegate 
decisions to parliamentarians, parliamentarians empower cabinet members 
and ministers delegate the implementation of the decision to public servants. 
Parliamentarians are therefore the “agents” of the voters (the “principal”) and 
the relationship between a national parliament and the national government 
is also one of a principal to his agent. MPs are consequently in the position of 
being simultaneously agents and principals (Saalfeld 2000: 356). In 
parliamentary democracies, delegation takes the form of a long and singular 
chain. For EU member states, European integration has made delegation to 
EU institutions the final step in the chain of delegation. 
Agency theory argues that any delegation of power to an agent creates 
risks for the principal, because the agent might not act in the best interest of 
the principal. The principal usually tries to reduce these risks through ex-
ante and ex-post control mechanisms over the agent: The chain of delegation 
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is, as Wolfgang C. Müller et al. (2003) put it, “mirrored by a corresponding 
chain of accountability” (2003: 20) through which the principal has 
possibilities to monitor, sanction or reward his/her agent. Agency problems 
may also occur if two or more agents compete for the attention of the same 
principal or if a single agent is accountable to two or more principals (Strøm 
2000: 270). Information asymmetries between the principal and the agent 
increase agency problems.  
In their principal-agent relationship with governments, parliaments suffer 
from information asymmetries vis-à-vis the executive. In order to reduce such 
asymmetries, they can adapt their internal functioning  and, for instance, 8
increase specialisation into parliamentary committees (Saalfeld 2000: 357), 
but a side effect of this are additional agency problems within a legislature 
between committee members and non-members. Monitoring and reporting 
requirements for the agent may also help the principal to control the agent.  
Different types of scrutiny and limitations of the principal-agent theory 
Besides the different modes of executive-legislative relations (King 1976) and 
the principal-agent theory, two further aspects must be taken into 
consideration for assessing parliamentary involvement: Different types of 
parliamentary scrutiny and the fact that principal-agent theory has some 
limitations. 
The work by King (1976) and Strøm et al. (2003a) provides a useful basis 
for classifying parliamentary control instruments and for distinguishing 
different types of scrutiny activities. In addition to these two schemes, 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argue that a large part of the scrutiny 
activities undertaken by legislatures corresponds to what they term “police-
patrol oversight”. This type of oversight means that legislatures, as the 
principal, monitor activities of the agent with the objective to detect 
deviations of the agent from his/her mandate. The alternative to “police-
 See also Dahl 1994 and the discussion of “counterbalancing” in Chapter 1 of this dissertation 8
(section 1.1 Democracy and legitimacy beyond the nation-state). 
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patrol oversight” is “fire-alarm oversight” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) 
where actors outside the legislative arena notify MPs about agents’ violations 
of the mandate that was fixed by the (parliamentary) principal.  
Finally, the principal-agent theory has certain limitations (see Rozenberg 
2018b: 333-34). The relationship between a principal and his/her agent in 
parliamentary democracies differs from the “standard type”: The governing 
parties (usually with a majority in parliament) support the government while 
the opposition does not. Governing parties and opposition parties must 
therefore be distinguished when analysing parliamentary behaviour in the 
EU (Auel 2007; Holzhacker 2002). Moreover, for instance with respect to how 
to motivate lawmakers to cooperate and to coordinate among themselves and 
beyond their domestic arena, principal-agent theory does not sufficiently take 
into account collective action problems within parliaments (Rozenberg 2018b: 
333-34). 
Relevance for Economic Governance and the analysis in this 
dissertation 
Viewed from principal-agent theory, European integration necessarily 
“involves a decline in the capacity of national politicians to affect policy 
outcomes that matter to their citizens” (Strøm et al. 2003b: 744). The 
strengthening of supranational norms and institutions has created a 
situation in which national governments must act responsibly to 
supranational principals and consequently find it even more difficult to be 
responsive to their own citizens (see Mair 2009; Rose 2014). Nowadays the 
tension between supranational responsibility and national responsiveness 
often characterises EU affairs and particularly the post-crisis economic 
governance. When national governments retain some autonomy while at the 
same time being constrained by supranational rules, as it is the case in the 
European Semester (Crum 2018: 270), the principle–agent relationship and 
the lines of accountability from executives to legislatures become even less 
clear. 
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Monitoring by national parliaments in EU economic governance mostly 
corresponds to “police-patrol oversight” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), but 
if governments deviate from plans and pledges under the European Semester 
or if a recipient of ESM stability support does not fulfil conditionality, 
external actors might make a national parliament aware of this (“fire-alarm 
oversight”). 
In this dissertation, Chapter 3 on the European Semester situates national 
parliaments in a dilemma between responsibility and responsiveness on 
budgetary issues in which they currently fail to control their agent, the 
national government. Chapter 4 then explicitly spells out what the chain of 
delegation and the principal-agent relationship from national parliaments to 
the ESM looks like. Both chapters take the role of the opposition into account 
and examine what happened inside national parliaments, with questions like 
“who raises what kind of objections against the European Semester?” and 
“who or what factors trigger parliamentary involvement?”. The case of 
interparliamentary cooperation in Chapter 5 is also interesting from a 
principal-agent perspective: It could remedy information deficits of national 
parliaments and MPs who participate at an interparliamentary conference 
are actually agents of the entire parliament or the relevant committee(s) 
which act(s) as the principal of these MPs. 
2.2.2  An overarching analytical framework 
The EU relies on two sources of democratic representation and legitimacy, 
enshrined via a two-channel structure in Article 10 TEU: Citizens are 
represented in their national parliament which controls the government in 
the Council of the EU and the European Council, and they are directly 
represented in the European Parliament (Crum and Fossum 2009: 249-50). 
This structure can be considered “an integral characteristic of the EU 
polity” (Crum 2016: 6). 
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In the 1990s and early 2000s, Karlheinz Neunreither (1994, 2005) 
examined interaction between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments, Andreas Maurer (2002) invented the term “Mehrebenen-
parlamentarismus” (European multilevel parliamentarism) and Arthur Benz 
(2003) conceptualised the EU as a “compound polity”. These different efforts 
in theorising the EU’s representative democracy argue that parliamentary 
functions and relations in the EU go beyond those of a simple network of 
legislators (see Slaughter 2004: 104-30). 
In 2009, Ben Crum and John E. Fossum concluded that an overarching 
analytical framework was needed to relate empirical research on democratic 
representation in the EU to normative debates about the EU’s democratic 
deficit and the prospects for representative democracy beyond the nation-
state in general (Crum and Fossum 2009: 254). They proposed to capture all 
representative bodies and relations in the EU under the concept of 
“Multilevel Parliamentary Field” (Crum and Fossum 2009, 2013a; see also 
Patzelt 2014).  The Multilevel Parliamentary Field has not been the first, but 
the most elaborate effort of theorising representative democracy in the EU to 
date (see Table 2.1). For studying parliaments in economic governance, it is 
important to depict both channels of representation on the basis of an 
overarching analytical framework. Even though this dissertation primarily 
analyses national parliaments, the Multilevel Parliamentary Field provides 
an important point of reference for such an analysis. 
Table 2.1  Approaches to theorising representative democracy in the EU 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Neunreither (1994, 2005) Cooperation and conflict
Maurer (2002) Mehrebenenparlamentarismus
Benz (2003) Compound polity
Slaughter (2004) Networks of Legislators
Crum and Fossum (2009, 2013) Multilevel Parliamentary Field
Lupo and Fasone (2016) Euro-national parliamentary system
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Studying the EU’s Multilevel Parliamentary Field 
The conceptual innovation of the Multilevel Parliamentary Field has been to 
introduce the sociological notion of the organisational field into the study of 
parliaments and representative democracy in the EU: DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) defined a “field” as composed of organisations that, “in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organi[s]ations that 
produce similar services or products” (1983: 148). One might even want to see 
parliaments as “suppliers” of legitimacy, but Crum and Fossum (2009) argue 
that the “recognised area of institutional life” must be seen broadly and that 
what keeps the Multilevel Parliamentary Field together is “a shared function 
and the role perception […] of representing people’s interest in EU decision-
making” (Crum and Fossum 2009: 260). This is closely related to Bourdieu 
(1984, 1989), according to whom a field designates the state of the relations 
between actors and institutions that share certain fundamental orientations 
(Bourdieu 1984: 114-15). At the same time, “the field takes on certain 
properties and dynamics that are of structural character” (Crum and Fossum 
2009: 260) which are “capable of guiding and constraining” (Bourdieu 1989: 
14) the practices of actors and institutions in the field. 
Building upon the Multilevel Parliamentary Field, the most recent 
attempt of theorising representative democracy in the EU has been the 
“Euro-national parliamentary system” by Nicola Lupo and Cristina Fasone 
(2016a). This “system” is composed of both European and national procedures 
and considers the individual parliamentary functions of representation, 
policy-making and oversight as “increasingly networked and shared” (Fasone 
and Lupo 2016a: 10) among the different parliaments in the EU. The notion 
of a parliamentary system refers to a “set of elements standing in 
interrelation to one another and with the environment” (Fasone and Lupo 
2016a: 11).  
Compared to the Euro-national parliamentary system (Lupo and Fasone 
2016), the Multilevel Parliamentary Field is less likely to imply that 
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“parliaments at either level should have a prescribed place” (Lord 2013: 235). 
The questions of whether interparliamentary relations are more akin to a 
field or a system (Crum 2017; Lupo 2018; see also Patzelt 2014) and to what 
extent the EU might have evolved from a Multilevel Parliamentary Field 
based on learning to a “democratically problematic” joint-decision structure, 
“especially in connection with the European Semester” (Fossum 2016: 9-10, 
13), where parliaments are less involved than under the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions for normal EU affairs, have received renewed attention in recent 
years and are discussed in this dissertation.  
Applicability to the post-crisis Economic Governance 
In EU economic governance, parliamentary procedures may suffer from 
shortcomings that prevent national parliaments from effectively holding the 
executive(s) accountable (see Curtin 2014; Dawson 2015). Such accountability 
deficits lead to asymmetries between national parliaments in the post-crisis 
economic governance. In addition to the existing severe imbalances between 
the governments of Euro area members, these asymmetries  between national 
parliaments threaten the “ability to foster a viable Multilevel Parliamentary 
Field” (Fossum 2015b: 808).  
In the European Semester, executive powers are dispersed between the 
European Commission and the national governments which cannot be 
collectively held accountable: Succinctly put, “no one is accountable” (Crum 
2018: 276). In the ESM, only some national parliaments have the powers to 
block or delay a decision of the Board of Governors, because they vote on a 
binding mandate for the government representative in the ESM Board of 
Governors; others merely have a right to be informed (Rittberger and Winzen 
2015: 435-37). The risk of growing asymmetries, between those national 
parliaments that have successfully adapted to EU economic governance and 
those that have not, is arguably bigger than ever. Interparliamentary 
cooperation, as provided in Article 13 TSCG, therefore faces difficulties to act 
as a “democratic coping mechanism” (Fossum 2015b) in this challenge. 
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2.3  Not just involved: Driving factors and 
ideal-typical models 
Beyond formal influence in terms of veto power, the oversight and monitoring 
of the executive branch in terms of scrutiny are among the key tasks of any 
legislature (see Kreppel 2014b). Various procedures for the scrutiny of EU 
affairs and for involvement in economic governance have emerged in national 
parliaments. The comparative analysis of parliamentary involvement in the 
post-crisis economic governance must therefore put an emphasis on the 
factors that drive the activities of national parliaments and on developing or 
adapting ideal-typical models which can be used as benchmarks for 
parliamentary involvement in different economic governance domains. 
This section argues that national parliaments are “not just involved” in the 
post-crisis economic governance, but that a complex interplay between 
prerogatives and activities that has only recently started to attract broader 
attention in research on national parliaments (Auel et al. 2015a) requires an 
analysis of the driving factors behind actual parliamentary involvement (see 
sub-section 2.3.1). With respect to ideal-typical scrutiny models (see sub-
section 2.3.2), it is clear that national parliaments can play more than one 
role within and beyond the institutional setting of their own political system. 
As Olivier Rozenberg and Claudia Hefftler (2015: 28) have stressed, ideal 
types of parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs are not mutually exclusive and 
are based on the functions that legislatures generally fulfil. This reasoning 
also applies to EU economic governance. Finally, this section considers cross-
cutting issues of parliamentary involvement (see sub-section 2.2.3). 
2.3.1  Driving factors for actual parliamentary involvement 
Adaptation of parliaments often implies “rule change” (Müller and Sieberer 
2014: 326), but despite a possible lack of (new) formal prerogatives, national 
parliaments may still be able to undertake scrutiny activities (see e.g. 
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Wessels et al. 2012 for the case of the European Council). When they can rely 
on existing powers, national parliaments do not need new prerogatives (see 
Kreilinger 2016: 30): With respect to the European Semester, the Finnish 
Eduskunta reported that its existing rules for the parliamentary scrutiny of 
the annual budget process fitted “nicely” and did not need to be adapted.    9
Thus it is indeed possible that some national parliaments did not see the 
need to adopt new rules –– either because their rules were suitable or 
because they could establish new practices without codifying them. If national 
parliaments obtained new prerogatives, this does not necessarily mean that 
they have been able to use these powers in an effective way: Sometimes 
national parliaments, even though they have the prerogatives, do not 
scrutinise (Auel et al. 2015b). The assumption that national parliaments are 
willing and able to use their rights and that formal capabilities are equal to 
actual parliamentary behaviour, has severe limitations (Auel 2007: 490). At 
the same time, national parliaments might (occasionally) also be more active 
than one would expect on the basis of their prerogatives. As a consequence, 
this dissertation does not limit itself to analysing prerogatives, but examines 
parliamentary activities.  
This perspective seeks to advance the literature on national parliaments in 
EU economic governance by moving to the analysis of their actual 
involvement (see also Auel et al. 2015a). Earlier research on national 
parliaments in EU economic governance, in particular Auel and Höing (2015), 
Hallerberg et al. (2012, 2018), Rittberger and Winzen (2015) or Winzen (2017: 
151-75), explained the role of national parliament with the two broad action 
logics of institutional path dependency and economic strength. Previously 
strong powers of a national parliament in EU affairs or in the budget 
procedure fall under institutional path dependency (see also Dimitrakopoulos 
2001), the first action logic, while economic strength is a completely different, 
second action logic.  
 COSAC, Annex to the Twenty-first Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. 9
Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny (Brussels: COSAC Secretariat, 
19 June 2014), p. 240.
 National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !47
Chapter 2: Assessing parliamentary involvement
However, these two action logics (institutional path dependency and 
economic strength) cannot account for the whole picture: Cases of unexpected 
parliamentary involvement as well as cases where one would have expected a 
national parliament to be involved both remain puzzling. This dissertation 
argues that it is therefore necessary to introduce a new set of driving factors 
that follow another action logic: domestic political dynamics. This third action 
logic looks at what happens within national parliaments, also in their 
relationship to the government: Different actors (opposition parties, 
governing parties, junior coalition partners and the government itself) all 
have different interests and motivations to trigger (or not to trigger) 
parliamentary involvement under the institutional constraints that they face.  
In this dissertation, each of the two empirical chapters that explains 
individual parliamentary involvement in the post-crisis economic governance 
(Chapter 3 on the European Semester and Chapter 4 on the ESM) relies on 
this overall framework with regard to the driving factors and puts forward its 
own distinct set of possible drivers for substantial parliamentary involvement 
in the respective domain of the post-crisis economic governance. 
2.3.2  Models of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs 
Although the national parliaments of EU member states are situated in 
similar actor constellations (see Scharpf 1997: 36-50), they organise their 
interaction with executive actors (i.e., parliamentary scrutiny activities) 
differently, according to their orientations and capabilities. The precise 
conduct of parliamentary involvement is the result of choices taken by 
parliamentary actors under the constraints that they face. The following six 
ideal-typical models are taken from Wessels et al. (2012) and Rozenberg and 
Hefftler (2015).  
In this sub-section, one ideal-typical model after the other is described and 
applied to EU economic governance: “Traditional scrutiniser” (Wessels et al. 
2012), “Policy shaper”, “Government watchdog”, “Public forum”, “Expert” and 
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“European player” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015; see also Wessels et al. 
2012).  10
“Traditional scrutiniser” 
National parliaments that are “traditional scrutinisers” (Wessels et al. 2012: 
42) either have reduced rights in EU affairs in general or only follow the 
standard scrutiny method for draft EU legislation, ex-ante control by a 
specialised parliamentary committee (Wessels et al. 2012: 42), and are 
“gatekeepers” (Raunio 2011; Sprungk 2013: 551). With their activities, these 
parliaments target “the ordinary legislative procedure, scrutinising 
Commission proposals and government behaviour in the Council” (de Wilde 
and Raunio 2018: 320). 
The “traditional scrutiniser” parliament is ill-suited for the post-crisis 
economic governance which is either mainly non-legislative, regulatory in 
nature and based on a new Coordinative method (European Semester) or non-
legislative and intergovernmental (ESM).  Such national parliaments are 11
lagging behind as they have not adapted to the new realities, but might want 
to compensate for this lack of adaptation by creating strong 
interparliamentary cooperation in EU economic governance. 
“Policy shaper” 
National parliaments that are “policy shapers” want to influence policies 
through ex-ante activities before binding agreements are reached at the EU 
level and have strong formal powers, like the possibility to mandate the 
position of their government for negotiations in the Council (Rozenberg and 
Hefftler 2015: 31). Such a mandate can either be constitutional binding or be 
considered politically binding (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 31; Winzen 
2012). Policy shaping mainly takes place in the European affairs committee, 
 As explained by Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015), the roles of national parliaments in the EU 10
are rooted in (national) parliamentary practices and based on divergent visions of what 
function(s) a legislature should perform.
 See section 2.1 Contemporary perspectives on European integration.11
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with an advisory role for sectoral committees, and often behind closed doors. 
Beyond shaping policy, a legislature acts in its function as legislator when it 
has the powers to delay, veto or amend legislation or when it has the 
authority to present an opinion on legislation, a general plan of action or a 
broad policy programme (see Kreppel 2014b: 117-19). 
Policy shaping is easier under normal EU affairs than under the new 
economic governance, because many bodies, such as the European Council, 
the Eurogroup or the ESM, operate less transparently than the EU’s 
legislative process (see Curtin 2014). But EU economic governance also offers 
possibilities to actually shape policy outcomes and therefore clear incentives 
for national parliaments to become active in these areas (see de Wilde and 
Raunio 2018: 318-19).  
“Government watchdog” 
When national parliaments lack the powers to issue mandates, to amend, 
delay or veto bills, documents or reports, they cannot shape policy 
beforehand, but as a “government watchdog” they still exercise control by 
holding the government accountable (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 32). This 
happens ex-post and can also be an effective way of parliamentary scrutiny: 
The existence of an accountability mechanism is expected to have an effect on 
the executive actors who will have to defend in parliament the position taken 
at the EU level (Crum and Curtin 2015: 72). “Government watchdog” 
parliaments do not have mandating powers, their main objective with this 
type of scrutiny is politics rather than policy, thus allowing to criticise the 
government and to increase visibility and publicity (de Wilde 2011: 676; 
Wessels et al. 2012: 42). In EU affairs, there are fewer possibilities for 
actually sanctioning the government ex-post than in domestic affairs, because 
once a final decision has been taken at the European level, such a decision is 
more difficult to reverse (Auel 2007: 502). 
For a “watchdog” parliament, ex-post accountability in economic 
governance for instance means that decisions on an ESM rescue package are 
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only debated in parliament after the decision was taken. With respect to the 
European Semester, such a national parliament can be expected to scrutinise 
the Country-specific recommendations after their adoption.  Cooperation 12
with others helps “watchdog” parliaments to obtain information, reduce 
information gaps and hold their government accountable.  
“Public forum” 
Scrutiny in plenary debates means that the national parliament becomes a 
“public forum” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 29) for the specific topic that is 
debated. National parliaments’ plenary debates allow to communicate policies 
to the public, but access to scarce plenary time (Cox 2006: 144) is generally 
difficult. Scholars of legislative studies “refine and challenge the conventional 
view that debate is a verbal contest between government and opposition 
without any real policy impact” (S. Martin et al. 2014: 13). Plenary debates 
allow for MPs to represent the views of the citizens and often also to (try to) 
hold the government accountable.  
Debating economic governance in public offers the possibility to contest 
and influence government policy. In addition to that, MPs who are initially 
not EU specialists become involved, if the entire assembly is called to debate 
(see Gattermann et al. 2016). If EU issues are the subject of plenary debates, 
this indicates a high salience. Although often considered technical, EU 
economic governance issues, such as the European Semester and the ESM 
have become subject of plenary debates (see Chapters 3 and 4). When 
decisions are taken under time pressure (White 2015), however, “there is […] 
no time for deliberation and extensive public debate” (Joerges 2015: 90). 
“Expert” 
A national parliament that follows the “expert” model, produces proper 
expertise on EU affairs (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 33) which enables it to 
 See Appendix A (Scrutinising the European Semester in four national parliaments) for more 12
information about scrutiny activities related to Country-specific recommendations.
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assess developments independently and to become active early in the 
different processes. This happens in committees, with the European affairs 
committee in the lead, but sectoral committees are involved, too. Conflicting 
positions within parliament are not visible and such activities –– almost an 
end in itself –– generally attract less attention than plenary debates or 
hearings with ministers (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 33).  
The working practices of the “expert” can be used for the new tasks and 
challenges of economic governance. Here, too, it is possible to produce proper 
expertise, if national parliaments have built up sufficient capacities. The 
complexity and unclear responsibilities in EU economic governance (Crum 
and Curtin 2015: 83) as well as economic emergencies (White 2015) might not 
always allow for the “expert” to fully play its role. The “expert” parliament is 
probably only clearly in favour of interparliamentary cooperation in EU 
economic governance, if it offers an added value to its own expertise. 
“European player” 
Finally, national parliaments that are a “European player” have a better 
understanding of the negotiation situation at the European level through a 
network “beyond the own domestic parliamentary arena” (Rozenberg and 
Hefftler 2015: 34). These parliaments perform a “networking role” (Sprungk 
2013: 551) with supranational institutions and with other parliaments, partly 
in order to obtain relevant information (that their own government might 
withhold from them) or in order to learn from other parliaments’ scrutiny 
practices. In that sense, John E. Fossum described the Multilevel 
Parliamentary Field after the Lisbon Treaty but prior to the economic and 
financial crisis as “based on learning” (Fossum 2016: 9-10). The ideal-type of 
the “European player” refers to national parliaments that actively use all the 
formal or informal opportunities to engage with EU institutions as well as 
interparliamentary cooperation (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 34-35). 
The “European player” is usually very cooperative and active in the 
interparliamentary relations of economic governance. Such parliaments can 
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take the lead in convening ad-hoc meetings of likeminded parliaments 
(Kreilinger 2015b: 281-86) and stimulate greater diversification in 
interparliamentary cooperation. In EU economic governance, some of them 
might strive for interparliamentary cooperation at which EU decision-makers 
are questioned, criticised and held to account.  13
Shifts between scrutiny models 
Given that national parliaments have usually adopted elements of several 
ideal-typical scrutiny models in general EU affairs, the same reasoning 
applies to economic governance. National parliaments probably follow 
different scrutiny models in EU economic governance and shifts over time are 
possible or even quite likely.  
Olivier Rozenberg and Claudia Hefftler (2015: 29) point out that national 
parliaments’ powers in their policy-making and policy-influencing function 
range from consultation to delay, veto and amending powers. In their control 
and oversight function, the instruments  of national parliaments in their 
scrutiny processes include questioning ministers, inquiries and hearings. 
Furthermore, great variations between the EU’s national parliaments 
continue to exist with respect to when and how they are informed by their 
governments (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 29). But this can change. The 
ultimate test about whether an accountability regime is effective depends on 
“its ability to correct or improve executive action by (re-)aligning the actions 
of the executive actor with those of the forum and constituency it 
represents” (Crum and Curtin 2015: 71-72).  
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 13
Governance.
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Table 2.2  Ideal-typical scrutiny models for EU affairs applied to EU 
economic governance 
Source: Own elaboration. Wessels et al. (2012) for the traditional scrutiniser model; 
Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015) for the remaining models. 
The individual empirical chapters of this dissertation examine which ideal-
typical models national parliaments follow in different areas of economic 
governance.  
2.3.3  Cross-cutting issues of parliamentary involvement in 
economic governance 
Ideal type Explanation EU economic governance challenges
a)
Traditional 
scrutiniser
Focus on EU 
legislation
• Ill-adapted to soft coordination and 
intergovernmental mechanisms 
• Compensation via interparliamentary 
cooperation
b)
Policy 
shaper
Influencing 
positions of  the 
government 
• Possibilities to shape EU economic governance 
via ex-ante activities 
• Inward-looking in interparliamentary 
cooperation
c)
Government 
watchdog
Holding the 
government 
accountable
• Executive accountability difficult in EU 
economic governance 
• Politics instead of  policy in parliament 
• Cooperative to reduce information gaps
d)
Public 
forum
Communicating 
with the public
• Possibility to publicly raise objections against EU 
economic governance 
• Involvement of  all MPs, incl. non-specialists 
• Cooperative to reduce information gaps
e) Expert
Producing 
proper expertise 
on EU affairs
• Independent assessments and early activities 
• Possibly not enough time in emergencies 
• Conditional interest in interparliamentary 
cooperation 
f)
European 
player
Acting directly 
at EU level
• Good understanding of  negotiation situation 
• Network beyond domestic arena 
• Engagement with EU institutions 
• Actively cooperating in interparliamentary 
relations, different preferences
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Besides driving factors and ideal-typical models for parliamentary 
involvement in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance, a number of cross-
cutting issues can help to understand national parliaments as “not just 
involved”. They contribute to the “throughput legitimacy” (Schmidt 2013) of 
economic governance. The cross-cutting issues that this sub-section examines 
concern the efficacy, transparency, inclusiveness and openness of national 
parliaments’ involvement in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance as well 
as broader accountability questions (see also Schmidt 2013).  
These cross-cutting issues primarily relate to the timing and setting of 
parliamentary involvement: The concrete organisation of the involvement of 
national parliaments in the European Semester or with respect to ESM 
rescue packages affects the “throughput legitimacy” of Europe’s post-crisis 
economic governance (see Barrett 2018; Fromage and van den Brink 2018). 
Efficacy of parliamentary involvement 
In general, parliamentary scrutiny depends on good and timely information 
about the dossiers in question (Krehbiel 1992) and the timing of 
parliamentary involvement makes a key difference for actual parliamentary 
influence in terms of its efficacy (the ability to produce the desired or 
intended result). Early parliamentary involvement takes place “in policy-
formulating phases before intergovernmental negotiations start” (de Wilde 
2011: 676). By this, a national parliament tries to influence the government 
before EU-level decisions are taken rather than to contest them afterwards 
(Wessels et al. 2012: 42). In relation to this, Katrin Auel points out that 
“[e]x ante, […] that is before and during the negotiations in the 
Council, national parliaments do have some power to sanction the 
government for both incomplete or late information (monitoring), as 
well as for a failure to take parliamentary opinions into account. And 
this is where strong formal parliamentary rights of influence, such as 
the right to issue public resolutions or to mandate the government’s 
negotiation position, really become important.” (Auel 2007: 502-03) 
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There is an overall trend towards earlier parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs.  
Parliamentary involvement can lack consistency and its timing often 
varies. In that respect, the role of the government is important, because it 
often controls the parliamentary agenda setting powers together with the 
parliamentary majority (see Döring 1995). For instance, in one year the 
European Semester may be closely scrutinised ex-ante while in another year 
it is not. Rescue packages of the ESM are usually considered under great 
time pressure. The efficacy of parliamentary scrutiny in EU economic 
governance largely depends on sufficient information, ex-ante scrutiny and 
early involvement. 
Inclusiveness and openness of parliamentary involvement 
Furthermore, the ability of legislatures “to serve as effective tools of 
communication as well as the relative importance of this role can vary 
significantly” (Kreppel 2014a: 85). Parliamentary involvement can take place 
in plenary and/or in committees. Debates or votes in plenary mean that all 
MPs are involved, but access to the common pool of plenary time for non-
legislative matters is regulated tightly (see Cox 2006: 144). The role that a 
national parliament plays in case of recurring plenary debates resembles the 
public forum, while regular and extensive committee activities follow more 
the expert model (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 30-35).  
Plenary sessions that deal with Europe’s post-crisis economic governance 
indicate that not only major constitutional moments of European integration, 
such as the ratification of EU Treaties are debated in plenary (see Thomas 
2016; Wendler 2016), but that EU economic governance is no longer a purely 
technocratic and committee-based affair. Parliamentarians “beyond the 
specialists for European affairs” (Gattermann et al. 2016) become involved 
when sectoral committees, such as the Budget and Finance committee (see 
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Fasone 2018b) or the Economic affairs committee , start to scrutinise the 14
European Semester or the ESM. In both cases, parliamentary involvement 
becomes more open and inclusive than if only members of European affairs 
committees were involved. 
Transparency of parliamentary involvement 
The transparency of parliamentary involvement extends the previous cross-
cutting issue of inclusiveness and openness. Transparency is, however, 
subject to a trade-off with the information that a legislature receives. 
Confidential information often means that meetings of parliamentary 
committees must take place behind closed doors (Curtin 2014: 24). But 
scrutiny outside the public eye does not allow for a direct confrontation 
between different opinions and opposing views in the parliamentary arena. 
Such committees are also more likely to become consensus-building arenas 
(see Shaw 1979). While the information discussed behind closed doors might 
be more relevant, this kind of committee work is not transparent for the 
public. 
Parliamentary committees play a truly important role in the budget 
process (Mattson and Strøm 1995; Yläoutinen and Hallerberg 2009). Among 
the EU’s national parliaments closed-door sessions of Budget or Finance 
committees are especially prominent in those parliaments that have a strong 
role in the annual budget process (Hallerberg et al. 2012: 72) and around 50% 
of European affairs committees meet behind closed doors, too (Auel and 
Raunio 2014: 4). Whether parliamentary involvement contributes to a better 
visibility of EU economic governance, therefore depends on the specific 
arrangements about the transparency of committee meetings.  
 In the German Bundestag, the Economic affairs committee leads the parliamentary scrutiny 14
of the National Reform Programme. See Appendix A (section A.1 German Bundestag: 
Parliamentary inertia).
 National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !57
Chapter 2: Assessing parliamentary involvement
More than “just involved” in Economic Governance 
In short, this sub-section with its analysis of “throughput legitimacy”-related 
cross-cutting issues and the previous two sub-sections on driving factors and 
ideal-typical models for parliamentary involvement provide a framework for 
analysing national parliaments in economic governance. The involvement of 
national parliaments is driven by an individual set of factors under one (or 
more than one) of the three action logics (see sub-section 2.3.1). This 
involvement follows one or several of the ideal-typical scrutiny models (see 
sub-section 2.3.2) under which national parliaments perform specific 
functions in EU economic governance. And, finally, cross-cutting issues must 
be taken into account (this sub-section). 
Shifts between scrutiny models are possible and even likely (see also 
Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 28). They indicate broader trends regarding 
national parliaments’ involvement in EU economic governance, for instance a 
greater emphasis on the communication function vis-à-vis the public, on 
specialisation within parliamentary assemblies or on direct engagement with 
the European Commission. These trends relate to the framework in the 
following ways: First, highly salient issues of EU economic governance, such 
as a rescue package for Greece, prompt national parliaments to become a 
“public forum”, if the time pressure allows. This kind of parliamentary 
involvement is open, inclusive and transparent. Second, the emergence of 
fiscal and economic issues leads to stronger involvement of Budget and 
Finance committees. It also makes acquiring expertise essential for national 
parliaments (ideal type of the “expert”). Such parliamentary involvement is 
efficacious, but it is usually not transparent. And third, a greater emphasis by 
national parliaments on their role as “European players” helps them to 
remedy information deficits vis-à-vis their government in EU economic 
governance and is therefore efficacious in itself. 
The three empirical chapters and the concluding chapter of this 
dissertation assess the specific kinds of parliamentary involvement that take 
place in the post-crisis economic governance. The overall framework with 
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driving factors, ideal types and cross-cutting issues (and general trends that 
indicate what “more than ‘just involved’” could mean) of this section serves as 
the backbone for the following analysis.  
  
2.4  Three comparative studies of national 
parliaments in the post-crisis economic 
governance 
The final section of this chapter explains how the following empirical 
chapters of this dissertation (Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) are set up 
methodologically  and proceeds in three steps: First, this section justifies the 15
selected cases (European Semester, ESM and SECG Conference) which cover 
the most important recent developments in economic governance (see also 
Rittberger and Winzen 2015). In a second step, it describes the 
methodological approach that the empirical chapters follow: qualitative in-
depth examinations of parliamentary procedures/activities and of the 
economic governance issue in question. This is, as the section reports in a 
third step, complemented by semi-structured interviews and participating 
observation.  
Key elements of Europe’s post-crisis economic governance 
The elements under investigation have been selected in order to cover and 
represent the new tasks and new challenges for national parliaments in the 
post-crisis economic governance. National parliaments’ “power of the 
purse” (Wehner 2006) is affected when a country ties its hands by making 
commitments in the area of fiscal and economic policies (as it does in the 
European Semester) and when taxpayers’ money is used to guarantee loans 
to another country (via the ESM). In both instances, national parliaments can 
 Each of the (self-standing) empirical chapters also contains a short methodological explainer.15
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be involved individually and (try to) hold their government accountable for its 
actions at the European level. In addition, a provision for collective 
parliamentary involvement (to set up an interparliamentary conference) was 
enshrined in Article 13 TSCG. The same threefold perspective on EU 
economic governance as in this dissertation has, for instance, been adopted by 
Berthold Rittberger and Thomas Winzen in an article in Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift (Rittberger and Winzen 2015).  
More specifically, this dissertation selects specific events and/or time spans 
linked to each of the three elements of EU economic governance. These are 
the scrutiny activities related to the Stability or Convergence Programmes 
and National Reform Programmes in four national parliaments  over five 16
years from 2012 to 2017 (Chapter 3 on the European Semester), the third 
rescue package for Greece of July and August 2015 (Chapter 4 on the ESM) 
and the negotiations about the institutional design and the Rules of 
Procedure of the SECG Conference from 2013 to 2015 (Chapter 5).  
National parliaments’ adaptation to the European Semester has been a 
slow process and therefore calls for a medium-term analysis of five European 
Semester cycles. The third rescue package for Greece represents a crucial 
case as it was the most salient and by far the most difficult to negotiate 
(Höing 2015b: 42-46; Moschella 2017). The analysis of the discussions about 
institutional design and the Rules of Procedure of the SECG Conference, 
finally, examines more than two years of interparliamentary negotiations. 
With these three cases, this dissertation provides an up-to-date picture of 
national parliaments’ involvement in the post-crisis economic governance.  
Qualitative in-depth analysis 
The in-depth studies of this dissertation are informed by different sources. 
Written sources from the parliamentary sphere are, for instance, 
complemented by academic literature and press coverage. In case of collective 
 These are the French Assemblée nationale, the German Bundestag, the Irish Dáil and the 16
Portuguese Assembleia.
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parliamentary involvement, the documentation is usually available on IPEX, 
the platform that parliaments use for interparliamentary information 
exchange. Plenary speeches that are made in parliamentary debates on 
economic governance are a key source to analyse individual parliamentary 
involvement. All these sources are used for tracking parliamentary 
procedures and actual involvement in the post-crisis economic governance.  
Each empirical chapter is a “single-outcome study” (Gerring 2006) whose 
ambition is “to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular 
outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all the 
important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being 
present” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 18; see also Mackie 1965). In comparison 
to the work of historians, and similar to “explaining-outcome process 
tracing” (Beach 2017), each of the empirical chapters has an ambition that 
reaches beyond that single case. 
For the analysis of parliamentary procedures, “[f]ormal rules governing 
the conduct of parliamentary work are typically contained in the constitution 
and in standing orders or rules of procedure of parliaments” (Müller and 
Sieberer 2014: 311). Such legal provisions for parliamentary involvement as 
well as evidence of activities inside the parliamentary arena (agendas or 
minutes of committee meetings, resolutions and reports adopted, voting 
records on motions that were tabled protocols, minutes, oral or written 
questions tabled in parliaments and press releases) are key sources and 
examined in detail. Appendix A and Appendix B complement the analysis of 
Chapters 3 and 4 in that respect. 
The analysis of the European Semester in Chapter 3 also asks what kind 
of objections are raised by MPs against the European Semester: Procedural or 
policy objections? And to whom are these objections directed, to the national 
government or the European Commission? Beyond the previously mentioned 
sources, plenary protocols were therefore retrieved from the websites of the 
French Assemblée nationale and the German Bundestag. The speeches made 
by MPs were screened and the objections raised were coded in their original 
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language (German or French) as either procedural or policy-related objections 
together with the addressee (national government or European Commission). 
Quotes from these speeches were translated into English and the speaker’s 
affiliation was also included (political group and governing/opposition party). 
Plenary debates are an important addition to the distinctive empirical 
evidence gathered from other sources and are included in Chapter 4 on the 
ESM, too.  17
In addition to that, the analysis of driving factors behind parliamentary 
involvement in case of the third rescue package for Greece (Chapter 4 on the 
ESM) is not solely qualitative, but relies on a quantitative analysis of 
different indices for parliamentary strength and activities in EU affairs and 
budget process (Auel et al. 2015a; Hallerberg et al. 2012; Wehner 2006; 
Winzen 2012). A series of t-tests are conducted to examine whether the 
differences in means (between those national parliaments that were 
substantially involved and those that were not substantially involved) are 
statistically significant or not. 
The preferences of national parliaments towards the institutional design of 
interparliamentary cooperation are at the core of the analysis of collective 
parliamentary involvement in Chapter 5. Besides agenda-setting and the 
participation in ad-hoc meetings or interparliamentary conferences, written 
documents allow to extract national parliaments’ preferences with respect to 
the institutional design of these bodies as they were expressed in relevant 
sections of reports and resolutions adopted by national parliaments 
individually or in letters and working papers drafted collectively in the 
context of interparliamentary ad-hoc meetings in sub-groups of national 
parliaments. Such documents are vital sources , as they allow to examine 18
which parliamentary actors took the initiative, their activities and 
preferences. This allows to track the parliamentary preferences and 
 See the country studies on France and Germany in Appendix A (Appendix to Chapter 3) and 17
in Appendix B (Appendix to Chapter 4).
 They are available on the IPEX website and on the websites of national parliaments and the 18
European Parliament.
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negotiation strategies in order to explain cooperativeness and institutional 
design in the interparliamentary relations of the post-crisis economic 
governance. 
Semi-structured interviews and participating observation 
In addition to that, a small number of semi-structured interviews with MPs 
and administrators provides important additions to other empirical evidence. 
Interviews help to get a “fine-textured understanding of beliefs, attitudes, 
values and motivation in relation to the behaviours of people in particular 
social contexts” (Gaskell 2000: 39) and are “one of the most valuable sources 
of data for the study of legislative behaviour” (S. Martin et al. 2014: 14). 
Interviews allow to find out what the actors involved in certain processes 
have done and are planning to do (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673). They 
are a particular suitable method to understand and to be able to explain the 
behaviour of parliamentarians and administrators –– in order to “give 
meaning to what legislators do” (S. Martin et al. 2014: 14), because written 
documents often do not directly reveal the ideas and strategies behind 
parliamentary activities.  
The legal and institutional analysis based on written evidence has 
therefore been complemented by three rounds of interviews with a total of 
eleven semi-structured interviews in Berlin and Paris between July 2016 and 
March 2017.  These interviews with MPs, parliamentary officials and 19
advisors in the French Assemblée nationale and the German Bundestag were 
guided by a common questionnaire on EU economic governance issues.  In 20
order to increase the likelihood of obtaining confidential information, 
 The full list of interviewees is included in Appendix C (for the purpose of the submission of 19
this dissertation only). Interviewees include a committee chairperson and the Vice-chair of a 
committee, the heads of delegations to the SECG Conference, leading MPs at the intersection 
between EU affairs and budgetary issues from the main political groups, an advisor to a 
political group, as well as administrators in the Secretariats of European affairs and budget 
committees and officials working on EU issues in the parliamentary administration. 
 See Appendix C (List of interviews) and Appendix D (Interview guide). Interviews lasted 20
between 30 and 75 minutes. In the case of permission, the interviews were audio-recorded. 
Otherwise written notes were taken and completed immediately afterwards.
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interview partners were granted anonymity.  Interviews were conducted in 21
German or French; the quotes from the interviews that are included in this 
study were translated into English. 
In addition to that, “participating observation” (Schöne 2005) at four 
meetings of the SECG Conference (Luxembourg 2015, Brussel 2016, 
Bratislava 2016 and Brussels 2017), including the final round of negotiations 
among the heads of delegations in Luxembourg on 11 November 2015, 
provides relevant insights for the analysis of the functioning of the 
Conference.   22
In short, the variety of sources on which this dissertation is based –– 
written documents of different origins, a small series of semi-structured 
interviews with key parliamentary actors in EU economic governance and 
participating observation –– allows to triangulate the evidence and findings 
about parliamentary involvement in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance 
in the qualitative content analyses of the following empirical chapters. 
 Except French MPs, following the approach by Rozenberg (2018a). But these quotes are 21
anonymised in this dissertation in order to treat them in the same way as German MPs.
 The possibility to establish personal contacts with MPs and administrators through 22
participating observation at interparliamentary conferences greatly facilitated obtaining 
appointments for interviews from their parliamentary offices later.
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Chapter 3: 
3   National parliaments in the 
European Semester  1
The European Semester is a complex governance framework designed to 
coordinate and monitor the fiscal and economic policies of EU member states. It 
constrains the powers of national parliaments, but it also represents an 
opportunity for them to re-gain influence in national budgetary processes. Such 
institutional change within national parliaments related to the European 
Semester would be part of the wider and ongoing Europeanisation of national 
parliaments. In addition, the European Semester allows assessing whether and, if 
yes, how national parliaments are willing and able to participate in multilevel 
coordination processes that are dominated by national governments and the 
European Commission.  
This chapter asks: What are the drivers of parliamentary involvement in the 
European Semester? It examines how national parliaments are involved in 
practice by analysing the various possible drivers across the cases of the French 
Assemblée nationale, the German Bundestag, the Irish Dáil and the Portuguese 
Assembleia.  
Considering that legal provisions for a parliamentary debate on the Stability 
Programme can be ignored in France, that the German Bundestag is much less 
active in the European Semester than in EU affairs or in the budget process and 
that the weakness of Ireland’s parliament in the annual budget procedure affects 
its role in the European Semester, this chapter recommends defining minimum 
standards for parliamentary involvement. EU economic governance and the 
European Semester do not suffer from a zero-sum trade-off between 
responsiveness on the one hand and responsibility on the other, but parliamentary 
involvement can strengthen national ownership over the coordination and 
surveillance cycle.  
 This chapter has been published as an article in the Journal of European Integration: 1
Valentin Kreilinger (2018), ‘Scrutinising the European Semester in national parliaments: what 
are the drivers of parliamentary involvement?’, Journal of European Integration, 40 (3), pp. 
325-340, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1450402.
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The Euro crisis has been a major stress test for representative democracy 
everywhere in Europe and has challenged the democratic legitimacy of 
European and national decisions (see Benz 2013; Crum 2013; Enderlein 
2013). The strengthening of EU economic governance established a higher 
degree of integration in the area of fiscal and economic policies, also by the 
creation of the so-called European Semester. But even though national 
parliaments try to exercise influence and to develop ownership over the 
European Semester (Crum 2018; Hallerberg et al. 2018; Kreilinger 2016; 
Rittberger and Winzen 2015; Rozenberg 2017), they face difficulties to review 
decisions that are taken as a consequence of the European Semester: It is 
difficult to locate political responsibility in a “never-ending cycle of budgetary 
monitoring” (Dawson 2015: 982), because “at every stage it is possible for the 
actors involved to refer to the preceding step as conditioning their 
actions” (Crum and Curtin 2015: 83). National parliaments have only to some 
extent been able to “fight back” (Raunio and Hix 2000) and adapt their 
functioning and behaviour.  
Beyond prerogatives and provisions, it is important to know how exactly 
procedures in national parliaments that relate to EU economic governance are 
used in practice. This chapter examines how national parliaments scrutinise 
the European Semester. The conditions under which they become active and 
their specific role determine the legitimacy of the European Semester in the 
sense of its throughput legitimacy. More concretely, the relationship of 
national parliaments with executive actors affects the European Semester’s 
efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness (Schmidt 
2013). If national parliaments are not involved, executive power is not under 
appropriate parliamentary control and it is unclear how constraints to 
national fiscal and economic policies are legitimated.   2
 The European Parliament can make a contribution to the throughput legitimacy of the 2
European Semester via its scrutiny of the European Commission at the EU level. The 
instruments at its disposal include conducting “economic dialogues” with the European 
Commission and other EU institutions as well as adopting own-initiative reports. The 
European Parliament was involved in the adoption of the European Semester via the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure over the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack, but it lacks direct policy influence 
over the European Semester. See also Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in 
Economic Governance (section 2.1 Contemporary perspectives on European integration).
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Previous research has identified asymmetries between national 
parliaments in their involvement in the European Semester, measured what 
competences national parliaments have and how active they are during the 
main stages of the European Semester cycle. Although national parliaments 
have been taking ownership in reaction to the Euro crisis in many areas 
(Auel and Höing 2015), including the European Semester (Kreilinger 2016), 
they have adapted in an asymmetric way. Rittberger and Winzen (2015: 437) 
measured new parliamentary prerogatives related to the European Semester 
on a 0-to-2 scale. According to their data, only one third of national 
parliaments (nine out of 27) adopted new prerogatives in order to scrutinise 
the European Semester.  A survey-based study by Hallerberg et al. (2018) 3
found that Budget and Finance committees of national parliaments play a 
more important role in the European Semester in 2015 than they did in 2012, 
but surprisingly, national parliaments of non-Euro area members are more 
actively scrutinising the European Semester than the national parliaments of 
member states whose currency is the Euro (Hallerberg et al. 2018: 261). The 
analysis by Rittberger and Winzen (2015) and other studies (e.g. Fasone 
2015; Jančić 2016; Kreilinger 2016) show that “[national] parliaments in 
Mediterranean countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal […] have been 
remarkably assertive in extending their involvement in the budgetary 
process” (Crum 2018: 275).  
The following analysis of national parliaments’ roles in the European 
Semester in France, Germany, Ireland and Portugal adds to the pre-existing 
literature: Behind the bigger trends, an important insight from comparative 
research on scrutiny procedures and practices in the European Semester is 
that there are not only asymmetries between individual national 
parliaments, but also differences in how a national parliament scrutinises 
from one cycle of the European Semester to another (Raimla 2016; Rozenberg 
2017). These depend less on structural factors, but largely on strategic 
 These member states are Denmark, France, Italy, Lithuania and Portugal (far-reaching 3
parliamentary reforms) as well as Bulgaria, Latvia, Austria and Spain (moderate 
parliamentary reforms). See Rittberger and Winzen (2015: 437).
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calculations of the political actors involved at the national level. This chapter 
aims to identify the factors that drive parliamentary activities in the 
European Semester. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: The first section (3.1) presents how the 
EU’s post-crisis economic governance affects the “power of the purse”. After 
that, section 3.2 puts forward a series of different driving factors for 
parliamentary involvement in the European Semester. The following section 
3.3 briefly summarises the scrutiny procedures and practices in France, 
Germany, Ireland and Portugal and explains these national parliaments’ 
relative level of involvement in the European Semester. The last section (3.4) 
of this chapter concludes by reviewing the asymmetries and loopholes of 
parliamentary scrutiny in the European Semester.  
3.1  Parliamentary scrutiny of the European 
Semester 
Each new cycle of the European Semester starts when national governments 
of Euro area members submit their draft budgetary plans to the European 
Commission by 15 October, before starting the national budget procedures. In 
November, the European Commission publishes the Annual Growth Survey 
(EU-wide economic policy priorities) and the Alert Mechanism Report 
(Macroeconomic Imbalances). These are followed by detailed country reports. 
The European Council then endorses the priorities of the Annual Growth 
Survey in March. After that the European Semester moves back to the 
national political arena: All member states are obliged to submit Stability or 
Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes to the European 
Commission by 30 April. According to the Five Presidents’ Report of June 
2015, national parliaments should “[a]s a rule […] be closely involved in the 
adoption of National Reform and Stability Programmes.”  Subsequently, the 4
 European Commission, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (Report by Jean-4
Claude Juncker in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and 
Martin Schulz), June 2015, p. 17.
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !68
Chapter 3: European Semester
Commission drafts Country-specific recommendations in which it provides 
guidance for reform and which are adopted by the Council in June/July. 
Member states are expected to take these recommendations into account for 
their national fiscal and economic policies.   5
The participation of a national parliament in the European Semester 
depends on domestic scrutiny arrangements. Economic governance is still 
partly in the crisis mode of an “ad-hoc technocratisation” (Enderlein 2013) 
with national parliaments undertaking exceptional scrutiny activities, but 
the European Semester is gradually becoming part of normal activities of 
national parliaments. Two scholars recently argued that  
“[g]iven limitations of time and expertise, as well as the electoral 
incentives facing their members, it seems unrealistic to expect most 
national parliaments to play a more active part in scrutinizing the 
Semester process” (Verdun and Zeitlin 2018: 145). 
Despite prerogatives to scrutinise, some national parliaments are inactive: 
Although some of them could, for example, amend the Stability or 
Convergence Programme or the National Reform Programme , they do not 6
exercise that kind of influence, and over time, they often do not pursue 
consistent preferences related to the European Semester. But many national 
parliaments have become involved at least to some extent; they follow their 
distinct scrutiny procedures and practices for the European Semester. 
In order to identify the driving factors behind parliamentary involvement 
in the European Semester, this chapter examines the involvement of four 
national parliaments (French Assemblée nationale, German Bundestag, Irish 
Dáil and Portuguese Assembleia) over five European Semester cycles from 
2012 to 2017. These four national parliaments bring together two large and 
two small member states (all of which have the euro as their currency), 
different political systems (two parliamentary systems and two semi-
presidential systems) and a different exposure to the economic and financial 
 See also Appendix A Scrutinising the European Semester in four national parliaments.5
 European Parliament, Review of Stability and Convergence Programmes by National 6
Parliaments within the framework of the European Semester (Spotlight on Parliaments in 
Europe, N°2), November 2014, pp. 2-3.
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crisis (two recipient countries and two creditor countries). As Table 3.1 shows, 
scrutiny roles of the four national parliaments in general EU affairs also vary 
(see Neuhold and Smith 2015: 678).  
Table 3.1  Scrutiny models of EU affairs and scores in budgetary 
strength of French Assemblée nationale, German Bundestag, 
Irish Dáil and Portuguese Assembleia 
Source: Own elaboration. Strength in the budget process from 0 (weak) to 6 (strong), 
legislative budget powers from 0 (none) to 100 (full). 
When the European Semester addresses public finances, the previous 
prerogatives and the overall position of a national parliament in the annual 
budget procedure must be taken into account. The typology of the overall 
budget policy impact of legislatures by Wehner (2004: 5), adapted from 
Norton (1993: Table 4.1), which distinguishes budget-making legislatures, 
budget-influencing legislatures, and legislatures with little or no budgetary 
effect, is useful in this regard. Furthermore, in Hallerberg et al.’s ranking 
(2012: 70), where strength in the budget process can range from 0 (weak) to 6 
(strong), Germany has a score of 4, Portugal a score of 2 while France and 
Ireland achieve a budgetary strength of 1. In Wehner’s assessment of 
legislative budget powers (2006: 781), Portugal (38.9) is near the median of 
the countries under examination, France (19.4) and Ireland (16.7) are clearly 
National parliaments’ 
roles in EU affairs  
(Neuhold and Smith 
(2015: 678))
Strength in 
the budget 
process  
((Hallerberg 
et al. 2012: 
70))
Legislative 
budget 
powers  
((Wehner 
2006: 777))
France: Assemblée nationale Public forum, Expert 1 19.4
Germany: Bundestag Watchdog, Policy 
shaper
4 52.8
Ireland: Dáil Public forum 1 16.7
Portugal: Assembleia Watchdog, Public 
forum, European player
2 38.9
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in the lower quartile while Germany (52.8) is close to the upper quartile of 
countries with the most powerful budget institutions (see Wehner 2006: 777).  
The Appendix to this chapter  gives an overview of the legal provisions, the 7
actual parliamentary involvement in the European Semester (plenary 
debates, votes, committee meetings, hearings) as well as of the different 
documents related to and emanating from scrutiny activities (such as reports, 
motions, resolutions).  
3.2  Driving factors for parliamentary 
involvement   8
Starting from the premise that involving national parliaments contributes to 
the “throughput legitimacy” of the European Semester and that it can take 
different forms and varies between member states and over time, this section 
proposes five possible driving factors behind parliamentary involvement in 
the European Semester. Two of them relate to parliamentary power, either in 
EU affairs or in the annual budget procedure (see sub-section 3.2.1). The 
three other possible driving factors are more specific to the European 
Semester (see sub-section 3.2.2): Firstly, specific legal bases for 
parliamentary involvement trigger actual involvement; secondly, political 
dynamics –– such as confidence in the government (or its lack), symbolic 
government interests to involve parliament and effective opposition 
mobilisation –– and, thirdly, the economic strength and the fiscal soundness 
of the public finances of a country could trigger parliamentary involvement in 
the European Semester. These factors are likely to influence each other in 
different ways. They can reinforce or depend upon each other, but the more 
these conditions are met, the more likely is parliamentary involvement in the 
 Appendix A Scrutinising the European Semester in four national parliaments.7
 Due to the stand-alone nature of this chapter, some overlaps with Chapter 2 Assessing 8
parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (section 2.3 Not just involved: Driving 
factors and ideal-typical models) are unavoidable.
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !71
Chapter 3: European Semester
European Semester. Each of the five driving factors is now discussed in 
detail.  
3.2.1  Parliamentary power as a driving factor  
General EU scrutiny power of a national parliament 
The European Semester requires that national parliaments create 
“capabilities to monitor complex, unfamiliar and opaque union 
procedures” (Lord 2017: 682). National parliaments could hence follow their 
roles in scrutinising normal EU affairs.  Rozenberg and Hefftler distinguish 9
five possible roles in the Handbook on National Parliaments and the 
European Union (2015): “Government watchdog”, “Policy shaper”, “Public 
forum”, “Expert” and “European player” (see Table 3.2). 
First, when a national parliament lacks the powers to issue mandates, 
amending, delay or veto powers, it cannot shape policy beforehand, but –– as 
a “government watchdog” –– it can exercise control by holding the 
government accountable (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 32). The existence of 
such an accountability mechanism means that executive actors will have to 
defend in parliament the position taken at the EU level (Crum and Curtin 
2015: 72). In the European Semester, “watchdog” parliaments hold 
governments and EU institutions to account ex-post, for example over the 
Country-specific recommendations. 
Second, national parliaments that are “policy shapers” want to influence 
policies through ex-ante activities and have strong formal powers (Rozenberg 
and Hefftler 2015: 31). Shaping government policy is easier for EU affairs 
than in the European Semester, but EU economic governance offers 
incentives for national parliaments to become involved and possibilities for 
them to shape policy outcomes (de Wilde and Raunio 2018: 318-19), for 
 The five ideal types of the Palgrave Handbook on National Parliaments and the European 9
Union (see Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 27-35) are applied to the European Semester. In the 
following, they are discussed one after the other (see also the summary in Table 3.2). 
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example via scrutinising Stability or Convergence Programmes and National 
Reform Programmes.  
Third, plenary activity of a national parliament often allows it to be a 
“public forum”. In plenary debates on the European Semester, the 
government’s fiscal and economic policy and EU recommendations can be 
contested. MPs who are initially not EU specialists become involved, if the 
entire assembly is called to debate and possibly vote (Fromage 2016b).  
Fourth, work in committee allows for “expert” scrutiny over the European 
Semester, for example over the content of the programmes to be submitted to 
the European Commission. It is possible for national parliaments to produce 
proper expertise, if administrative capacities are built up. This enables them 
to assess developments independently, become active early and conduct a 
report-based scrutiny of all major stages. Conflicting positions within 
parliament are, however, not visible; such activities (almost an end in itself) 
generally attract less attention than plenary debates or hearings (Rozenberg 
and Hefftler 2015: 33). 
Fifth and finally, as a “European player”, a national parliament acts 
directly at the EU level via formal and informal ways of engaging with the 
European Commission, other national parliaments and the European 
Parliament. It has a better understanding of the negotiation situation at the 
European level, a network “beyond the own domestic parliamentary 
arena” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 34) and is able to obtain relevant 
information that its own government might withhold.  
Some involvement into EU affairs is a necessary condition for national 
parliaments’ involvement in the European Semester, but not a sufficient one. 
Whether they actually follow the same roles as in EU affairs, remains to be 
answered in the empirical analysis. 
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Table 3.2  Ideal-typical scrutiny models for EU affairs applied to the 
European Semester 
Source: Own elaboration, based on Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.3.2 Models of 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs). Ideal types and explanations according to 
Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015). 
General budgetary power of a national parliament 
Related to public finances, a crucial requirement of the European Semester is 
that national governments must submit their draft budget to the European 
Commission –– possibly even before their national parliament has seen it.  10
In general, budgeting differs from most other parliamentary decisions by the 
“calendar-based necessity” for a decision: “If parliament has not acted by a 
certain date, specified budget decisions are automatically activated” (Olson 
Ideal type Explanation Application to the European Semester
Government 
watchdog
Holding the 
government 
accountable
• Focus on executive accountability (ex-post) 
• Politics instead of policy in parliament 
• Scrutiny of Country-specific 
recommendations
Policy shaper Influencing positions 
of the government 
• Ex-ante scrutiny of European Semester 
• Strong formal prerogatives  
• Scrutiny of Stability Programmes and 
National Reform Programmes
Public forum Communicating with 
the public
• Plenary debates on the European Semester 
• Possibility to publicly contest European 
Semester 
• Involvement of all MPs, incl. non-specialists 
Expert Producing proper 
expertise on EU 
affairs
• Independent assessments and early 
activities 
• Own expertise related to the European 
Semester 
• Report-based scrutiny of all major steps
European 
player
Acting directly at EU 
level
• Network beyond domestic arena  
• Good understanding of negotiation situation 
• Direct engagement with EU institutions
 See European Union, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 10
Council on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and 
ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.
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2008: 324). Since national parliaments “have had to adapt from different 
positions of relative strength in their own national political systems” (Lord 
2017: 683), the budgetary power of a legislature can be a driver for 
parliamentary involvement in the European Semester. 
The annual budget procedure has commonly been divided into four 
phases : Preparation, adoption, implementation and evaluation (Imbeau and 11
Stapenhurst 2017; Wehner 2004). In the first phase of the annual budget 
procedure, the government prepares the draft budget and submits it to 
parliament. After that, in the second phase, the budget is debated in 
parliament and accepted, amended or rejected by parliament (the powers of 
amendment and rejection are generally limited). The third phase, 
implementation, is then once again solely a governmental task –– only if the 
budget needs to be adjusted, the government must ask parliament for 
approval. Finally, in the fourth phase of the annual budget procedure, the 
accounts are evaluated, generally by a Court of Auditors which submits a 
report to government and parliament (see Imbeau and Stapenhurst 2017).  
A national parliament may already have had limited powers in the annual 
budget procedure before EU surveillance mechanisms were created or 
strengthened, because the “power of the purse” (Wehner 2006), that 
parliaments have, varies widely: Many legislatures do not have the 
institutional means or the political independence to be influential budgetary 
actors. For these parliaments, the approval of the national budget is, 
according to Wehner (2010: 141), “little more than a constitutional myth”. 
Considering that, under the European Semester, the EU’s national 
parliaments are merely obliged to approve the national budget after it was 
validated at the EU level, their role might not have changed significantly –– 
the fiscal autonomy of national governments might have been more affected 
than those of national parliaments (see Fasone 2015: 11). Thus, the pre-crisis 
role of a legislature in the annual budget procedure matters for assessing the 
 This paragraph had not been included in Valentin Kreilinger, ‘Scrutinising the European 11
Semester in national parliaments: what are the drivers of parliamentary involvement?’, 
Journal of European Integration 40 (3), pp. 325-340.
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impact of EU surveillance procedures on national parliaments, because, 
formally, the European Semester, has “left the primacy of national policy-
making in fiscal affairs intact” (Crum 2018: 273). The impact of a legislature 
on budget policy (Norton 1993) can be expected to be a necessary, although 
not a sufficient condition for parliamentary involvement in the European 
Semester. 
3.2.2  European Semester-specific driving factors for 
involvement  
The next three possible drivers for parliamentary involvement are specific to 
the European Semester. They refer to legal enabling clauses, political 
dynamics and economic strength.  
Legal enabling clauses 
If there are “systemic” drivers for parliamentary involvement (as proposed in 
the previous sub-section 3.2.1), it is reasonable to expect that at least some 
parliaments have developed new scrutiny arrangements for the European 
Semester. These can be based on new legal provisions that enable or 
prescribe certain parliamentary scrutiny procedures or practices in the 
European Semester.  
Indeed, many national parliaments “have used the European Semester to 
increase their consultation rights in the early stages of budget preparation 
and on the broader financial and economic frameworks that govern the 
budgetary process” (Crum 2018: 274). In 2013, for instance, the Danish 
Folketing introduced a “National Semester” which provides for three annual 
joint consultations of the European affairs committee and the Finance 
committee with the government (Buskjaer Rasmussen 2018: 348-53; 
Kreilinger 2016: 35-36). The first joint consultation takes place on the Annual 
Growth Survey (in December). A report of the Danish Parliament describes 
the second joint consultation as  
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“an overall briefing [by the government] on how it generally expects to 
reflect the broad economic policy orientations set by the Spring 
European Council in the National Reform Programme and the 
Convergence Programme.”  12
This was criticised by an opposition party in a minority opinion to the 
Folketing’s report as insufficient, because “the Government will merely need 
to discuss its general ideas regarding the economic situation with the Danish 
Parliament on a non-binding basis”  before it starts drafting the 13
Convergence Programme and the National Reform Programme. Thus, even a 
generally strong national parliament like the Danish Folketing possibly faces 
problem in holding the government to account in the European Semester. 
Finally, a third joint session of the two parliamentary committees concerns 
the draft Country-specific recommendations of the European Commission at 
the end of May and takes place before they are adopted by the Council. 
Instead of such new legal enabling clauses, it is also possible that national 
parliaments did not see the need to adopt new rules, either because their old 
rules have been suitable for the scrutiny of the European Semester or 
because they were able to establish new practices without writing them down 
(Kreilinger 2016: 30). The Finnish Eduskunta, for instance, reports that 
existing rules for the parliamentary scrutiny of the annual budget process 
fitted “nicely” and did not need to be adapted to the European Semester.  14
The Eduskunta can nevertheless adopt an opinion on the Stability 
Programme that is binding for the government.  Legal enabling clauses are 15
therefore a possible condition for parliamentary involvement in the European 
Semester, but neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition.  
 Danish Folketing, Report on Consideration of the European Semester by the Danish 12
Parliament, issued by the European Affairs Committee and the Finance Committee on 21 June 
2013, Report No. 5 – 2012-13, p. 2.
 Ibid., p. 3.13
 COSAC, Annex to the Twenty-first Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. 14
Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny (Brussels: COSAC Secretariat, 
19 June 2014), p. 240.
 European Parliament, Review of Stability and Convergence Programmes by National 15
Parliaments within the framework of the European Semester (Spotlight on Parliaments in 
Europe, No. 2), November 2014, pp. 2-3.
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Political dynamics 
The notion of “political dynamics”, as the forth possible driving factor, refers 
to (symbolic) government interests to involve parliament and to effective 
opposition mobilisation. National decision-makers have sometimes not fully 
embraced and accepted the coordination and surveillance system of the 
European Semester in which the European Commission can make 
recommendations and the Council adopts them. EU institutions have been 
repeatedly criticised for interfering in national fiscal or economic policies. 
French President François Hollande insisted in May 2013 that the “European 
Commission cannot dictate what we should do; it can only say that France 
must balance its public finances”  and in October 2015 Italy’s Prime 16
Minister Matteo Renzi said that “Brussels is not a teacher giving exams, it’s 
not qualified to intervene”, the EU “can advise us, but it can’t tell us which 
tax to cut” . 17
The involvement of a national parliament in the European Semester can, 
first of all, be related to its confidence in the government (or the lack thereof). 
But just like the opposition, national governments also have specific interests 
to involve parliament. They can “use international co-ordination to co-manage 
and constrain their own national democracies” (Lord 2017: 683). In both 
cases, parliamentary parties have the possibility to raise objections against 
the European Semester which can be classified as two different types of 
objections, either policy objections or procedural objections : On the one 18
hand, parliamentary parties can raise policy objections related to the specific 
policy initiatives promised by the government or to those recommended by 
the EU. On the other hand, parliamentary parties can raise procedural 
objections related to how the European Semester is treated in the national 
parliament or about how it unfolds at the European level (see Table 3.3). 
 Pour Hollande, Bruxelles “n’a pas à nous dicter ce que nous avons à faire”, Le Monde, 29 16
May 2013, https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/05/29/ayrault-nous-ferons-les-
reformes-a-notre-maniere_3420368_3234.html.
 Brussels not a teacher giving exams says Renzi, ANSA English, 16 October 2015.17
 See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (section 2.4 18
Three comparative studies of national parliaments and EU Economic Governance).
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Table 3.3  Raising objections against the European Semester 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Economic strength 
Finally, under the European Semester, EU member states “retain a certain 
level of autonomy but […] become constrained by supranational 
norms” (Crum 2018: 270). The fiscal rules matter the most for a country that 
is in risk of breaching them. The economic strength and the fiscal soundness 
of the public finance therefore affect how constraining the different rules and 
surveillance mechanisms are in the context of the European Semester. The 
higher the constraints, the more salient economic governance becomes and 
the more likely is parliamentary involvement in the European Semester.  
3.3  Explaining national parliaments’ 
involvement in France, Germany, Ireland 
and Portugal 
This section briefly presents how the French Assemblée nationale, the 
German Bundestag, the Irish Dáil and the Portuguese Assembleia scrutinise 
the European Semester.  The four national parliaments are involved at 19
different stages in the cycle and they use different scrutiny tools and 
instruments. In the context of many other pressing issues in EU affairs and 
domestic politics, the key question for each legislature is to scrutinise or not to 
National level EU level
Type of 
objection
Procedure 
Domestic scrutiny of the 
European Semester
Conduct of the European 
Semester at the EU level
Policy
European Semester 
pledges of the 
government
Country-specific 
recommendations of the 
European Semester
 For a detailed description of their involvement, see Appendix A Scrutinising the European 19
Semester in four national parliaments.
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scrutinise? (see also Auel et al. 2015b). Neither the involvement in EU affairs 
nor in the annual budget procedure can guarantee influence in the European 
Semester: In France, Germany, Ireland and Portugal, national parliamentary 
scrutiny depends to a large extent on domestic political dynamics and on the 
current economic situation of the country. Plenary debates on the European 
Semester have taken place in France, Germany and Portugal despite difficult 
access to scarce plenary time in legislatures (Cox 2006: 144), but are 
exceptional rather than normal. This indicates that the European Semester is 
not always a purely technocratic or committee-based affair with National 
Reform and Stability Programmes being quietly send to Brussels (as it is still 
the case in Ireland), but that, by now, fiscal and economic policy coordination 
is occasionally debated at the heart of the parliamentary arena. Ireland still 
faces an uphill struggle there. 
3.3.1  To scrutinise or not to scrutinise? 
With respect to the first driving factor, EU scrutiny power, the four national 
parliaments only to a certain extent follow the roles of their scrutiny of EU 
affairs (“government watchdog”, “policy shaper”, “public forum”, “expert”, 
“European player”). The same is true for the second driving factor, budgetary 
power. This sub-section now briefly examines each of the four national 
parliaments in turn. 
From 2013 to 2017, the Assemblée nationale adopted numerous 
parliamentary reports and acted as an “expert” in the European Semester. 
The amount of written expertise produced is impressive and may once again 
almost have become an end in itself (see Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 33). 
The Assemblée nationale tries to be a “public forum” for debating the 
European Semester. But while it is powerful on paper, with a debate and vote 
on the Stability Programme foreseen , the reality is different: The French 20
parliament itself concedes that both depend on the willingness of the 
 See Appendix A (A.1 French Assemblée nationale: Adaptation without obligation).20
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government and that only a revision of the Constitution (and no other legal 
provision) could guarantee parliamentary participation in the European 
Semester.  The scrutiny practice for the Stability Programme confirms the 21
parliamentary weakness in the annual budget procedure.  Plenary debates 22
and votes on the Stability Programme took place in 2013 and 2014, but after 
there had been 41 abstentions from Socialist MPs in 2014, the government 
was not certain that it would have a majority in 2015. A senior Socialist 
lawmaker explains that the government “simply abolished the examination in 
plenary session and the vote, using the parliamentary Easter vacations as an 
excuse.”  One year later, the Stability Programme was debated, but not 23
subject to a vote; the opposition deplored the “weakening of the role of our 
assembly.”  The role of the Assemblée nationale in the European Semester 24
has been to gather information and sometimes to stimulate a public debate, 
but not to hold the government to account (see also Thomas and Tacea 2015).  
In its scrutiny prerogatives and activities related to the European 
Semester , the Bundestag does not meet the standard of its EU affairs 25
scrutiny, where the German parliament is considered a “government 
watchdog” and “policy shaper” (see Höing 2015a). This is surprising given 
that Chancellor Merkel was at the origin of several initiatives that eventually 
led to the tightening of fiscal and economic surveillance. When pushing for 
these reforms at the EU level, she was under considerable pressure from her 
backbenchers to ensure strict conditionality of any kind of financial 
assistance and to force other member states to be in compliance with fiscal 
rules. But according to one interview partner from the EU affairs directorate 
 Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°3195 sur le traitement des affaires 21
européennes à l’Assemblée nationale, 3 November 2015, p. 30, p. 33.
 See Table 3.1: The French Assemblée nationale scored 1/6 in terms of strength in the budget 22
process (Hallerberg et al. 2012: 70) and 19.4/100 for legislative budget powers (Wehner 2006: 
777).
 Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016. See also 23
Pas de vote pour cause de vacances, Le Canard enchainé, 15 April 2015, p. 2.
 Gilles Carrez, LR, Assemblée nationale, 173e séance, Compte rendu intégral, 2e séance du 24
mardi 26 avril 2016, 2837. Translated by the author.
 See country study on Germany in Appendix A (A.2 German Bundestag: Parliamentary 25
inertia).
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in the German Bundestag, “[t]he European Semester is a case where the 
German Bundestag could and should do more.”  Senior MPs from CDU and 26
SPD agree on the existence of “upward potential”  and that the European 27
Semester “is the instrument that could be used more intensively”.  It was 28
occasionally debated in short plenary sessions, but speeches were sometimes 
only added to the plenary protocol.  In 2016, Green MP Katharina Dröge 29
sarcastically noted that the discussion of the National Reform Programme 
took place two hours earlier than in 2015: “It is a success that we are 
discussing it at 9 pm this evening. Last time we discussed it at 11 pm.”  30
In Ireland , the limited involvement of parliament in the European 31
Semester clearly follows from its marginal role in the annual budget 
procedure. According to the OECD Budget Review of Ireland, parliamentary 
involvement in the budget process “is under-developed by international 
standards” (Downes and Nicol 2016: 1). Although MPs are aware of the 
European Semester and stressed its importance after the country had exited 
its bailout, the Irish Dáil has not been a “public forum” as it is in normal EU 
affairs (see Barrett 2015). Its scrutiny of the European Semester has not 
started to follow another scrutiny model of EU affairs either and must thus 
be considered ill-adapted, even though some scrutiny activities take place.  
Finally, Portugal –– the other crisis-hit country examined here –– is a case 
where the nature of the executive-legislative relationship and parliamentary 
scrutiny led to the downfall of the minority government under Prime Minister 
Sócrates in 2011. The Portuguese Assembleia  is an example for an active 32
national parliament with strong prerogatives. Despite a mixed adaptation to 
general EU affairs and comparatively weak powers in the budget process 
before the crisis (see Hallerberg et al. 2012: 70; Kreilinger 2016: 20), national 
 Interview with a clerk in the EU affairs directorate of the German Bundestag, 2 March 2017.26
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (CDU), 22 March 2017.27
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), 8 March 2017.28
 See Appendix A (A.1 German Bundestag: Parliamentary inertia).29
 Katharina Dröge, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer 30
Bericht der 167. Sitzung vom 28. April 2016, 16491C-D. Translated by the author.
 See Appendix A (A.3 Irish Dáil: Overall weakness in the budgetary procedure).31
 See Appendix A (A.4 Portuguese Assembleia: Using and expanding powers).32
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parliaments from Mediterranean countries, including Portugal, have been 
relatively well involved in the European Semester.  Greater efforts to adapt 33
to the European Semester might be the consequence of initially weaker 
parliamentary rights, both in EU affairs and the annual budgetary 
procedure, and follow the logic of “backbenchers fight[ing] back” (Raunio and 
Hix 2000). In the case of Portugal, this was part of a broader revision of the 
rules governing parliamentary involvement in EU affairs in 2011 (see Jančić 
2015). Like in broader EU affairs, the Assembleia has managed to play the 
roles of “government watchdog”, “public forum” and “European player” in the 
European Semester and despite shortcomings, such as the lack of a 
compliance mechanism to ensure that the governments fulfils its information 
duties (Fasone 2014b: 13), it can no longer be classified as a legislature with 
only little budgetary influence. 
The summary of these findings shows that the four national parliaments 
often do not play their roles from EU affairs when it comes to scrutinising the 
European Semester (“No”). They are sometimes able to partly play the 
respective role in the European Semester when they fully play it in EU 
affairs, but rarely manage to fully meet that standard (see Table 3.4). 
 See Crum (2018: 275), Fasone (2015: 20-21), Jančić (2016: 242-43). According to Buskjaer 33
Rasmussen (2018), however, the Spanish parliament cannot provide substantial scrutiny of the 
European Semester. It is important to note that Greece and Cyprus, due to financial assistance 
programmes, were not part of the European Semester for most of the time. 
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Table 3.4  Scrutiny models for the European Semester in French 
Assemblée nationale, German Bundestag, Irish Dáil and 
Portuguese Assembleia 
Notes:  
(✓) = National parliament plays the respective role in general EU affairs and partly 
in the European Semester;  
✓ = National parliament plays the respective role in general EU affairs and in the 
European Semester. 
Source: Own elaboration, roles in EU affairs: Neuhold and Smith (2015: 678). 
3.3.2  Raising objections against the European Semester 
Other driving factors for parliamentary involvement beyond EU scrutiny 
power and budgetary power could, as suggested in section 3.2, be the 
following three factors: legal enabling clauses, political dynamics and 
economic strength. With respect to the executive-legislative relationship, 
governments and parliaments should not be treated as separate entities and 
legislatures are not a “black box” (Auel 2007). The means and ends of 
governing and opposition parties in national parliaments differ. This leads to 
a “government versus opposition” conflict line in parliamentary democracies 
which also seems to guide European Semester scrutiny. 
The third driving factor, new legal enabling clauses, turns out to be less 
relevant since two out of four national parliaments (Germany and Ireland) do 
not have formal prerogatives related to the European Semester. And despite 
Watchdog Policy 
shaper
Public 
forum
Expert European 
player
Germany: Bundestag No No
France: Assemblée nationale (✓) ✓
Ireland: Dáil No
Portugal: Assembleia (✓) ✓ (✓)
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the legal provision to hold a plenary debate and vote in France, the 
government was consistently able to limit parliamentary involvement.  34
Political dynamics, proposed as the fourth driving factor, clearly plays a 
role: When the European Semester arrives in the national parliamentary 
arena, the key problem are information asymmetries between governing 
parties and the opposition. An EU coordination process in which governments 
make pledges and communicate their plans to the European Commission and 
in which they receive feedback (in the form of Country-specific 
recommendations) on their plans in return, almost automatically leads to a 
re-emergence of the government-opposition conflict line: Governing parties 
and the government form a block against the opposition and vice versa.  But 35
the European Semester makes it possible for everyone to raise objections. 
Procedural issues and policy issues can be put forward when, each spring, the 
European Semester moves from the EU level to the national level and arrives 
in the national parliamentary arena. In 2016, French and German opposition 
MPs raised procedural issues about the domestic scrutiny of the European 
Semester process while MPs from governing parties raised procedural issues 
about the conduct of the European Semester process at the EU level.  36
Parliamentary parties can also use their scrutiny of the European Semester 
to contest EU-level analyses or recommendations and to propose alternative 
policies, like national governments do in their programmes (see Bekker 2016: 
8), or to contest government policy: Opposition MPs in France and in 
Germany raised policy issues about the government’s EU economic 
governance pledges; MPs from governing parties raised policy issues about 
European Semester decisions or recommendations (see Table 3.3, above).   37
 President François Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Valls sought to ensure the survival 34
of the government and in the light of a high number of abstentions or possible “no” votes, they 
refrained from greater parliamentary involvement.
 When votes take place, opposition MPs are hesitant about whether to approve or reject the 35
motion on the European Semester. This was the case in France.
 See Appendix A, country studies on France (A.1) and Germany (A.2) with a qualitative 36
analysis of the plenary debates in the French Assemblée nationale on 27 April 2016 and the 
German Bundestag on 28 April 2016.
 See also Appendix A (Appendix to Chapter 3) Scrutinising the European Semester in four 37
national parliaments, country studies on France (A.1) and Germany (A.2).
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Finally, economic strength,  the fifth possible driving factor for 
parliamentary involvement in the European Semester, plays a role, too. One 
reason for the reluctance of the German Bundestag to engage with the 
European Semester might be that the surveillance procedures of the 
European Semester are not constraining for a country that is currently 
experiencing a fiscal surplus. Furthermore, many German economists and 
centre-right politicians have questioned the reasoning that the country’s 
current account surplus constitutes a macroeconomic imbalance. They rather 
see it as a sign of economic strength. Also, the balanced-budget rule as the 
core fiscal rule of the new governance was an ordoliberal idea from Germany 
and enshrined into the Basic Law even before the TSCG required its 
Contracting Parties to do so. Following this reasoning, for crisis-hit countries 
like Portugal, parliamentary scrutiny of the European Semester can be seen 
their attempt to preserve national budgetary autonomy which has become 
severely constrained by the “ad-hoc technocratisation of economic policy-
making” (Enderlein 2013).  
3.4  Opportunities and constraints for 
scrutinising the European Semester 
From a “throughput legitimacy” perspective (Schmidt 2013), loopholes of 
parliamentary involvement create specific (throughput) legitimacy deficits in 
terms of executive accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness 
of the European Semester. This chapter examined the factors that trigger 
national parliamentary involvement in the European Semester.  
Summary of the findings 
For each of the four national parliaments it was possible to identify what the 
influence of the five driving factors has been and how they reinforce or 
depend upon each other: Strong formal powers in conjunction with little real 
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influence in EU affairs and weak budgetary power, as in the case of the 
French Assemblée nationale, mean that European Semester scrutiny 
provisions can be overturned by the government. But despite strong powers 
in EU affairs and the annual budget procedure, a national parliament can 
still be largely absent from the European Semester. This is the case of the 
German Bundestag.  The Irish Dáil, however, shows that the existence of 38
parliamentary powers is a precondition for meaningful involvement in the 
European Semester. If neither in EU affairs nor in the budgetary process 
significant parliamentary powers exist, a national parliament is unlikely to 
be substantially involved in the European Semester. But institutional 
reforms that strengthen the legislature, for instance in EU affairs, can have a 
direct positive effect on European Semester involvement. The case of the 
Portuguese Assembleia confirms this. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from these findings: The existence 
of some parliamentary powers related to EU affairs and the annual budget 
procedure is a precondition for parliamentary involvement in the European 
Semester: Without them, there is no involvement, but such powers do not 
guarantee a powerful role in the European Semester. Legal enabling clauses 
for scrutinising the European Semester are, as the analysis has shown, 
optional. Unless such clauses are binding for the government, they can be 
overturned by government-induced political dynamics: In France, the 
government could successfully avoid the debate and vote on the Stability 
Programme in 2015 and it could avoid a parliamentary vote in 2016. 
Generally, political dynamics play an important role in the scrutiny of the 
European Semester and can trigger (as well as prevent) meaningful 
parliamentary involvement: Opposition parties try to push scrutinising the 
European Semester while governing parties want to limit it. The broader 
examination of the European Semester has shown that whether the 
 Aleksandra Maatsch argues that in the Bundestag “parliamentary parties made very 38
effective use of their strong formal powers in order to initiate debates on the European 
Semester” (2017: 208). In this respect, however, 2015 (three resolutions proposed and one of 
them adopted) was an exceptional year. In 2016 and 2017, only one plenary debate took place, 
no resolutions were tabled. The resolution tabled by the Green Party in 2014 was identical to 
the Green’s resolution a year later.
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parliamentary procedures and control possibilities in the European Semester 
are being fully used often depends on the willingness of the parliamentary 
majority and the government (see also Rozenberg 2017: 52-53). For both 
governing parties and opposition parties, the European Semester provides an 
opportunity to raise objections of different kinds. Finally, economic strength 
plays a role insofar as it shapes the intrusiveness of the European Semester 
which creates an incentive for MPs to become active. Unsurprisingly, 
parliamentary involvement in the European Semester is more likely the more 
of these conditions are met. 
Political implications: Legitimacy and control of the European Semester 
But what are the political implications of these findings? Do the drivers of 
parliamentary involvement soften or increase concerns about legitimacy and 
parliamentary control of the European Semester?  
Firstly, economic governance is still to a very large extent a case of 
“exploratory governance” (Enderlein 2015a) and the nature of the European 
Semester –– still makes it difficult for national parliaments to claim or 
acquire ownership (see Kreilinger 2016; Vanheuverzwijn and Crespy 2018). 
Therefore, minimum standards for parliamentary involvement should be 
defined in the form of guidelines that national parliaments elaborate (and 
adopt) jointly.  Strengthening interparliamentary cooperation is also vital 39
for better information exchanges between national parliaments (see Griglio 
and Lupo 2018; Kreilinger 2015b). 
Secondly, related to public finances, there are possibilities for parliaments 
to “regain an effective voice in the budget cycle” (Schick 2002; see also 
Wehner 2004). Plenary debates are no longer seen as a “verbal contest 
between government and opposition without any real policy impact” (S. 
Martin et al. 2014: 13), but allow for MPs to articulate their positions on the 
European Semester and communicate them to the public. The issues raised in 
 See Chapter 6 Conclusion (sub-section 6.3.2 National parliaments and reforming the 39
Economic and Monetary Union), which develops the recommendation of “minimum standards” 
in detail.
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !88
Chapter 3: European Semester
plenary debates in France and Germany  are an encouraging sign for a slow 40
politicisation of EU economic governance. Controversial assessments of the 
European Commission, such as the budgetary situation in France or a 
macroeconomic imbalance like the German current account surplus, were 
debated in plenary debates on the European Semester in 2015 and MPs 
beyond the specialists for EU affairs were involved in these debates. But 
fiscal rules that impose numerical limits on budget aggregates such as the 
fiscal balance, total revenues, total expenditures and/or debt (Lienert 2010: 6) 
can limit the role of parliaments and are a common feature of budgeting in 
the 21st century. Examples of fiscal rules in the EU are the criteria of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, the constitutionalisation of European budgetary 
constraints in the TSCG that provided for the introduction of balanced-
budget rules in the national legal order (F. Fabbrini 2016a: 27-42) –– and the 
European Semester.  
Thirdly, legislative involvement in the budget procedure meets another 
important challenge: With respect to fiscal discipline, does, as Posner and 
Park (2007: 20) put it, “responsiveness to political constituents trump 
responsibility?” Do parliaments think about the long-term? This, again, 
matters for the fiscal policy coordination and surveillance under the 
European Semester. Wehner concludes that “[t]o some, the fiscal cost of 
parliamentary activism may simply be an acceptable side effect of democracy” 
(Wehner 2010: 141). In the 20th century, however, parliamentarians in 
legislatures of many countries did not trust themselves to make responsible 
financial decisions and “voluntarily yielded budgetary power to the executive” 
(Schick 2002: 16). Following this view, an annual budget process with greater 
legislative control will enhance democratic accountability, but at the same 
time, it might potentially risk eroding fiscal discipline and government 
efficiency (see Posner and Park 2007: 20-21). Some have suggested that in the 
European Semester “democracy has to be sacrificed in order to achieve 
compliance” (Maatsch 2017: 208), but there is no zero-sum trade-off between 
 See Appendix A (Appendix to Chapter 3) Scrutinising the European Semester in four 40
national parliaments.
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parliamentary involvement in the European Semester and compliance with 
Country-specific recommendations, as the example of Denmark shows 
(Kreilinger 2016: 6-7, 35-36). In order to have legislatures that are powerful 
and fiscally responsible, fiscal institutions must force parliamentarians “to fix 
prudent aggregate parameters and to focus debate on allocative choices 
within a hard budget constraint” (Wehner 2010: 141). In the context of the 
European Semester, however, the coordination and surveillance of fiscal and 
economic policies makes it even more difficult to have influential parliaments 
than under normal circumstances.  
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !90
Appendix A (European Semester)
Appendix A (Appendix to Chapter 3): 
Scrutinising the European Semester in four 
national parliaments  1
This Appendix presents the country studies on the scrutiny procedures and 
practices related to the European Semester in four member states: France (A.
1), Germany (A.2), Ireland (A.3) and Portugal (A.4). These countries were 
selected as case studies on parliamentary scrutiny of the European Semester 
in order to cover large and small member states as well as different political 
systems and parliamentary powers.  2
Each country study first examines the specific national legal provisions for 
national parliamentary involvement in the European Semester and assesses 
the actual scrutiny procedures and practices. For France (A.1) and Germany 
(A.2), this is complemented by a brief qualitative analysis of MPs’ speeches in 
a plenary debate on the European Semester  and a summary of all their 3
parliamentary scrutiny activities related to the European Semester. 
Main stages of the European Semester cycle  4
The European Semester proceeds in four main stages from October to July: 
At its start, draft budgetary plans are elaborated by Euro area members at 
the national level; then the European Commission analyses the fiscal and 
economic situation; after that, all member states draft their Stability or 
Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes; and, finally, 
 Sections A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4 of this appendix have been published as supplemental material 1
to Valentin Kreilinger, ‘Scrutinising the European Semester in national parliaments: what are 
the drivers of parliamentary involvement?’, Journal of European Integration 40 (3), pp. 
325-340. It can be accessed here: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1450402.
 See on the case selection: Chapter 3 National parliaments in the European Semester (section 2
3.1 Parliamentary scrutiny in the European Semester).
 The plenary debates under analysis are the debate on the Stability Programme 2016-19 in 3
the French Assemblée nationale on 27 April 2016 and the debate on the National Reform 
Programme 2016 in the German Bundestag on 28 April 2016.
 The “Main stages of the European Semester cycle” are not part of the supplemental material 4
(Footnote 1, above).  
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Country-specific recommendations are issued. Before this section turns to the 
country studies (A.1 to A.4), those four stages (and the possibilities that they 
offer for national parliaments to become involved) are developed in the 
following.  
In the first stage of the European Semester, as part of the Two-Pack , the 5
national governments of Euro area members are required to submit a draft 
budgetary plan to the European Commission before the annual budget 
procedure starts by 15 October. The European Commission then examines 
these plans and adopts an opinion about whether these plans comply with 
fiscal rules and pledges. It can demand from the national government to 
amend the draft budgetary plan. The Two-Pack also enshrined the right of 
national parliaments to convene a Commissioner in the context of the 
assessment of draft budgetary plans and the Excessive Deficit Procedure , 6
but national parliaments have been reluctant to use that possibility, although 
the Five Presidents’ Report of June 2015 encouraged them to do so.  The 7
adoption of the European Commission’s opinion on a draft budgetary plan 
could nevertheless be an opportunity for a national parliament to scrutinise 
the opinion and (eventually) to articulate its own view in the form of a report 
or communication. 
The second stage of the European Semester consists of the Annual Growth 
Survey, the Alert Mechanism Report and the Euro area recommendation. The 
European Commission publishes its assessment of the economic situation 
(Annual Growth Survey) and the scoreboard of the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure (Alert Mechanism Report) in November. Since the 
European Semester cycle of 2017, the European Commission puts forward its 
 See European Union, Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 5
Council on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and 
ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area.
 The national parliament from any Euro area country can ask the Commission to present its 6
opinion on the draft budgetary plan and a recommendation issued in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure in case of a recommendation issued because of a risk of non-compliance with the 
deadline to correct an excessive deficit (Article 7(3) and Article 11(2) of Regulation 473/2013).
 European Commission, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (Report by Jean-7
Claude Juncker in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and 
Martin Schulz), June 2015, p. 17.
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Euro area recommendation at the same time. Several countries challenged 
the Commission’s view that the Euro area required a positive fiscal stance. 
The recommendation that was ultimately adopted by the Council in 2017 was 
modified insofar as it (only) recommended an overall fiscal stance of the Euro 
area that was neutral. A critical political moment in the European Semester, 
as part of this second stage, is the European Council in March, when member 
states “claim political control over the process” (Crum 2018: 279), but the 
summit has generally only endorsed the economic priorities that have been 
put forward by the European Commission in the Annual Growth Survey: It 
has not been the place and the moment for debating or deciding EU-wide 
economic policy priorities.  
In the third stage, the European Semester moves to the national level: 
Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes are 
the two documents that contain the national governments’ plans, promises 
and pledges in the area of fiscal and economic policies.  According to the Five 8
Presidents’ Report of June 2015, national parliaments should “[a]s a rule […] 
be closely involved in the adoption of National Reform and Stability 
Programmes.”  In its communication “On steps towards Completing 9
Economic and Monetary Union” of October 2015, the European Commission 
stressed that National Reform Programmes “should become an instrument 
for member states to respond to the Commission analysis by presenting 
forward-looking policy initiatives.”  Most national parliaments scrutinise 10
Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes ex-
ante –– before their governments submit them to the European Commission 
(Hagelstam et al. 2018). In some countries, however, national parliaments 
 Euro area members draft/submit Stability Programmes while EU member states whose 8
currency is not the Euro draft/submit Convergence Programmes.
 European Commission, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (Report by Jean-9
Claude Juncker in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and 
Martin Schulz), June 2015, p. 17.
 European Commission, On steps towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, 10
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Central Bank, COM(2015) 600 final, 21 October 2015, p. 3.
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are only able to scrutinise Stability or Convergence Programmes and 
National Reform Programmes ex-post –– after they were sent to Brussels.  11
The fourth stage of the European Semester contains the “result” of the 
European Semester as a coordination and surveillance cycle, the Country-
specific recommendations that provide guidance for reform. They are drafted 
by the European Commission, member states adopt them in the Council (the 
possibility to amend them by RQMV exists) and are expected to take these 
recommendations into account when they develop their national fiscal and 
economic policies. The European Commission monitors the implementation of 
the Country-specific recommendations, but even though it claims that the 
European Semester has become “an important vehicle for delivering reforms 
at national and EU level” , most member states have a low implementation 12
record for Country-specific recommendations (Darvas and Leandro 2015; 
Deroose and Griesse 2014; Efstathiou and Wolff  2018; see also Verdun and 
Zeitlin 2018: 140). The German government claimed in 2014 that member 
states “hardly ever” conducted a political debate about Country-specific 
recommendations.  The principal venue for discussing these 13
recommendations in the national political arena would be national 
parliaments (Kreilinger 2016: 40). Even though most national parliaments 
scrutinise the Country-specific recommendations (Hallerberg et al. 2018), 
parliamentary involvement could be improved: The recommendations could 
be an agenda item in parliamentary committees or even plenary sessions and 
could be the subject of hearings with the national government and the 
European Commission. This echoes the Five Presidents’ Report which 
referred to Country-specific recommendations and national budgetary 
 In this respect, Kreilinger (2016) uses a different classification than Hallerberg et al. (2012, 11
2018) whose ex-ante/ex-post classification refers to the European Semester cycle as a whole: 
Hallerberg et al. classify scrutiny of the Stability Programme or the National Reform 
Programme generally as ex-ante and scrutiny of Country-specific recommendations generally 
as ex-post.
 European Commission, On steps towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, 12
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Central Bank, COM(2015) 600 final, 21 October 2015, p. 3.
 German Federal Government (Federal Ministry of Finance and Federal Ministry for 13
Economic Affairs and Energy), Letter to Mr Katainen. 20 October 2014. On file with the 
author.
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procedures when it suggested that the European Commission “should work 
out model arrangements to make interaction with national parliaments more 
efficient.”   14
In short: There is plenty of room for national parliaments to become 
involved. The country studies in the next four sections examine the legal 
provisions for parliamentary involvement in France, Germany, Ireland and 
Portugal –– as well as how the national parliaments in these countries 
actually scrutinise the European Semester.  
A.1  French Assemblée nationale: Adaptation without 
obligation 
Legal provisions in France 
In France, the European Semester is subject to specific procedures for 
parliamentary involvement (see e.g. Rittberger and Winzen 2015: 437). The 
French parliament has adapted to the European Semester by following the 
different stages of the European Semester, for instance plenary debates on 
the Stability Programme and information reports adopted by the European 
affairs committee on the Annual Growth Survey, the Country-specific 
recommendations or the European Commission’s opinion on the draft 
budgetary plan.  15
The government shall transmit the draft Stability Programme to 
parliament two weeks before it is submitted to the European Commission.  16
 European Commission, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (Report by 14
Jean-Claude Juncker in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario 
Draghi and Martin Schulz), June 2015, p. 17. See also Chapter 6 Conclusion (sub-section 6.3.2 
National parliaments and reforming the Economic and Monetary Union), on possible model 
arrangements.
 Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°3195 sur le traitement des affaires 15
européennes à l'Assemblée nationale, 3 November 2015, p. 32.
 République française, Article 14 de la loi n°2010-1645 du 28 décembre 2010 de 16
programmation des finances publiques pour les années 2011-2014.
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The National Reform Programme, however, is regarded as an explanatory 
document prepared for the European Commission by government, not as a 
programming document, and is therefore not specifically examined or debated 
in parliament. In general, the parliamentary role in the drafting of both 
documents is “marginal” , but Stability Programme and the National Reform 17
Programme are discussed in a hearing with the responsible Minister(s) in the 
Finance committee of the Assemblée nationale. The practice of making the 
Stability Programme to the subject of a plenary debate and vote on a 
declaration of the government , however, does not give MPs the power to 18
amend the programme: 
“We demanded to have a right to vote on it, it is now subject to a vote, but 
to a vote without the possibility to present amendments which is quite 
distinctive and very formal, because generally the majority votes in 
favour of the Stability Programme.”   19
Interestingly, the government is not even obliged to use this procedure for 
the parliamentary scrutiny of the Stability Programme: The European affairs 
committee of the Assemblée nationale concedes that the provision on the 
Stability Programme according to which parliament shall debate this draft 
and shall vote  has “no binding force since such an obligation is not 20
enshrined in the [French] Constitution.”  Thus the decision to organise such 21
a debate and to attach a vote to it or not is entirely within the discretion of 
the government.   22
Scrutiny practices in France 
The above-mentioned procedure was used in 2011, 2013 and 2014, but it was 
not used in 2015 for party-political reasons (see also Jančić 2016: 243). In 
 Interview with an EU affairs advisor in the Assemblée nationale, 7 November 2016.17
 République française, Article 14 de la loi n°2010-1645 du 28 décembre 2010 de 18
programmation des finances publiques pour les années 2011-2014.
 Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016. 19
 République française, Article 14 de la loi n°2010-1645 du 28 décembre 2010 de 20
programmation des finances publiques pour les années 2011-2014.
 Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°3195 sur le traitement des affaires 21
européennes à l'Assemblée nationale, 3 November 2015, p. 33.
 Ibid., p. 30.22
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2016, the Assemblée nationale debated the Stability Programme, but did not 
vote on it. In 2012 and 2017, neither a plenary debate nor a vote took place –– 
due to the end of the legislative term ahead of French presidential and 
parliamentary elections.   23
In 2014, the new French government under Prime Minister Manuel Valls 
faced a rebellion from the left wing of the Socialist Party. Although some left-
wing MPs had expected that the government would slow down the reduction 
of the deficit, the Stability Programme pencilled the deficit for 2015 at exactly 
3% through “a mix of fairly ambitious budget savings and improved growth 
forecasts.”  As a consequence, around 100 MPs raised their discontent and 24
only few voices supported the Prime Minister.  In order to appease the 25
concerns of many of its MPs about the welfare spending freeze announced in 
the Stability Programme, the government made some last-minute 
concessions. But in the end, there were still 41 Socialist MPs who abstained 
and 3 who voted against, while 242 Socialist MPs voted in favour of the 
government’s declaration on the Stability Programme. MPs from the UMP 
opposition, alongside the Greens and the Front de Gauche voted 
overwhelmingly against; the centrist UDI party mostly abstained. The 
Stability Programme passed by 265 votes to 232.   26
 By means of updating this assessment, it is important to note that, in 2018, the French 23
Assemblée nationale debated and voted the Stability Programme on 18 April 2018: 368 MPs 
voted in favour and 169 MPs against.
 Squaring the Circle, The Economist, 23 April 2014, https://www.economist.com/blogs/24
charlemagne/2014/04/french-public-finances.
 Plan d'économies : qui votera le texte de Manuel Valls ?, Le Monde, 28 April 2014, http://25
www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2014/04/28/parti-par-parti-qui-votera-le-pacte-de-
stabilite-presente-par-manuel-valls_4408618_4355770.html, 
Caresche, Christophe (PS), “Un moment de vérité”, Le Monde, 25 April 2014, http://
www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/04/25/un-moment-de-verite_4407025_3232.html. 
 Assemblée nationale, Analyse du scrutin n° 786, Première séance du 29/04/2014, Scrutin 26
public sur la déclaration du Gouvernement sur le projet de programme de stabilité pour 
2014-2017 (en application de l'article 50-1 de la Constitution), http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/scrutins/jo0786.asp. 
In 2013, only three Socialist MPs had abstained and two had voted against the Stability 
Programme. See Assemblée nationale, Analyse du scrutin n° 512, Deuxième séance du 
23/04/2013, Scrutin public sur le programme de stabilité de la France 2013-2017 (sur la 
déclaration du Gouvernement en application de l'article 50-1 de la Constitution), http://
www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/detail/(legislature)/14/(num)/512.  
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !97
Appendix A (European Semester)
A year later, in 2015, the government shunned away from the risk of 
holding a debate and a vote that would again have exposed splits within the 
Socialist Party about the fiscal and economic policy.  A senior Socialist MP 27
explains: “Let’s be clear: Why was there no vote? Because the government 
thought that it would not have a majority. […] So it simply abolished the 
examination in plenary session and the vote, using the parliamentary Easter 
vacations as an excuse.”  28
Debating the European Semester in the French Assemblée nationale  29
In 2016, a plenary debate on the Stability Programme took place in the 
Assemblée nationale on 26 April 2016 , but it was not followed by a vote. The 30
opposition objected to the government’s approach not to initiate a debate 
followed by a vote: 
“I begin this short intervention by regretting that the Government has 
not taken the initiative to hold a debate followed by a vote under Article 
50, paragraph 1, of the Constitution. [...]. We multiply the votes on 
secondary subjects, but whenever we talk about economics and public 
finances, the Government seems to fear the discussion. Nevertheless, the 
stability program transmitted to Brussels […] constitutes one of the most 
important commitments that our country can take. [...] Yes, this 
legislative term will have been marked by a further weakening of the role 
of our assembly!” (Gilles Carrez, LR, AN-ES-2016: 2837) 
 In 2014, a vote on the Stability Programme took place: L'Assemblée s'apprête à voter le 27
programme de stabilité, Libération, 29 April 2014, http://www.liberation.fr/france/2014/04/29/l-
assemblee-vote-le-programme-de-stabilite_1006872. In 2015, the Stability Programme was not 
voted in parliament: Pacte de stabilité: l’UMP regrette l’absence de vote à l’Assemblée, Le 
Figaro, 7 April 2015, http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/
2015/04/07/25002-20150407ARTFIG00255-pacte-de-stabilite-l-ump-regrette-l-absence-de-vote-
a-l-assemblee.php. See also Programme de stabilité 2015: députés et sénateurs privés de vote, 
malgré la loi, Contre la Cour, 15 April 2015, http://www.contrelacour.fr/programme-
stabilite-2015-parlement-prive-vote/.
 Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016.  28
See also “Pas de vote pour cause de vacances”, Le Canard enchainé, 15 April 2015, p. 2.
 See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (section 2.4 29
Three comparative studies of national parliaments and EU Economic Governance).
 Assemblée nationale, Journal officiel, 173e séance, Compte rendu intégral, 2e séance du 30
mardi 26 avril 2016, 7. Débat sur le programme de stabilité 2016-2019, 2835-2853 (quoted in 
the following as AN-ES-2016). All quotes were translated by the author.
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !98
Appendix A (European Semester)
MPs from the governing Socialist Party criticised last year’s Council 
recommendation on the path for reducing the budget deficit of France –– even 
though that decision had been taken with the participation of the French 
government in the Council of the EU: 
“I fully endorse the Government’s choice of a reasonable balance between 
consolidating public finances and supporting growth and not to follow the 
Council recommendation.” (Valérie Rabault, PS, AN-ES-2016: 2836) 
“The Council recommendation last year was to make a bigger structural 
adjustment […]. The Government has, it seems to me, done well in 
holding on to its position against the Commission.” (Christophe Caresche, 
PS, AN-ES-2016: 2849) 
Unsurprisingly, opposition MPs criticised the government’s fiscal policy: 
“The government finds the 2015 results excellent and boasts of them, but 
looking at them closely, they are not so good [...]. Moreover, the 3.5% 
deficit in 2015 must be compared to an average deficit of the Euro area 
countries at 2.1%.” (Gilles Carrez, LR, AN-ES-2016: 2837) 
Les Républicains’ Gilles Carrez, the chairman of the Budget committee, 
also called the National Reform Programme “empty of reform” and concluded 
that the government was lacking courage, lucidity and coherence: 
“[T]he Government and its majority lack courage, lucidity and coherence. 
Alas, I do not think that less than a year from the end of this legislature, 
we will finally embark on the structural reforms that our country sorely 
needs.” (Gilles Carrez, LR, AN-ES-2016: 2838) 
Finally, there was little criticism of fiscal and economic policy coordination 
processes, with the exception of Socialist MP Valérie Rabault who argued 
that the EU institutions did not sufficiently take into account the objectives 
of the “Europe 2020” strategy (AN-ES-2016: 2836).  
Other scrutiny activities in the French Assemblée nationale 
Between 2013 and 2017, a significant number of rapports d’information on 
the European Semester was drafted and adopted by the Assemblée nationale 
(see Table A.1). Several “Résolutions européennes” addressed the European 
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Semester.  For instance, the Assemblée nationale “invited […] the 31
government to consult it at the major stages of the European Semester and 
the budgetary evaluation.”  32
The fact that plenary debate and vote about the Stability Programme are 
at the discretion of the government calls for other ways to scrutinise and to 
exercise influence: The “Résolution européenne sur la gouvernance de la zone 
euro” of 3 January 2016 insists on the necessity to have the Assemblée 
nationale present at all stages of the European Semester  and that it should 33
be involved in the drafting of the Stability Programme and the National 
Reform Programme. It would also be essential to guarantee the right to 
debate and vote on these programmes in parliament, if necessary via a 
revision of the Constitution that obliges the government to submit the 
Stability Programme and the National Reform Programme to the Assemblée 
nationale and the Sénat at least two weeks before their transmission to the 
European Commission.  In 2016, the Assemblée nationale reaffirmed its 34
willingness to be granted the power to amend these programmes.  Finally, 35
the government’s position in the dialogue with the European Commission 
could be monitored through the participation of representatives of the 
Assemblée nationale in the process of exchanges with the European 
Commission that takes place before the government presents the Stability 
Programme and the National Reform Programme.   36
 Assemblée nationale, Résolution sur les orientations européennes de politique économique, 31
15 March 2013, TA n° 95. 
Assemblée nationale, Résolution sur l'avis de la Commission européenne sur les programmes 
de stabilité et de réforme de la France, 11 August 2013, TA n° 205.
 Assemblée nationale, Résolution sur l’ancrage démocratique du gouvernement économique 32
européen, 27 novembre 2012, TA n° 48, point 5. 
See also Assemblée nationale, Résolution sur le renforcement de l’Union économique et 
monétaire, 15 January 2017, TA n° 884, point 30.
 Assemblée nationale, Résolution sur la gouvernance de la zone euro, 3 January 2016, TA n° 33
654, point 10.
 See Assemblée nationale, Rapport d'information N°3195 sur le traitement des affaires 34
européennes à l’Assemblée nationale, 3 November 2015, pp. 45-46.
 Assemblée nationale, Résolution sur la gouvernance de la zone euro, 3 January 2016, TA n° 35
654, point 10.
 See Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°3195 sur le traitement des affaires 36
européennes à l'Assemblée nationale, 3 November 2015, pp. 45-46.
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The European Semester or, more specifically, the Stability Programme 
was addressed in parliamentary questions during the XIVe legislative term of 
the Assemblée nationale (2012 to 2017): A total of 77 written questions and 
32 Questions au Gouvernement were asked by MPs. Over the years, the 
number of both types of questions decreased (see Table A.1). 
Table A.1  European Semester scrutiny activities in the French 
Assemblée nationale (2013-2017) 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of parliamentary documentation . 37
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Plenary debates and 
votes
PStab:  
23 April 2013 
Yes: 297 
No: 220
PStab:  
30 April 2014 
Yes: 265  
No: 232
No debate,  
no vote
PStab:  
26 April 2016 
(no vote)
No debate,  
no vote
Committee meetings Finance 
committee  
17 April 2013
Finance 
committee  
23 April 2014
Finance 
committee  
17 April 2015 
22 April 2015
Finance 
committee  
13 April 2016
Finance 
committee  
12 April 2017
Reports or 
Resolutions
AGS: Rapport 
d’information 
26 Feb 2013 
PStab: 
Rapport 
d’information 
17 April 2013 
CSRs: Rapport 
d’information 
26 June 2013
AGS: 
Communicatio
n 26 Feb 2014 
CSRs: 
Rapport 
d’information 
24 June 2014
AGS+DBP: 
Rapport 
d’information 
17 Dec 2014 
PStab: 
Rapport 
d’information 
22 April 2015 
CSRs: 
Communicatio
n 24 June 2015
AGS+DBP: 
Rapport 
d’information 
16 Dec 2015 
PStab: 
Rapport 
d’information 
20 April 2016 
CSRs: 
Rapport 
d’information 
29 June 2016
(AGS+DBP): 
Rapport 
d’information 
20 Dec 2016 
PStab: 
Rapport 
d’information 
• Questions to the 
government: 
• Written questions:
13 
32
12 
25
4 
10
2 
5
1 
1
Direct engagement 
with the European 
Commission (hearing 
with Commissioner)
18 June 2013 14 Oct 2014 3 June 2015 
25 Nov 2015
8 June 2016 
5 Oct 2016
14 Dec 2016
 Committee meetings: Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°4547 sur l’activité de la 37
commission des finances au cours de la XIVe législature, 22 February 2017, p. 44. 
Reports and resolutions: Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°4605 sur le bilan 
d’activité de la commission des Affaires europénnes (XVIème législature), 4 April 2017, pp. 
34-36.  
Direct engagement with the European Commission: Ibid., p. 36.  
“Questions au Gouvernement” and “Questions écrites”: Own data collection “Programme de 
Stabilité” on www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/recherche/questions/14. 
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A.2  German Bundestag: Parliamentary inertia  
Legal provisions in Germany 
In Germany, no legal obligations or rules exist for parliamentary involvement 
in the European Semester beyond what is foreseen in normal EU affairs (see 
e.g. Rittberger and Winzen 2015: 437). The government is not obliged to 
specifically involve the national parliament in the European Semester. 
According to one interview partner, a clerk in the EU affairs directorate in 
the German Bundestag, “[t]he European Semester is a case where the 
German Bundestag could and should do more.”  Senior MPs from the 38
governing parties in the 2013-17 legislature, CDU and SPD, agree that the 
European Semester “is the instrument that could be used more intensively”  39
and that “we still have an upward potential there.”  40
Scrutiny practices in Germany 
The Bundestag receives the Stability Programme for consideration before it is 
submitted to the European Commission. It would have the possibility to 
adopt a non-binding opinion.  The Bundestag “receives all the documents, it 41
just does not do enough with them.”  Unlike in the national parliaments of 42
most other EU member states, the main parliamentary responsibility for the 
National Reform Programme is attributed to the Economic affairs committee 
(see Hallerberg et al. 2018: 264) which usually holds a debate before the 
programme is submitted to the European Commission at the end of April.  43
Other committees, including the European affairs and the Budget committee, 
also receive the document. From time to time, the European affairs and the 
 Interview with a clerk in the EU affairs directorate of the German Bundestag, 2 March 2017.38
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), 8 March 2017.39
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (CDU), 22 March 2017.40
 European Parliament, Review of Stability and Convergence Programmes by National 41
Parliaments within the framework of the European Semester (Spotlight on Parliaments in 
Europe, N°2), November 2014, pp. 2-3.
 Interview with a clerk in the EU affairs directorate of the German Bundestag, 2 March 2017.42
 For instance, the National Reform Programme was debated in the Economic affairs 43
committee on 22 April 2015 and 3 April 2014; 12 June 2013 is the exception.
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Economic affairs committee squabble about who is in charge. The European 
affairs committee therefore started to conduct ex-ante scrutiny of the 
National Reform Programme:  
“When the first draft and the second draft are ready, we invite the 
Federal Ministry of the Economy, then the State Secretary appears and it 
is being discussed. Then it is an agenda item and both drafts are called in 
committee and there is an exchange of views […]. This happens in March 
and April, before the government sends the programme to Brussels.”  44
Interview partners generally agree that the division of labour between the 
committees is not entirely straightforward, stems from historic reasons and 
means in its result that the European Semester is insufficiently accompanied 
by the German Bundestag.  The submission of the Stability Programme or 45
the National Reform Programme to the European Commission does, in any 
case, not depend on parliamentary approval. 
Occasionally the Bundestag holds plenary debates that are specifically 
dedicated to the European Semester.  However, in some cases during the 46
18th legislative term, these plenary debates did not actually take place: MPs 
did not deliver their speeches to the plenary, but the texts of the speeches 
were only added to the plenary protocol.   47
 Interview with a clerk in the European affairs committee of the German Bundestag, 31 44
August 2017.
 Interview with a clerk in the EU affairs directorate of the German Bundestag, 2 March 2017.45
 By means of updating this assessment, it is important to note that, in 2018, the German 46
Bundestag debated the National Reform Programme as part of the Questions to the 
Government with the Federal Minister for the Economy, Peter Altmaier, on 25 April 2018. The 
Minister’s introductory statement lasted for five minutes and he then replied to questions by 
MPs. 
 This occurred on 13 November 2014 (Plenarprotokoll 18/66, Anlage 9), 27 March 2015 47
(Plenarprotokoll 18/98, Anlage 9) and 11 June 2015 (Plenarprotokoll 18/109, Anlage 4). 
Plenary debates took place on 3 April 2014 (Plenarprotokoll 18/26) and 28 April 2016 
(Plenarprotokoll 18/167).
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Debating the European Semester in the German Bundestag   48
The plenary debate about the National Reform Programme 2016 which was 
hold on 28 April 2016  allows to highlight the conflict lines between the 49
government and opposition.The debate suffered from weak attendance as it 
took place at 10pm on a Thursday evening and it lasted for only 25 minutes. 
No member of the government participated.  
But the German current account surplus, criticised by the European 
Commission in the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure and an in-depth 
review , was one of the issues that was addressed prominently. MPs from 50
the governing parties supported the government, as for example a CSU 
backbencher: “[T]he EU Commission has not been able to identify any 
imbalances that could jeopardise stability now or in the future. According to 
the Commission, there are imbalances, but not excessive imbalances.”  51
Opposition MPs from Die Linke and B’90/Die Grünen challenged the 
government’s position on the current account surplus and its justification in 
the National Reform Programme: 
“This foreign trade surplus has nothing, but nothing to do with a healthy 
economic policy. It is interesting, however, that the Federal government 
addresses the criticism from the European Commission in this report and 
tries to refute it. The government does not succeed. Here, Germany 
breaks EU rules.” (Michael Schlecht, DIE LINKE, BT-ES-2016: 16488B) 
“You may find this uncomfortable [...], because the European Commission 
writes down something which you, as the Federal government, are unable 
to achieve. [...] What you do is a proof of these shortcomings.” (Katharina 
Dröge, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-ES-2016: 16491A) 
 See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (section 2.4 48
Three comparative studies of national parliaments and EU Economic Governance).
 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/167, Stenographischer Bericht der 167. Sitzung 49
vom 28. April 2016, Tagesordnungspunkt 16 “Beratung der Unterrichtung durch die 
Bundesregierung: Nationales Reformprogramm 2016”, 16487A-16492C (quoted in the following 
as BT-ES-2016). All quotes were translated by the author.
 See European Commission, Results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 50
on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, COM (2014) 150 final, 5 March 
2014.
 Andreas Lenz, CSU, BT-ES-2016: 16489B.51
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With respect to a procedural issue, Green MP Katharina Dröge referred to 
her party’s proposals to take the National Reform Programme seriously and 
let the Bundestag vote on it. She also sarcastically noted that the discussion 
of the National Reform Programme took place two hours earlier than in 2015:  
“One last sentence on the National Reform Program. It is a success that 
we are discussing this at 9 pm this evening. Last time we discussed it at 
11 pm. It is also a success that we do talk about it in the Bundestag before 
it is sent to Brussels.” (Katharina Dröge, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 
BT-ES-2016: 16491C-D) 
The plenary debate also provided an opportunity for the governing party 
CSU to criticise the conduct of fiscal and economic surveillance at the EU 
level:  
“In order to strengthen competitiveness in the European Union, above all, 
structural reforms [...] are necessary. [...] Moreover, it would be better to 
review the Maastricht criteria more rigorously and concentrate more on 
those countries that have weaknesses in their competitiveness.” (Andreas 
Lenz, CSU, BT-ES-2016: 16489A) 
Instead of a general plenary debate about the European Semester, as the 
one that exceptionally took place on 28 April 2016, it might be more effective 
to target the position of the Federal government in the Council and its 
position in the dialogue with the European Commission, as well as the 
Country-specific recommendations: “There, the German Bundestag is very 
reluctant compared to what could be done with the European Semester.”  52
The European Semester plays a role in the Budget committee of the 
Bundestag, but, as a senior CDU MP observes: 
“One must look: What are the topics? Yes, there is a proposal. Okay. 
Or what are the topics in which one invests oneself, undertakes an 
intensive dialogue [with the government] and says, ‘No, not here, but 
there’.”   53
For many MPs, the conclusion seems to be that the European Semester is 
not salient enough. With respect to the scrutiny of Country-specific 
recommendations, the study by Hallerberg et al. (2018: 258) reports that, in 
 Interview with a clerk in the EU affairs directorate of the German Bundestag, 2 March 2017.52
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (CDU), 22 March 2017.53
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2015, they appeared on the agenda of the Budget committee, but were not 
debated.  
Other scrutiny activities in the German Bundestag 
Between 2013 and 2017 five motions for a resolution in the German 
Bundestag targeted the European Semester. One of them was adopted. It was 
tabled in 2015 by the governing parties CDU/CSU and SPD and called for 
“strengthening, better implementing and further developing” the European 
Semester.  According to CDU/CSU and SPD, the European Commission 54
should prepare its opinions on budgetary plans and National Reform 
Programmes and the corresponding Country-specific recommendations on the 
basis of “objective criteria and without political intervention by the member 
states”. Such a transparent procedure could help to ensure that the 
Commission’s comments were not understood by the member states as an 
intrusion into their sovereignty and, as a result, would be better 
implemented.  A competing motion for a resolution  tabled by the Greens 55 56
was voted down by the governing parties, whereas their own motion was 
adopted on 11 June 2015.  The opposition party B’90/Die Grünen had 57
already tabled a similar motion for a resolution on the National Reform 
Programme 2014. At that time it had reacted to the in-depth review of 
German economic imbalances (notably the current account surplus) by the 
European Commission which had made the following assessment: 
 Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag “Das Europäische Semester stärken, besser umsetzen und 54
weiterentwickeln”, Drucksache 18/4426, 24 March 2015. 
 Ibid. 55
 Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag “Nationales Reformprogramm 2015 – Wirtschaftspolitische 56
Steuerung in der EU ernst nehmen und Investitionen stärken”, Drucksache 18/4464, 26 March 
2015.
 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht zu dem Antrag “Das Europäische 57
Semester stärken, besser umsetzen und weiterentwickeln”, Drucksache 18/5071, 8 June 2015; 
Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht zu dem Antrag “Nationales Reformprogramm 2015 – 
Wirtschaftspolitische Steuerung in der EU ernst nehmen und Investitionen stärken”, 
Drucksache 18/4717, 23 April 2015. See Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/109 (11 June 
2015).
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“Germany is experiencing macroeconomic imbalances, which require 
monitoring and policy action. In particular, the current account has 
persistently recorded a very high surplus.”  58
The Greens had urged the Federal government to “take EU economic 
governance seriously and strengthen investment.”  The motion was defeated, 59
too.  The Left Party had tabled a motion for a resolution related to the 60
declaration of the Chancellor before the European Council meeting of March 
2014 in which it criticised the economic policy guidelines of the European 
Semester’s Annual Growth Survey and the different surveillance 
procedures.  In 2015, the Left Party then proposed a resolution that called 61
for reducing the current account surplus and changing wage policy.  Neither 62
of the two attempts was successful either.   63
In the 18th legislative term, the European Semester was rarely specifically 
addressed in parliamentary questions. Even at the time of the adoption of the 
new EU economic governance instruments in the 2009-13 legislative term, 
the Six-Pack that created the European Semester was only raised in 12% of 
the parliamentary scrutiny activities related to the Euro crisis (see Wonka 
and Göbel 2016: 225-27). When the European Semester was addressed from 
2013 onwards, proposals or initiatives of the Federal government for 
strengthening fiscal and economic coordination in the form of letters to 
 European Commission, Results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on 58
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, COM (2014) 150 final, 5 March 
2014, p. 13.
 Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag “Nationales Reformprogramm 2014 nutzen – 59
Wirtschaftspolitische Steuerung in der EU ernst nehmen und Investitionen stärken”, 
Drucksache 18/978, 2 April 2014.
 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht zu dem Antrag “Nationales 60
Reformprogramm 2014 nutzen – Wirtschaftspolitische Steuerung in der EU ernst nehmen und 
Investitionen stärken”, Drucksache 18/1675, 5 June 2014.  
The recommendation of the Economic affairs committee to reject the motion by B’90 Die 
Grünen was approved in a plenary vote on 13 November 2014 (Plenarprotokoll 18/66).
 Deutscher Bundestag, Entschließungsantrag zu der Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung 61
durch die Bundeskanzlerin zum Europäischen Rat am 20./21. März 2014 in Brüssel, 
Drucksache 18/853, 18 March 2014.
 Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag “Exportüberschüsse abbauen - Wende in der Lohnpolitik 62
einleiten”, Drucksache 18/4837, 6 May 2015. The motion was debated on 11 June 2015 
(Plenarprotokoll 18/109).
 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht zu dem Antrag “Exportüberschüsse 63
abbauen - Wende in der Lohnpolitik einleiten”, Drucksache 18/6251, 5 October 2015; see 
Plenarprotokoll 18/199 (11 November 2016).
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European Commissioners  or non-papers for the ECOFIN Council  usually 64 65
only prompted B’90/Die Grünen to ask written questions  for which it then 66
received written replies from a State Secretary in the Finance Ministry. In 
Germany, ministers hardly ever answer questions themselves : They 67
delegate the task to parliamentary State Secretaries which indicates that the 
procedure is not considered as politically very significant (see Rozenberg et al. 
2011: 346). 
A few “Kleine Anfragen” touched upon the European Semester. They are 
answered in writing and are often used by opposition parties as a preparatory 
tool for motions and resolutions (see Ismayr 2013: 326). The Left Party, for 
instance, questioned the Federal government about the “Strategic Agenda for 
the Union in Times of Change” adopted by the European Council of June 
2014 with respect to the need for structural reforms, flexibility in the 
Stability and Growth Pact underpinning the European Semester, economic 
policy convergence and social policies.  In August 2015, B’90/Die Grünen 68
enquired about European intrusion into national wage-setting systems and 
the position of the Federal government on the issue.  In February 2016, the 69
Left Party asked about the position of the Federal government on the 
proposal of the European Commission to create so-called Competitiveness 
Councils in EU member states.   70
 German Federal Government (Ministry of Finance and Ministry for Economic Affairs and 64
Energy), Letter to Mr Katainen. 20 October 2014. On file with the author.
 German Federal Government, German deliberations on further developing the European 65
Semester. Increasing the quality of the country-specific recommendations by improving the 
consultation process between the European Commission and Member States, 1 November 2016 
[non-paper]. On file with the author.
 E.g. Manuel Sarrazin (B’90 Die Grünen), in: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/11024 66
Q16, January 2017. See also Sarrazin, Manuel, Giegold, Sven and Dröge, Katharina (B’90 Die 
Grünen): Letter to Frans Timmermans, Jyrki Katainen, Valdis Dombrovskis and Pierre 
Moscovici, “Vorschläge zur Verbesserung des Europäischen Semester”, 19 December 2014. On 
file with the author.
 An exception is Federal Minister of the Economy Peter Altmaier in case of the National 67
Reform Programme 2018.
 See Deutscher Bundestag, Kleine Anfrage (Die Linke), Strategische Agenda für die 68
Europäische Union in Zeiten des Wandels, Drucksache 18/2317.
 See Deutscher Bundestag, Kleine Anfrage (B’90/Die Grünen), Eingriffe in nationale 69
Tarifsysteme – Haltung der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 18/5802.
 See Deutscher Bundestag, Kleine Anfrage (Die Linke), Wettbewerbsausschüsse in den 70
Euroländern, Drucksache 18/7348.
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Table A.2  European Semester scrutiny activities in the German 
Bundestag (2014-2017) 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of documents retrieved from the DIP21 search engine. 
2014 2015 2016 2017
Plenary 
debates
3 April 2014:  
Debate about motion 
Drucksache 18/978
27 March 2015:  
Debate about motion 
Drucksache 18/4464 (Speeches 
added to the plenary protocol)
28 April 2016:  
Debate about 
report by the 
Federal 
government on the 
National Reform 
Programme 2016
-/-
13 November 2014: 
Debate about 
recommendation and 
report on Drucksache 
18/1675  
(Speeches added to the 
plenary protocol)
11 June 2015:  
• Debate and recommendation 
on Drucksache 18/4426 
• Debate and recommendation 
on Drucksache 18/4464  
(Speeches added to the plenary 
protocol) 
Debate about motion 
Drucksache 18/4837
Committee 
meetings
National Reform 
Programme: Committee 
on Economics and 
Energy, 3 April 2014 
(responsible committee; 
other committees 
participating in the 
deliberations in an 
advisory capacity)
National Reform Programme: 
Committee on Economics and 
Energy, 22 April 2015 
(responsible committee; other 
committees participating in the 
deliberations in an advisory 
capacity)
National Reform 
Programme: 
Committee on 
Economics and 
Energy 
(responsible 
committee; other 
committees 
participating in the 
deliberations in an 
advisory capacity)
National Reform 
Programme: 
Committee on 
Economics and 
Energy, 22 March 
2017 (responsible 
committee; other 
committees 
participating in the 
deliberations in an 
advisory capacity)
Motions for 
resolutions
B’90/Die Grünen: 
Nationales 
Reformprogramm 2014 
nutzen - 
Wirtschaftspolitische 
Steuerung in der EU 
ernst nehmen und 
Investitionen stärken 
(Drucksache 18/978)
CDU/CSU, SPD: 
Das Europäische Semester 
stärken, besser umsetzen und 
weiterentwickeln (Drucksache 
18/4426)  
DIE LINKE:  
Exportüberschüsse abbauen – 
Wende in der Lohnpolitik 
einleiten (Drucksache 18/4837) 
B’90/Die Grünen: Nationales 
Reformprogramm 2015 - 
Wirtschaftspolitische Steuerung 
in der EU ernst nehmen und 
Investitionen stärken 
(Drucksache 18/4464)
-/- -/-
Reports or 
resolutions
Recommendation and 
Report (Drucksache 
18/1675)
Recommendation and Report 
of  5 October 2015 (Drucksache 
18/6251) 
Recommendation and Report 
of  8 June 2015 (Drucksache 
18/5071) 
Recommendation and Report 
of  23 April 2015 (Drucksache 
18/4717)
-/- -/-
Written or 
oral 
questions
Sarah Wagenknecht (Die 
Linke), Drucksache 
18/729 
Minor interpellation (Die 
Linke), Drucksache 
18/2317 
Minor interpellation (Die 
Linke), 
Drucksache 18/2404 
Manuel Sarrazin (B’90/
Die Grünen), 
Drucksache 18/3258, 
Q35
Minor interpellation (B’90/Die 
Grünen), Drucksache 18/5802
Minor 
interpellation (Die 
Linke), 
Drucksache 
18/7348
Manuel Sarrazin 
(B’90/Die 
Grünen), 
Drucksache 
18/11024 Q16+17
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A.3  Irish Dáil: Overall weakness in the budgetary 
procedure 
Ireland is, due to its fragile financial situation in the early 2010s, one of the 
countries that has been most affected by the new budgetary rules of EU 
economic governance (see Piedrafita 2014: 319). At the same time, Ireland’s 
constitutional architecture means that the executive is very strong vis-à-vis 
the legislature:  
“A fused executive-legislative in the lower house, an in-built government 
majority in the upper house, a budgetary process dominated by 
government, an especially strong whip system and a weak independent 
parliamentary culture has resulted in an exceptional executive 
dominance” (Coutts 2017: 238). 
Legal provisions in Ireland 
The Fiscal Responsibility Bill of 2012 incorporated the balanced budget rule 
into Irish law and, for instance, also foresees that in case of “significant 
deviation from the medium-term budgetary objective or from the agreed 
adjustment path towards it, the government must lay a correction plan before 
the Dáil within two months” (Piedrafita 2014: 330). However, according to the 
“Review of budgetary oversight by the Irish parliament” conducted by the 
OECD in 2016 (Downes and Nicol 2016), compared to other OECD countries, 
budget oversight is underdeveloped in Ireland: “[E]xisting procedures serve to 
keep the Dáil at a remove from the substance of the budget process” (Downes 
and Nicol 2016: 82).  
Scrutiny practices in the Irish Dáil 
In December 2010, the financial assistance programme for Ireland was 
formally agreed, the country was subject to a Memorandum of Understanding 
until late 2013 and therefore not part of the reporting requirements under 
the European Semester during that period.  
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In 2013, the Joint Committee on EU affairs, for the first time, held a 
debate on the draft National Reform Programme before it was finalised and 
submitted; the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform 
held a debate on the Stability Programme on the day it was submitted.  71
This practice continued in 2014; the debate on the Stability Programme took 
place earlier.  Generally, the European Semester is discussed only in 72
committee (see Maatsch 2017: 206). The chairman of the Oireachtas Joint 
Committee on EU affairs argued in January 2014 that “[t]his process for 
enhanced budgetary surveillance […] provides a valuable opportunity for 
Oireachtas Members […] to feed into Irish national budgetary decisions […] 
in a more meaningful way than ever before.”   73
Aleksandra Maatsch notes that during the 2014 European Semester cycle, 
“Irish parliamentarians posed a large number of written questions regarding 
the functioning of the European Semester” (Maatsch 2017: 206) and Gavin 
Barrett concludes that Ireland is adapting to the European Semester:  
“As regards economic governance, Ireland […] is transitioning from 
organising its budgetary policy in a way which takes into account only its 
own domestic standards, to adopting budgets which substantively and 
procedurally take into account the impact of national budgetary policies 
on other members of the Eurozone” (Barrett 2016: 9).  
The OECD has recommended that ex-ante parliamentary hearings should 
be held in the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform 
to inform the government’s drafting of the Stability Programme and that  
 COSAC, Annex to the Twenty-first Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. 71
Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny (Brussels: COSAC Secretariat, 
19 June 2014), p. 398.
 Minister for European Affairs, Paschal Donohoe: “At the start of April [2014], I had the 72
opportunity to present the draft National Reform Programme to the Joint Committee on 
European Union Affairs and Minister Noonan presented the draft Stability Programme 
Update to the Joint Committee on Finance and Public Expenditure before Easter.” See Irish 
Government (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Speech by the Minister for European 
Affairs, Paschal Donohoe at the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA): Ireland 
and the European Semester, 1 May 2014, https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/speeches/
speeches-archive/2014/may/ireland-in-european-semester/.
 “The Troika may be gone, but Ireland’s social problems remain”, Dominic Hannigan (Labour) 73
in TheJournal.ie, 27 January 2014, http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/the-troika-may-be-gone-
but-irelands-social-problems-remain-1284394-Jan2014/. 
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !111
Appendix A (European Semester)
“[t]he draft medium-term fiscal plan should then be submitted to the 
Dáil for approval before its presentation to the European Commission” 
(Downes and Nicol 2016: 68).  
In 2017, a draft of the Irish Stability Programme was presented to the Dáil 
on 11 April and the document was submitted to the European Commission on 
2 May 2017  –– in accordance with the European Semester’s requirements, 74
but no formal parliamentary approval took place.  
A.4  Portuguese Assembleia: Using and expanding 
powers 
Portugal was also severely hit by the financial and economic crisis and the 
government of Prime Minister Sócrates resigned in March 2011 after it had 
lost a vote on its “austerity budget” . The country received a bailout in May 75
2011, was subject to a Memorandum of Understanding from 2011 to 2014 and 
therefore not part of the reporting requirements under the European 
Semester during that period.  
Most recently, at the start of the 2017 European Semester cycle (when 
Portugal participated again for the third time), the European Commission 
found that the draft budgetary plan submitted by the Portuguese government 
was at risk of non-compliance with the provisions of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. The Commission saw a significant deviation from the required 
adjustment path towards the Medium Term Objective and non-compliance 
with the debt reduction benchmark.  In May 2017, however, Portugal could 76
 See Irish Government (Department of Finance), Stability Programme Update, April 2017, 74
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-semester-stability-programme-ireland-
en.pdf, p. i. 
 Portugal in crisis after prime minister resigns over austerity measures, 23 March 2011, 75
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/mar/23/portugal-government-collapses-eu-bailout-
looms.
 In August 2016, the Council agreed to the European Commission’s proposal of zero fines and 76
new deadlines for Portugal and Spain. See Council of the European Union, Press Release, 8 
August 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/08/09/excessive-
deficit-portugal-spain/.
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leave the Excessive Deficit Procedure and has now its lowest budget deficit 
since the early 1990s.   77
Legal provisions in Portugal 
There is no legal obligation for Portugal’s parliament to approve the Stability 
Programme, but the fall of the Sócrates Government in 2011 was “rooted in 
Parliament’s rejection of the S[tability] P[rogramme]” (Jančić 2016: 243). In 
reaction to the new EU economic governance, the European Scrutiny Act and 
the Budgetary Framework Act were amended: “Portugal has completely 
overhauled its parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs” (Jančić 2014: 2) and the 
information rights of the parliament in the annual budget procedure were 
also reinforced (see Fasone 2014b: 13). The government must submit the 
Stability Programme to parliament before sending it to the European 
Commission and the European Scrutiny Act provides for a plenary debate on 
it:  
“The Assembleia da República shall monitor and assess Portugal’s 
participation in the process of constructing the European Union, 
particularly by holding […] [a] plenary debate in which the Government 
shall take part, on the various instruments for the economic governance 
of the European Union that are included in the European Semester, and 
particularly on the Stability and Growth Programme, in the second 
quarter of the year.”   78
Scrutiny practices in the Portuguese Assembleia 
Hallerberg et al. (2018) suggest in their discussion of the Portuguese 
parliament being active in the scrutiny of the Stability Programme that 
“weak parliaments may exploit EU procedures to gain access to issues they 
would not otherwise have a chance to discuss” (Hallerberg et al. 2018: 265).  
 Portugal exits EU budget procedure six years after bailout, Financial Times, 22 May 2017, 77
https://www.ft.com/content/a1ab5468-3f8d-3363-8607-2a791c6cec18.
 Portuguese Republic, Article 4d, Law no. 43/2006 of 25 August 2006 as amended by Law no. 78
21/2012 of 17 May 2012, on the Monitoring, assessment and pronouncement by the Assembleia 
da República within the scope of the process of constructing the European Union.
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Generally speaking, in Portugal plenary debates have been increasingly 
used as “a powerful strategic tool for domestic politics” (Jančić 2015: 383) to 
provide a public forum for scrutinising and debating EU affairs. In terms of 
executive accountability in the European Semester, the government must 
provide a “reasoned explanation of any significant differences between its 
own macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts and those made by the 
European Commission” (Jančić 2016: 242-43) and include measures to correct 
deviations from the balanced budget rule into the Stability Programme. But 
“there is no mechanism for ensuring the compliance of the Government with 
its duty to information” (Fasone 2014b: 13) and the economic and financial 
crisis generally allowed for the Portuguese government to concentrate powers 
in its own hands and to strengthen its position compared to other domestic 
actors (see Moury and Standring 2017), like the national parliament. 
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !114
Chapter 4: European Stability Mechanism
Chapter 4: 
4   National parliaments and the 
European Stability Mechanism 
Compared to the European Semester in the previous chapter, the emergency 
regime of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) affects the budgetary powers 
of national parliaments in a different way, through paid-in capital and financial 
guarantees. In addition, the ESM offers the possibility to examine whether and, if 
yes, how national parliaments are able to oversee intergovernmental bodies 
outside the community framework.  
From a broader perspective and taking the overall structure of representative 
relations in the EU into account, as long as only some national parliaments are 
involved in the context of negotiations on a rescue package for a Euro area 
member in financial difficulties while other national parliaments are not involved 
at all, the channel of legitimacy that national parliaments provide for Euro area 
governance is characterised by asymmetries (especially if the recipient country 
simply has to acquiesce to the conditionality attached to the financial assistance).  
Because this is an accurate assumption about the state of ESM affairs, the 
analysis turns to the following question: Under what conditions do national 
parliaments get a substantial say on ESM rescue packages? The chapter examines 
how national parliaments are involved in practice by examining the various 
possible drivers for substantial parliamentary involvement in the context of the 
negotiations on the third rescue package for Greece that serves as a single case 
study to analyse how exactly parliamentary procedures unfold. 
Considering that only few national parliaments can rely on direct legal 
enabling clauses for substantial parliamentary involvement while in other 
national parliaments domestic political dynamics are the key explanatory factor, 
this chapter concludes that the high salience of the third rescue package for Greece 
played an important role in triggering the involvement of national parliaments. 
This should not be taken for granted. A more symmetric way of involving elected 
representatives from/in all Euro area members would have to build on some kind 
of joint parliamentary structure and simultaneously maintain national 
parliaments’ current prerogatives, since parliamentary powers or agenda setting 
powers cannot be simply taken away in democratic political systems. 
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The creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has been one of the 
major institutional innovations in reaction to the Euro crisis. As a vehicle to 
grant financial assistance to Euro area members experiencing or threatened 
by severe financing problems, the ESM can provide loans as part of 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes and has other instruments at its 
disposal to safeguard financial stability.  The ESM Treaty sets the legal 1
framework under which financial assistance can be granted after national 
procedures in ESM member states have been completed. Financial assistance 
is provided in the form of loans which are secured by financial guarantees 
from ESM member states.  Each ESM member country is fully liable for its 2
share of the ESM’s capital; financial assistance packages thus affect the 
budgetary rights of national parliaments.  
On Friday, 3 July 2015, at the beginning of the last regular session of the 
Bundestag before the summer break, President Norbert Lammert made an 
allusion that the plenary might have to reconvene soon and advised his 
colleagues in the following way:  
“Do not swim too far. Perhaps it would also be a good idea to plan 
short holidays in Berlin within walking distance of the Reichstag 
building for this year’s summer break in order to be prepared for all 
eventualities.”   3
Indeed, the German Bundestag was reconvened twice during the 2015 
summer break for debates and votes in relation to the third rescue package 
for Greece. The widespread focus on the crucial role of the Euro area’s largest 
 The Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) was signed by 1
those EU member states whose currency is the Euro. It entered into force in 2012 and has 
replaced previous ad-hoc arrangements and bodies for financial assistance that were set up in 
2010. The ESM has an authorised capital of about €700 bn (consisting of €80 bn paid-in capital 
as well as €620 bn committed callable capital) and a maximum lending capacity of €500 bn.
 Countries receiving financial assistance (against strict conditionality) benefit from the low 2
interest rates that the ESM pays on the financial markets. In exchange for committing 
towards –– and undertaking –– economic reform and fiscal consolidation, they do not need to 
issue or refinance their debt on the financial markets while they are in a financial assistance 
programme.
 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/116, Stenografischer Bericht der 116. Sitzung vom 3
3. Juli 2015, 11283B. Translated by the author.
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economy and the veto player role of its parliament in the context of the 
negotiations with Greece , however, is only one part of the story: Seven other 4
national parliaments were also involved in a substantial way.  
The request for ESM stability support that ultimately led to the third 
rescue package for Greece was preceded by the end of the second financial 
assistance package under the EFSF on 30 June 2015. Greece was close to 
exiting the Euro and only just before 9am on Monday, 13 July 2015, the 19 
Heads of State and Government at the Euro summit agreed on a statement 
which provided the basis for new financial assistance and in which the Greek 
authorities committed themselves “to legislate without delay a first set of 
measures”  by Wednesday, 15 July 2015. A conference call of the Eurogroup 5
yielded a positive assessment of these prior actions on that day. In view of a 
decision of the Board of Governors to start negotiations on a new ESM 
programme to be taken by the end of the week, relevant national procedures 
had to be completed by Friday, 17 July 2015. Greece also needed a “bridge 
financing” to meet its immediate financial needs. Importantly, the Euro 
summit had emphasised that “the start of negotiations does not preclude any 
final possible agreement on a new ESM programme” . About three weeks 6
later, the negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a 
financial assistance facility agreement were concluded. This, again, meant 
that the relevant national (parliamentary) procedures had to be completed 
ahead of the decision of the Board of Governors to approve the deal on 19 
August 2015. A day later Greece received the first tranche of the € 86 bn 
financial assistance package.  
 See, for example, The Guardian (Angela Merkel faces tough vote as German MPs set to rebel 4
over Greece, 17 July 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/17/angela-merkel-vote-
german-mps-rebel-greece-bailout-bundestag) and the Financial Times (Angela Merkel wins 
German parliament’s backing for Greece bailout, 17 July 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/
0c909836-2c72-11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7). 
 Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, 12 July 2015, SN 4070/15, http://5
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/pdf/20150712-eurosummit-
statement-greece/. 
 Ibid.6
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This chapter examines under what conditions national parliaments get a 
substantial say on ESM rescue packages. The third rescue package for Greece 
serves as a single case study to analyse how exactly parliamentary 
procedures unfolded. The different trajectories of parliamentary involvement 
that are identified in this chapter are evidence for national parliaments’ 
asymmetric empowerment in ESM affairs. In addition, Appendix B examines 
the eight creditor countries with substantial involvement by the national 
parliament, where lawmakers voted at least once in plenary or committee 
related to financial assistance for Greece in July or August 2015, in greater 
detail (see, for a brief overview Kreilinger 2015a).  7
Outline of this chapter 
The next section (4.1) describes the decision-making process in the ESM. 
After that, section 4.2 presents the analytical framework of this chapter and 
proposes six possible drivers of substantial parliamentary involvement in 
ESM rescue packages. On this basis, the following section (4.3) explains why 
national parliaments were substantially involved (or not). Section 4.4 then 
analyses different trajectories of parliamentary involvement and examines 
how, when and which bodies of national parliaments were active. This 
chapter concludes in section 4.5 by revisiting the tangled web of the ESM and 
its procedures. 
4.1  Decision-making on ESM rescue packages  
ESM decision-making procedures are, as the Five Presidents’ Report 
conceded, “complex and lengthy”  and the ESM has often been criticised for a 8
 The country studies can be found in Appendix B (Appendix to Chapter 4): Voting on the third 7
rescue package for Greece in eight national parliaments.
 European Commission (2015), Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (Report 8
by Jean-Claude Juncker in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario 
Draghi and Martin Schulz), p. 18.
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lack of transparency (see Ban and Seabrooke 2017; De Nes 2015) as well as 
for its “opacity, confidentiality and secrecy” (Simone 2017: 207). This section 
presents the legal provisions for granting stability support under the ESM 
Treaty. National parliaments are subsequently conceptualised as part of the 
chain of delegation behind ESM decision-making. This section finally 
describes the methodological framework of this chapter. 
Legal provisions in the ESM Treaty 
Article 13 of the ESM Treaty contains the legal provisions for granting 
stability support to a Euro area member in financial difficulties. Negotiations 
about financial assistance by the ESM are triggered by a request for stability 
support: “An ESM Member may address a request for stability support to the 
Chairperson of the Board of Governors.”  After receiving that request, the 9
Chairperson of the Board of Governors entrusts the European Commission, in 
liaison with the ECB, to carry out risk assessments on the financial stability 
of the Euro area, the sustainability of the public debt of the applicant country 
and its financing needs. Then, the Board of Governors may decide “to grant, 
in principle, stability support to the ESM Member concerned in the form of a 
financial assistance facility” .  10
If such a decision is adopted, negotiations can start after the ESM Board of 
Governors has 
“entrust[ed] the European Commission – in liaison with the ECB and, 
wherever possible, together with the IMF – with the task of 
negotiating, with the ESM member concerned, a MoU detailing the 
conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility.”   11
In parallel, the Managing Director of the ESM prepares the proposal for a 
financial assistance facility agreement. After that the Board of Governors 
decides to conclude the MoU and adopts the decision to grant stability 
support. As the last step, the MoU is signed by the European Commission on 
 Article 13(1) ESM Treaty.9
 Article 13(2) ESM Treaty.10
 Article 13(3) ESM Treaty.11
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behalf of the ESM, “subject to prior […] approval by the Board of 
Governors” , while the financial assistance facility agreement shall be 12
approved by the Board of Directors of the ESM  (see Figure 4.1). 13
Figure 4.1  The procedure for granting stability support
!  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
It is also important to note that under an emergency procedure in Article 4(4) 
ESM Treaty national “vetoes” from smaller Euro area members could be 
overturned , but the provision has never been used until now. If it were 14
used, it would severely damage the legitimacy of a decision to grant financial 
assistance. 
The ESM Treaty does not contain any provisions regarding parliamentary 
control , such as provisions to transmit documents, to inform or to seek the 15
approval of rescue packages from either national parliaments or the 
 Article 13(4) ESM Treaty.12
 Article 13(5) ESM Treaty.13
 Generally, decisions in the Board of Governors of the ESM are taken by mutual agreement, 14
but Article 4(4) ESM Treaty allows to decide with a super-qualified majority of 85%. This is 
subject to a positive assessment by the European Commission and the ECB decide that such 
assistance is of systemic importance.  
The voting power of national representatives in the Board of Governors of the ESM depends on 
their subscriptions to the authorised capital stock as set out in Annexes I and II to the ESM 
Treaty. Germany has a voting power of 27%; the voting power of Malta, the smallest member, 
is 0,1%.
 However, the ESM’s Managing Director Klaus Regling has reported on the ESM’s activities 15
to national parliaments of ESM member countries. He has also appeared before the ECON 
committee of the European Parliament for hearings and ESM representatives have spoken at 
the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (for 
more details on this conference, see Chapter 5). Such practices could be formalised. The ESM 
and the European Commission, for instance, agreed a formal cooperation agreement in April 
2018 (see Korhonen 2018: 72). 
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European Parliament. The only obligation is to make the report of the ESM’s 
Board of Auditors “accessible” to national parliaments.  The ESM stresses 16
that “[u]ltimate control […] is with national parliaments” , because the 17
members of its Board of Governors are, in their capacity as national Finance 
Ministers, accountable to national parliaments.  18
The chain of delegation in ESM affairs 
The ESM Treaty (e.g. Louis 2012; Pilz 2016; Tomkin 2013) and asymmetries 
between national parliaments in ESM affairs (Fasone 2014a; Höing 2015b; 
Rittberger and Winzen 2015) have been extensively examined in the 
literature. If one considers the consequences of non-involvement for 
democratic accountability and executive oversight (no accountability, no 
oversight), the question of the role of national parliaments in ESM decision-
making is an important question with broader implications for the Economic 
and Monetary Union (Benz 2013; Crum 2013).  
As the ESM is in no accountability relationship to any parliamentary body 
and national parliaments can only play a role via the oversight of national 
government representatives in ESM decision-making bodies, this chapter 
conceptualises ESM decision-making as a “chain of delegation” (Saalfeld 
2000; Strøm et al. 2003a).  National parliaments delegate decision-making 19
powers to the national government and its representative in the Board of 
Governors (see Figure 4.2). Article 13(3) ESM Treaty then delegates the 
negotiation and monitoring of financial assistance programmes to the Troika 
 Article 30(5) ESM Treaty.16
 European Stability Mechanism (2017), Explainer on the Transparency International report 17
on the ESM, Press Release, 6 March 2017, https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/
explainer-transparency-international-report-esm.
 The composition of the ESM’s Board of Governors and the Eurogroup is identical (the 18
Finance Ministers of Euro area countries), but how the two bodies are intertwined complicates 
holding them accountable: the former, an informal body based on Protocol No 14 annexed to 
the EU Treaties is not supposed to take decisions even though it prepares ESM decisions, and 
the latter is totally outside the EU’s legal framework.
 See also Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (sub-19
section 2.2.1 Executive-legislative relations, principals and agents).
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which acts as the agent of national representatives in the Board of Governors 
(see also da Conceição-Heldt 2016). 
Figure 4.2  The chain of delegation for negotiating stability support 
  !  
  Source: Own elaboration. 
Understanding the role of national parliaments 
Domestic procedures can turn national parliaments into veto players over 
opening and concluding the negotiations on the financial assistance package. 
National parliaments generally have policy influence if they act in their 
function as legislator via powers to delay, to veto or to amend a mandate or 
when they can present an opinion (see Kreppel 2014b: 117-19). Legislatures 
generally rely on receiving sufficient information to fulfil their control 
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function (Krehbiel 1992). In case of the ESM, national governments have the 
task to provide information about ESM activities to national parliaments.   20
Besides a right to be informed by their government, national parliaments 
can be asked to vote on motions related to the ESM that are prepared by the 
government (or tabled by parliamentary party groups); they can adopt 
opinions; they can be obliged to authorise decisions in which the national 
representative participates by voting a mandate that ties the hands of that 
representative in the Board of Governors; they can hold plenary debates 
about rescue packages; they can arrange committee hearings; and, finally, 
they can ask oral or written questions. National parliaments’ main possibility 
to become involved is via issuing a motion related to the negotiations or via 
issuing a mandate for the government representative in the Board of 
Governors. 
Previous research has shown that some national parliaments are required 
to vote binding mandates for the government representative in the Board of 
Governors of the ESM, while others only have weaker rights (Fasone 2014a: 
15-23; Höing 2015b; Rittberger and Winzen 2015). This leads to asymmetries 
in parliamentary involvement and in the bargaining strength of national 
governments, because greater domestic constraints mean an advantage at the 
international level that allow a negotiator to say: “‘I’d like to accept your 
proposal, but I could never get it accepted at home’” (Putnam 1988: 440).  
This chapter seeks to advance the literature on the ESM by turning away 
from the analysis of parliamentary prerogatives (Höing 2015b; Rittberger and 
Winzen 2015; Winzen 2017) towards the analysis of national parliaments’ 
actual activities: “[T]o gain a full picture of parliamentary strength, it is vital 
to take actual parliamentary behaviour into account” (Auel et al. 2015a: 65). 
The analysis adopts a rational-institutionalist perspective: (National) 
 For instance, the German Federal Constitutional Court demanded in its judgement of 12 20
September 2012 that ESM Treaty provisions on professional secrecy and immunity may not 
prevent the Bundestag from receiving all relevant information about ESM activities. The 
Contracting Parties to the ESM Treaty acknowledged this in an interpretative declaration to 
the ESM Treaty, signed on 27 September 2012. 
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political actors have clear and given interests and pursue them according to 
the institutional constraints that they face.  
Among all national parliaments in the Euro area, eight national 
parliaments were substantially involved in relation to the third rescue 
package for Greece (see Table 4.1).  Parliamentary activity without a vote 21
being taken in plenary or committee does not count as substantial 
involvement. Other national parliaments than the eight substantially 
involved legislatures played a smaller role , or none at all (see Kreilinger 22
2015a; Moschella 2017: 10; Wendler 2017: 180). This means that ten national 
parliaments were not substantially involved.  23
Table 4.1  Parliamentary involvement in relation to the third rescue 
package for Greece (2015) 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Notes: In case of bicameral systems, “national parliament” refers to the lower chamber. 
“Substantial parliamentary involvement” means that the national parliament voted at 
least once in plenary or committee related to financial assistance for Greece in July or 
August 2015. The recipient country (Greece) is not included.  
Substantially involved Not substantially involved
Austria 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Latvia 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Ireland 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia
 “Substantial parliamentary involvement” means that the national parliament voted at least 21
once in plenary or committee related to financial assistance for Greece in July or August 2015.
 Greece, the recipient country, is not included. See also Wendler (2017: 180) who uses “votes” 22
as defining parliamentary involvement, too. But, unlike this chapter, Wendler also includes 
Lithuania in that category. For Lithuania, see sub-section 4.3.3 Domestic political dynamics.
 An example of parliamentary activity without a vote is Ireland, where a parliamentary 23
committee debated before the start of negotiations.
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This overview of parliamentary involvement relates to earlier research on 
parliamentary prerogatives in ESM affairs (Höing 2015b; Rittberger and 
Winzen 2015: 435-37). One contribution has classified Estonia, Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands as having quasi-veto powers and Austria with 
partial veto-powers (Höing 2015b: 221-22).  Another contribution has found 24
that only the national parliaments in Austria, Estonia, Germany have 
obtained strong approval rights, while the rights of national parliaments in 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands related to ESM stability support are 
limited (Rittberger and Winzen 2015: 436). National parliaments’ actual 
involvement in the case of the third rescue package was not fully in line with 
these findings: More national parliaments (eight) than those which had been 
assessed as holding strong parliamentary prerogatives (only Estonia and 
Germany in both contributions) were substantially involved in case of the 
third rescue package for Greece.  This is one of the issues to be examined in 25
the next section of this chapter. 
Data, method and cases 
This chapter aims to identify the drivers behind parliamentary involvement 
in ESM affairs and pursues a systematic analysis of the two-level negotiation 
process on the third rescue package for Greece. Beyond prerogatives and 
legal provisions, it is important to know what national parliaments actually 
do in relation to an ESM rescue package. In order to explain parliamentary 
involvement, this chapter examines and compares the activities that national 
parliaments undertook in relation to the third rescue package for Greece in 
July and August 2015.  
The parliamentary strength and activity in EU affairs and the budget 
process and the situation of the national economy in the eight countries 
whose national parliaments were substantially involved are compared with 
 What Höing describes as “veto-powers” is a legal obligation to vote, while the notion of 24
“substantial parliamentary involvement” in this chapter covers all votes, also those that took 
place without a legal obligation.
 Latvia (national parliament substantially involved) and Lithuania (not substantially 25
involved) introduced the euro in 2014 and in 2015. Both were not covered by previous research.
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the ten countries whose national parliaments were not substantially involved 
in case of the third rescue package for Greece. The explanatory variables that 
are examined through the most common strategy to decide whether 
differences between two means are statistically significant, a t-test, include 
the index of EU control rights by Winzen (2012)  and the OPAL scores on 26
national parliaments’ institutional strength and activity in EU affairs. The 
OPAL institutional strength score measures access to information, the 
quality of the scrutiny infrastructure and the level of oversight/influence in 
national parliaments (Auel et al. 2015a: 66-71) while the OPAL activity score 
covers activity in terms of mandates/resolutions, committee meetings and 
opinions in national parliaments from 2010 to 2012 (Auel et al. 2015a: 71-74). 
For budgetary strength, the indices by Wehner (2006) and Hallerberg et al. 
(2012) measure access to budgetary information, time available for scrutiny, 
the government’s flexibility in implementing the budget and other items. 
Furthermore, a series of key macroeconomic indicators, already used by 
Crum (2013) and updated in this chapter, covers the GDP, unemployment, 
the current account and budget deficit/surplus. 
In order to capture the domestic political dynamics, this chapter then 
analyses the agenda-setting process that launched the respective 
parliamentary procedures, the content of the debates and the voting results. 
If a national parliament was not substantially involved, media reports, press 
releases and other documents are taken into account to illustrate the national 
debate about parliamentary involvement in relation to the third rescue 
package for Greece.  The level of analysis is, again, the national 27
(parliamentary) system. In addition to the previous evidence, insights from a 
small number of semi-structured interviews with MPs and administrators (in 
the two ESM member countries with the highest share of capital and 
 Compared to the Winzen 2012 index, his 2017 index (Winzen 2017) only uses a different 26
scale. The analysis in this chapter relies on Winzen 2012, because the index and its 0-2.5 scale 
have been used widely. 
 This can be found in greater depth in Appendix B, but all sections refer to the country 27
studies of Appendix B in a condensed form.
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guarantees, Germany and France) complement and allow to triangulate some 
of the findings. 
4.2  Driving factors for national parliaments’ 
involvement  28
The overall decision-making procedure for granting stability support begins 
with the request of an ESM member country for stability support and 
concludes when the MoU is signed. In this process, not only the provisions in 
Article 13 ESM Treaty, but also the unfolding of national procedures and the 
possibility of substantial parliamentary involvement must be taken into 
account (see Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3  National procedures and the procedure for granting ESM 
stability support 
!  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 See also the general introduction to “driving factors” in Chapter 2 (section 2.3 Not just 28
involved: Driving factors and ideal-typical models).
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In order to examine the question “under what conditions do national 
parliaments get a substantial say on ESM rescue packages?”, this section 
proposes six possible drivers for substantial parliamentary involvement in 
the ESM. It clusters the different possible drivers along three action logics 
(institutional path dependency, economic strength and domestic political 
dynamics) and discusses them one after the other. 
The literature on national parliaments and the ESM, in particular Höing 
(2015b) and Rittberger and Winzen (2015), identified previously strong 
powers of the national parliament in EU affairs or in the budget procedure 
and economic strength or financial leverage in the Euro area as the main 
explanatory factors for prerogatives of a national parliament in ESM affairs 
(see also Winzen 2017: 151-75). This study additionally proposes three 
driving factors related to domestic political dynamics. 
Institutional path dependency 
Historical institutionalism would assume that rights of national parliaments 
to grant (or withhold) a mandate for the national representative in the ESM 
Board of Governors come from strong EU scrutiny powers or a strong role in 
the budget process. The first set of possible drivers follows the assumption 
that when parliaments are “faced with new situations or challenges[, they] 
will draw on pre-existing institutions or patterns of behaviour rather than 
considering new ones” (Auel and Christiansen 2015: 266). But if “parliaments 
are already marginal […], further loss of institutional competences to the 
ESM should raise little criticism from national policy-makers” (Winzen 2017: 
163) and those weak parliaments are unlikely to be substantially involved in 
case of ESM rescue packages.  Whether parliamentary rights are used and 29
national parliaments become actually substantially involved when a Euro 
 Indeed, a national parliament may have had limited budget powers before the ESM was 29
created: The “power of the purse” (Wehner 2006), that parliaments have, varies widely: Many 
legislatures do not have the institutional means or the political independence to be influential 
budgetary actors. For these parliaments, the approval of the national budget is, according to 
Wehner (2010: 141), “little more than a constitutional myth”. See also Chapter 3 National 
parliaments in the European Semester.
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area member requests financial assistance from the ESM, is another 
question. Strong EU scrutiny powers and a strong role in the budget process 
are therefore necessary, but not sufficient conditions for substantial 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs. 
The first of the six possible drivers for substantial parliamentary 
involvement is strength/activity in EU affairs, the second driver is strength 
in the budget process. In order to measure those powers, this study relies on 
the index of EU control rights by Winzen (2012), the OPAL scores by Auel et 
al. (2015a) for national parliaments’ institutional strength and activities in 
EU affairs and on the indices by Hallerberg et al. (2012) and Wehner (2006, 
2010) for budgetary affairs.  30
Economic strength 
The third driver for substantial parliamentary involvement is economic 
strength. Creditor countries are asked to accept “ever more staggering 
commitments to cover the ever-increasing financial risks associated with a 
succession of rescue funds” (Scharpf 2012: 25). More specifically, while 
countries with a weak economy might need their own rescue package in the 
future, the national parliaments in economically strong countries could have 
a greater incentive to become substantially involved in ESM affairs (see 
Höing 2015b: 71): The redistributive effects of ESM rescue packages  31
threaten the economic and financial situation of creditor countries. National 
parliaments of creditor countries could therefore use their involvement to 
ensure strict conditionality of stability support. This reasoning follows the 
observation that redistributive effects are controversial in net contributor 
countries to the EU budget and have led to tighter scrutiny of national 
 A correlation table for the different institutional path dependency indices can be found in 30
Appendix E. Unsurprisingly, there are some rather strong and highly statistically significant 
correlations between EU control rights (Winzen 2012) and the OPAL institutional strength 
score (Auel et al. 2015a): r = 0.774, p < 0.001; between the OPAL institutional strength and the 
OPAL activity score: r = 0.682, p < 0.01; and between budgetary power (Wehner 2006) and 
budgetary strength (Hallerberg et al. 2012): r = 0.765, p < 0.01. See Appendix E, Table E.1.
 See also Chapter 1 Introduction (section 1.3 Why Economic Governance is different).31
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contributions to the EU budget (Rittberger and Winzen 2015: 443; Selle 
2017).  
In order to capture the economic strength (or weakness) of a country, this 
study relies on a set of key macroeconomic indicators already used by Crum 
(2013: 617) and updates them.  If substantial parliamentary involvement 32
was shaped by economic strength, this would deepen asymmetries between 
Northern European creditor countries and Southern European debtor 
countries (Benz 2013; Moschella 2017). Economic strength is a possible driver 
for substantial involvement, but parliamentary procedures and involvement 
are unlikely to be solely based on such an external factor. National 
parliaments could also be involved in economically weak countries for 
different reasons. Economic strength is thus neither necessary nor sufficient, 
but could nevertheless be a possible additional driver behind substantial 
involvement by national parliaments.   
Domestic political dynamics 
Besides institutional path dependency and economic strength, actual 
parliamentary activities could also be shaped by domestic political dynamics. 
The remaining three possible drivers all refer to this action logic. As there is 
no evidence for recent institutional reforms of national parliaments’ ESM-
related legal provisions, discrepancies between ESM-related prerogatives of 
national parliaments (Höing 2015b; Rittberger and Winzen 2015) and their 
actual parliamentary activities in the case of the third rescue package for 
Greece (Kreilinger 2015a) –– more national parliaments were substantially 
involved than those legally required to become substantially involved –– 
suggest that national parliaments did not undertake ESM-related 
institutional reforms, but that “strategic partisan exigencies” (Winzen 2017: 
164) were strong enough to trigger substantial parliamentary involvement.  
 The analysis considers GDP growth, GDP per capita compared to the EU average, 32
unemployment rate, the three-year average of the current account balance and the budget 
deficit/surplus of a country in 2015. See Appendix E, Table E.3 for the different indicators. For 
a correlation matrix, see Table E.4. Only the unemployment rate and the budget deficit/
surplus are strongly negatively and statistically significantly correlated: r = -0.715, p < 0.001.
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In countries where substantial parliamentary involvement takes place 
despite the absence of a legal enabling clause for it, governing parties and 
opposition parties can resort to votes in order to exploit a rescue package 
domestically. On the one hand, substantial involvement could be in line with 
the preferences of the government. In that case, it is the political will of the 
government to have a motion supporting the government’s policy approved by 
the national parliament. This kind of legitimation is merely pro-forma (see 
Enderlein 2013: 732). Furthermore, if a coalition partner tries to monitor the 
rest of the government (L. W. Martin and Vanberg 2004), one would, in the 
case of an ESM rescue package, expect the coalition partner from Party A to 
trigger a procedure in which a parliamentary mandate is issued for the 
Finance Minister from Party B. On the other hand, a motion could also be 
tabled by the opposition or a vote takes place based on a different 
parliamentary procedure and this provides the basis for the legislature to 
become substantially involved in relation to an ESM rescue package. 
These considerations lead to three other possible drivers for substantial 
parliamentary involvement: (Symbolic) government interests to involve 
parliament (fourth driver), monitoring by a (junior) coalition partner (fifth 
driver) and effective opposition mobilisation (sixth driver). In all of these 
three cases of domestic political dynamics, a vote must take place in relation 
to the financial assistance package in order for the activity to count as 
substantial ESM-related parliamentary involvement. 
In short, this section argued that six drivers determine the parliamentary 
agenda in favour or against substantial involvement. The framework that has 
been put forward suggests institutional path dependency, economic strength 
and domestic political dynamics as the three action logics that shape the 
parliamentary agenda. 
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4.3  Explaining the involvement of national 
parliaments 
This section examines the possible drivers for parliamentary involvement in 
ESM affairs. It reviews the explanatory power of each of the respective 
drivers for substantial parliamentary involvement under the three action 
logics (institutional path dependency, economic strength and domestic political 
dynamics) in turn. The aim is to systematically identify the factors that 
trigger substantial involvement and to assess how, for instance, a legal 
obligation for parliamentary involvement or the strategic calculations of 
domestic political actors mattered. The underlying question is whether, for 
instance, national parliaments that were substantially involved in the ESM 
rescue package are associated with a higher parliamentary strength in EU 
affairs than those national parliaments that were not substantially involved.  
4.3.1  Institutional path dependency 
The first step in order to explain parliamentary involvement with respect to 
the action logic of institutional path dependency is a series of statistical 
difference-of-means comparisons (t-tests). The question is whether it reveals 
that the differences of the means (between those national parliaments that 
were substantially involved and those that were not) are statistically 
significant or  whether they are not statistically significant. 
Parliamentary strength and activity in EU affairs 
The differences (between those national parliaments that were substantially 
involved and those that were not) are not statistically significant, except for 
the OPAL score on institutional strength (Auel et al. 2015a) which is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.2  National parliaments’ scores in EU affairs (t-tests) 
Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04. 
The group of substantially involved national parliaments (N = 8) is 
associated with an OPAL institutional strength score M = 0.618 (SD  = 
0.147). By comparison, the group of not substantially involved national 
parliaments (N = 10) is associated with a numerically smaller OPAL score for 
institutional strength M = 0.454 (SD = 0.142) (see Table 4.3). Substantively, 
this is an important difference: On a 0-to-1 scale, the OPAL institutional 
strength score ranges from 0.16 (Belgian Senate, weakest chamber) to 0.84 
(Finnish Eduskunta, strongest chamber). 0.618 corresponds to the strength of 
the German Bundesrat, the 8th strongest chamber in the ranking of 40 
parliamentary chambers, while a value of 0.454 is slightly below the average 
and is the equivalent of the OPAL institutional strength scores for the Irish 
Dáil or the Portuguese Assembleia (see Auel et al. 2015a: 79). 
Table 4.3  OPAL score institutional strength in EU affairs (group 
descriptives)   
 Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04. 
This independent samples t-test examined the hypothesis that the 
substantially involved national parliaments and the not substantially 
involved national parliaments were associated with statistically significantly 
  t df p
Control rights EU (Winzen 2012) 1.03 16.0 0.316
OPAL institutional strength (Auel et al. 2015a) 2.39 16.0 0.030
OPAL activity (Auel et al. 2015a) 1.82 16.0 0.088
  Group N Mean Median SD SE
OPAL institutional 
strength
Substantially 
involved 8 0.618 0.605 0.147 0.0520
  Not substantially involved 10 0.454 0.460 0.142 0.0450
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different institutional strengths in EU affairs. The two groups were 
sufficiently normal for the purpose of conducting a t-test (Shapiro-Wilk W = 
0.965, p = 0.696). The assumption of homogeneity of variances was also tested 
and satisfied according to Levene’s F test, F(1) = 0.342, p = 0.567 (see Table 
4.4). As described, the t-test was associated with a statistically significant 
effect at the 0.05 level: t(16) = 2.39, p = 0.030. Substantially involved national 
parliaments are therefore associated with a statistically significantly larger 
mean institutional strength in EU affairs than not substantially involved 
national parliaments. 
Table 4.4  OPAL score institutional strength in EU affairs (assumptions)          
Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04. 
This shows that one of the two indices that measures the strength of 
national parliaments in EU affairs (the OPAL score on institutional strength 
in EU affairs, Auel et al. 2015a), is able to explain whether national 
parliaments were substantially involved or not.  The OPAL activity score is 33
Independent Samples t-test
    t df p Cohen's d
OPAL institutional 2.39 16.0 0.030 1.13
Test of Normality (Shapiro-Wilk)
  W p
OPAL institutional 0.965 0.696
Note: A low p-value suggests a violation of the assumption of normality.
Test of Equality of Variances (Levene's)
  F df p
OPAL institutional 0.342 1 0.567
Note: A low p-value suggests a violation of the assumption of equal variances.
 For the other index on institutional strength in EU affairs (Winzen 2012), this is not the 33
case: p = 0.316 (see Table 4.2).
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not able to predict substantial parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs 
either. Beyond the statistical analysis, however, it is also important to 
examine the differences qualitatively.  
On the one hand, the Finnish Eduskunta has the highest OPAL scores for 
institutional strength (0.84) and activity (0.60) as well as the second-highest 
score in Winzen’s 2012 ranking. The national parliaments of Estonia, 
Germany and the Netherlands have strong EU scrutiny rights (Winzen 2012) 
and, according to the OPAL scores by Auel et al. (2015a), their institutional 
strength in EU affairs and their overall EU-related activity are also high. 
Latvia’s Saeima is at the average in terms of institutional strength, its OPAL 
activity score is below the average; Winzen (2012) sees its parliament as 
rather strong. The Austrian Nationalrat, also considered relatively strong 
and active , is above the Euro area average for each of the three EU affairs 34
variables (see Table E.2 in Appendix E). 
On the other hand, the national parliaments of France and Spain have 
control rights in EU affairs, institutional strength and activity (as measured 
by the OPAL scores) and budgetary strength that are generally near or below 
the average. Among the ten national parliaments that were not substantially 
involved in case of the third rescue package for Greece, only the Lithuanian 
Saeima and the Slovenian Chamber also have a high OPAL score for 
institutional strength (see Table E.2 in Appendix E). 
National parliaments’ budgetary strength 
Factors such as parliamentary access to budgetary information, time 
available for scrutiny and the government’s flexibility in implementing the 
budget, covered by the Wehner (2006) and Hallerberg et al. (2012) indices, 
could also matter for substantial parliamentary involvement in case of an 
ESM rescue package. But the differences between those national parliaments 
 Austria has for a long time been considered as the typical case of strong powers on paper and 34
little activity in practice. This claim is supported by the activity score of 0.22 (Euro area 
average 0.23).
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that were substantially involved and those that were not substantially 
involved are not statistically significant (see Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5  National parliaments’ budgetary strength (t-tests) 
Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04. 
On Hallerberg et al.’s (2012) 0-to-6 scale for parliamentary strength in the 
budget process, the Austrian Nationalrat (5), the Finnish Eduskuntu (5), the 
German Bundestag (4), the Latvian Saeima (4) and the Dutch Tweede Kamer 
(4) are strong parliaments in the budget process while the Estonian Riigikogu 
only achieves a score of 1. Wehner (2006) has similar results for Germany 
and Austria and puts them in the upper quartile of his index of legislative 
budget institutions (52.8 and 55.6 on a 0-to-100 scale). The score of the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer is 59.7, the Finnish parliament is at the median (see Table E.
2 in Appendix E).   35
Among the ten national parliaments that were not substantially involved 
in case of the third rescue package for Greece, the budgetary powers of the 
legislature in Belgium have also been assessed as quite strong (Hallerberg et 
al. 2012: 70; Wehner 2006: 777).  
These initial findings suggest that (only) the presence of one of the first 
two drivers proposed as explanatory factors under the action logic of 
institutional path dependency, parliamentary strength in EU affairs 
(measured through the OPAL institutional score), is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for substantial parliamentary involvement.  
  t df p
Budgetary power (Wehner 2006) 1.54 10.0 0.155
Budgetary strength (Hallerberg et al. 2012) 1.11 16.0 0.282
 Wehner’s index has Finland at 38.9, at the median. Latvia is not included.35
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4.3.2  Economic strength 
The second action logic is economic strength. As suggested under the third 
driver for substantial parliamentary involvement in the ESM affairs, 
indicators such as GDP growth, GDP per capita compared to the EU average, 
the unemployment rate, the three-year average of the current account 
balance and the budget deficit/surplus of a country could also shape 
parliamentary involvement (see Crum 2013: 617; see Table E.3 in Appendix 
E).  
The economic strength of Euro area members in terms of these factors 
varies. Even though differences are sometimes numerically impressive (see 
Table E.5 in Appendix E), in the series of independent samples t-tests of the 
different economic indicators, the means often were numerically similar, once 
even violated the assumption of equal variances and none of the variables 
revealed a statistically significant difference between the group of 
substantially involved national parliaments (N = 8) and the group of not 
substantially involved national parliaments (N = 10) (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6  Macroeconomic situation of Euro area members (t-tests) 
Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04.  
Note: Ireland’s GDP growth of 25% was caused by changes to economic statistics in 2015.  
  t df p
GDP growth -1.286 ᵃ 16.0 0.217
GDP (relative) -0.481 16.0 0.637
Unemployment -0.272 16.0 0.789
Current account balance 0.107 16.0 0.916
Budget deficit/surplus -0.109 16.0 0.914
ᵃ Levene's test is significant (p < .05), suggesting a violation of the assumption of equal 
variances
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4.3.3  Domestic political dynamics 
Besides drivers under the action logics of institutional path dependency and 
economic strength, three possible further drivers (symbolic government 
interests, junior coalition partners and effective opposition mobilisation), 
summarised under the action logic of domestic political dynamics, might also 
be able to explain why some national parliaments were substantially involved 
while others were not. 
Symbolic government interests 
In France and Spain, parliamentary involvement was driven by the 
government itself and rather symbolic in character, as suggested under the 
fourth driver for substantial parliamentary involvement.  Nobody would 36
have considered the idea credible that these parliaments constituted an 
obstacle to granting financial assistance in the sense of the two-level game 
(see Moschella 2017). Indeed, these national parliaments stood firmly behind 
the third rescue package for Greece.  Their involvement was part of political 37
calculations by the government.  
In France, Article 50(1) of the Constitution provided the basis for involving 
parliament at the discretion of the government:  
“The Government may, before either House, upon its own initiative 
[…] make a declaration on a given subject, which leads to a debate 
and, if it so desires, gives rise to a vote, without making it an issue of 
confidence.”   38
Parliamentary involvement was not constraining, but a purely political 
move.  A leading member of the governing party in the French Assemblée 39
nationale confirmed in an interview that the government exploited the issue:  
 See country studies in Appendix B (B.4 French Assemblée nationale: If it suits the 36
government and B.8 Spanish Congreso: Surprise involvement). 
 See the voting results: Table 4.9 in section 4.4.2 (What kind of parliamentary involvement?).37
 République française, Constitution of 4 October 1958, http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/38
langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly#Title5.
 Interview with an EU affairs advisor in the French Assemblée nationale, 7 November 2016.39
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“What this means is that in reality the procedures in France depend 
on the political configuration. This is pretty funny. […] If it suits the 
government, we do it; if it does not fit, we do not do it.”  40
One should, however, not forget that the French executive was also under 
considerable pressure to involve the national parliament (see Rozenberg 
2018a: 75). In addition to this debate and vote, the opposition demanded an 
ex-post vote on the final deal, but Prime Minister Manuel Valls insisted that 
parliamentary involvement remained at the discretion of the government:  
Christian Jacob, LR: “We solemnly ask you, Prime Minister, to 
undertake to submit to us the final plan which will set the European 
agreement in motion. [...] We also demand to set up a monitoring 
group for this agreement between the Government and the Finance 
committee of our Assembly.”  41
Manuel Valls, PS: “At each stage, when the Government deems it 
useful and necessary, Parliament will be informed, consulted and 
eventually called to vote. But there is no imperative mandate.”  42
Both chambers of the French parliament debated and voted on 15 July 
2015, without any major risks for the government : “The President knew 43
that by doing this he would have a consensus.”  With these votes, the French 44
centre-left government also managed to split the centre-right opposition  45
which was internally divided (Rozenberg 2018a: 75) and, in addition, France 
could send a signal to Germany two days before the vote in the Bundestag.  46
In Spain, Prime Minister Rajoy had promised the parliamentary vote 
 Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016.40
 Assemblée nationale, Journal officiel, Session extraordinaire de 2014-2015, XIVe législature, 41
Compte rendu intégral, 1re séance du mardi 15 juillet 2015, 2. Déclaration du Gouvernement 
sur l’accord européen relatif à la Grèce, 6720. Translated by the author.
 Ibid., 6724. Translated by the author.42
 En France, un vote sans enjeux sur l’accord grec, Le Monde, 14 July 2015, http://43
www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/14/au-parlement-un-vote-sans-
enjeux_4682477_3214.html.
 Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016.44
 Les Republicains, the major opposition party, were internally divided: 93 votes in favour, 41 45
against, 35 abstentions.
 Given the vulnerabilities of their own public finances, the French President and, in a similar 46
way, the Spanish Prime Minister (see below) might have wanted to send the implicit signal to 
the German Chancellor and the Bundestag that their parliaments acted responsibly by 
supporting financial solidarity with Greece.
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during a plenary debate on the results of the July 2015 European Council.  47
An overwhelming majority of MPs supported the rescue package on 18 
August 2015.  The centre-right majority was able to force the Socialist PSOE 48
to rally behind the government, a few months before national elections and, 
according to El País, made “a last-minute attempt to exploit the issue for its 
election campaign.”   49
Junior coalition partners 
A different type of domestic political dynamics was, for example, at play in 
Lithuania, where the political council of the ruling coalition, an informal 
political body, met to discuss the issue (Šaltinytė 2015). This happened at the 
request of a junior coalition partner, Labour Party (Darbo Partija) leader 
Valentinas Mazuronis. Lithuania’s European affairs committee also 
discussed the Greek bailout ex-ante on 15 July 2015, but without voting.  50
The government ultimately approved the rescue package for Greece on 17 
August 2015. Domestic political dynamics were clearly at play in Lithuanian 
politics, but did not lead to substantial parliamentary involvement.  
Finland is the only country in which the emergency procedure of Article 
4(4) ESM Treaty was publicly discussed in the context of the third rescue 
package for Greece in July/August 2015. Foreign Minister Timo Soini from 
the Eurosceptic Finns justified his party’s approval of the rescue package 
with the possibility that the ESM and Finland’s partners could resort to the 
emergency procedure: “If we vote against a deal, it goes to the emergency 
 Spain to put Greek deal to parliament vote, 15 July 2015, http://www.ekathimerini.com/47
199544/article/ekathimerini/news/spain-to-put-greek-deal-to-parliament-vote 
 297 MPs voted in favour, 20 against and 5 abstained.48
 Eurotopics.net, The next hurdle in the Greek bailout, http://www.eurotopics.net/en/151008/49
the-next-hurdle-in-the-greek-bailout?zitat=151014#zitat151014 (referring to an editorial in El 
País: Excesivo electoralismo, Los que debaten sobre Grecia en España deben abstenerse de 
simplismos, 17 July 2015, https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/07/16/opinion/
1437071586_185447.html).
 Lithuanian parliamentary committee to discuss Greek bailout on Wednesday, DELFI by the 50
Lithuania Tribune, 13 July 2015, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/29/108058/lithuanian-
parliamentary-committee-to-discuss-greek-bailout-on-wednesday.
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procedure, and a package is implemented regardless of us.”  The vote in the 51
Finnish Eduskunta’s Grand Committee is an example where the Eurosceptic 
Finns Party –– as a junior coalition partner that wanted to “police the 
bargain” (L. W. Martin and Vanberg 2004) through mandates for the national 
Finance Minister at Eurogroup meetings –– was forced to be “responsible” 
and support the rescue package. Furthermore, the party had to explain the 
shift in its position towards financial assistance for Greece to the public. 
Contrary to the two previous cases, there is no evidence for specific 
“policing the bargain”-behaviour (L. W. Martin and Vanberg 2004) in the 
German Bundestag. Undoubtedly the strongest national parliament in ESM 
affairs, parliamentarians of the junior coalition partner SPD felt well-
informed: 
“Q: Do you see anywhere that the Bundestag or the SPD as the junior 
partner in a Grand Coalition were not informed comprehensively and 
in good time by the relevant political actors, Chancellor and Federal 
Minister of Finance, who acted at the European level? 
A: There is no reason for any formal complaint. If one has the 
impression that one needs more information, each member of 
parliament is able to satisfy this curiosity. So this depends on the 
initiative of individual political groups. And it also is a task of the 
opposition to pay attention on this issue. In the circles of the governing 
parties, we naturally expect that we are informed as completely and as 
timely as possible.”  52
Effective opposition mobilisation 
Finally, the sixth driver behind substantial parliamentary involvement is 
clearly visible and successfully employed in the Netherlands, where it was 
the largest opposition party (PVV) that triggered political dynamics when it 
 See the country study on Finland in Appendix B (B.3 Finnish Eduskunta: Mandates for the 51
Minister).  
See also Finland could stay out of new Greek bailout – foreign minister, Reuters, 8 August 
2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eurozone-greece-finland/finland-could-stay-out-of-new-
greek-bailout-foreign-minister-idUKKCN0QD0IM20150808. 
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), 8 March 2017. 52
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put a no-confidence vote against the government on the agenda.  This served 53
the purpose of putting the government on the spot: Geert Wilders wanted to 
embarrass the government with his motion of no-confidence and exploit 
Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s broken electoral promise not to give any 
additional money to Greece.  54
The results suggest that substantial parliamentary involvement in 
relation to the third rescue package for Greece was driven by parliamentary 
strength in EU affairs and domestic political dynamics triggered by the 
government or the opposition. Parliamentary strength in EU affairs is a 
necessary condition, while domestic political dynamics of either type are a 
sufficient condition for substantial parliamentary involvement. However, 
each of the two drivers could also work in conjunction with another of the six 
drivers or could be reinforced by one of them. The next section aims at further 
disentangling the linkages between the drivers behind substantially 
parliamentary involvement. 
4.4  Law and politics of national parliaments’ 
substantial involvement 
Based on the findings of the previous section (i.e., substantial parliamentary 
involvement is driven by parliamentary strength in EU affairs and domestic 
political dynamics), this section examines how exactly substantial 
parliamentary involvement unfolds in relation to an ESM rescue package. 
The analysis proceeds as follows: Sub-section 4.4.1 distinguishes four 
trajectories of substantial parliamentary involvement and specifies which 
national parliament followed which trajectory in case of the third rescue 
package for Greece. After that, sub-section 4.4.2 classifies the substantial 
 See Appendix B (B.7 Dutch Tweede Kamer: Opposition mobilisation).53
 Ruling parties, opposition to back Greek bailout deal, 19 August 2015, https://nl-times.nl/54
2015/08/19/report-ruling-parties-opposition-back-greek-bailout-deal.
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involvement of national parliaments in that context according to the timing 
and the parliamentary bodies in which a vote was held. 
4.4.1  Trajectories of substantial parliamentary involvement 
Looking at the various procedural steps that can be taken at the national 
level, the findings of the previous section and the country studies in Appendix 
B allow to distinguish four trajectories behind substantial parliamentary 
involvement at the national level. The first trajectory refers to direct legal 
enabling clauses that involve the national parliament in a substantial way; 
under the second trajectory such provisions relate to the ESM indirectly. 
Under the third and fourth trajectory, substantial parliamentary involvement 
is triggered by domestic political dynamics. Each of the four trajectories of 
substantial parliamentary involvement has broader implications for the role 
of a national parliament in the process of granting financial assistance in 
form of an ESM rescue package. 
Legal enabling clauses 
The first trajectory is based on a direct legal enabling clause related to the 
ESM or financial assistance packages and requires from the national 
parliament to issue a mandate for the national representative in the Board of 
Governors or from the government to ask parliament for such a mandate. An 
ESM-related institutional reform codified such a provision in national law 
and thereby created the obligation to vote on this mandate. One can expect 
that substantial parliamentary involvement under this trajectory takes place, 
because the government would break the law, if it tried to circumvent such a 
provision. Direct legal enabling clauses for substantial parliamentary 
involvement in ESM affairs can follow from a constitutional court ruling in 
favour of parliamentary involvement. Estonia and Germany enacted direct 
legal enabling clauses after their national constitutional courts had ruled 
that the national representative in the ESM Board of Governors was not 
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allowed to vote in favour of a financial assistance package without prior 
parliamentary approval.   55
In the ex-ante plenary debate on the third rescue package for Greece in the 
German Bundestag  on 17 July 2015, the Chancellor framed the debate and 56
vote in the following way: 
Angela Merkel: “The question is: Can I ask the German 
Bundestag to give the Federal government a mandate to start 
negotiations on an ESM programme for Greece on the basis of all 
that I have presented to you? So, therefore, do the advantages of 
Monday’s result outweigh the disadvantages?”  57
In Austria and Estonia substantial parliamentary involvement is a legal 
requirement, too.  Direct legal enabling clauses (to vote on a mandate for the 58
national representative in the ESM Board of Governors) constitute, on their 
own, a sufficient condition for triggering substantial parliamentary 
involvement. They are a logic extension of strong parliamentary competences 
in EU affairs. Among all national parliaments in the Euro area, the only 
countries whose national parliaments act on the basis of a direct legal 
enabling clause are Austria, Estonia and Germany. In none of the other five 
substantially involved parliaments such a clause exists: The Finnish 
Eduskunta, the French Assemblée nationale, the Lativan Saeima, the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer and the Spanish Congreso voted in the context of the third 
rescue package and were substantially involved without a direct legal 
enabling clause.  
 See the country studies in Appendix B (B.2 Estonian Riigikogu: Involved as usual and B.4 55
German Bundestag: Same procedure as every time).
 In Germany, parliamentary involvement takes place on the basis of the ESM Financing Act, 56
adopted on 13 September 2012 [Gesetz zur finanziellen Beteiligung am Europäischen 
Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESMFinG)].
 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/117, Stenografischer Bericht der 117. Sitzung vom 57
17. Juli 2015, Tagesordnungpunkt 1 “Antrag des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen: 
Stabilitätshilfe zugunsten Griechenlands”, 11354B-C. Translated by the author.
 In Austria, parliamentary involvement takes place on the basis of Article 50b of the 58
Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the Nationalrat. In Estonia, on the basis of the Act 
on Ratification and Implementation of Treaty Establishing European Stability Mechanism, 
passed on 30 August 2012. See Appendix B.
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Substantial parliamentary involvement under the second trajectory is 
based on an indirect legal enabling clause that allows to grant a mandate for 
the national Finance Minister prior to Eurogroup meetings. Substantial 
parliamentary involvement that relies on this type of enabling clause creates 
an indirect link to the decision-making on financial assistance by the ESM as 
it is not directly related to the ESM Board of Governors: Parliaments vote on 
a mandate for the national Finance Minister prior to meetings of the 
Eurogroup. But as the Eurogroup and the ESM Board of Governors are 
intertwined, this clause provides a sufficient basis for substantial 
parliamentary involvement in relation to an ESM rescue package. Such an 
indirect legal enabling clause, again, follows from strong parliamentary 
competences in EU affairs.  
In Finland and Latvia , where no direct legal enabling clauses exist, 59
parliamentary involvement in relation to an ESM rescue package relies on 
such indirect legal enabling clauses related to the Eurogroup (i.e., to the 
institutional architecture of the EMU). Besides the statistical analysis of the 
previous section, it is noteworthy is that all five member states, in which 
parliaments could rely on either type of legal enabling clause for their 
substantial parliamentary involvement (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia), national economy and financial leverage are seen as rather strong. 
Domestic political dynamics 
A higher number of national parliaments was substantially involved than 
those that are could rely on a direct or an indirect legal enabling clause in 
relation to an ESM rescue package. Just like in general EU affairs, where 
“institutional provisions […] play an important role in facilitating or 
constraining parliamentary activity […], they cannot be equated with 
parliamentary involvement.” (Auel et al. 2015a: 65) 
 See the country studies in Appendix B (B.3 Finnish Eduskunta: Mandates for the Minister 59
and B.6 Latvian Saeima: A new role).
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In three Euro area members (France, Netherlands and Spain), national 
parliaments were substantially involved in the context of the negotiations on 
the third rescue package, although parliamentary involvement was not based 
on direct or indirect legal enabling clauses. Thus, there were situations in 
which parliaments got involved, even though they lack legal enabling clauses 
to that effect. This type of substantial parliamentary involvement is initiated 
by the government or it is forced upon the government by the opposition and 
happens by invoking certain general procedures in a national parliament.   60
If it is only the political will of the national government to involve 
parliament (third trajectory), appropriate parliamentary procedures are 
triggered by the government or its majority in parliament. Parliamentary 
involvement can thus solely depend on the political willingness of the 
national government. This has been the case in France and Spain. Debating 
and voting in relation to a rescue package nevertheless creates an 
opportunity for all MPs to articulate their views and voice their concerns or 
objections. The plenary debates on the third rescue package in France and 
Germany  show that MPs used their possibilities to criticise policy 61
(especially in the German Bundestag) and procedure (especially in the French 
Assemblée nationale) and that despite differing legal provisions and political 
dynamics both chambers served as a “public forum” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 
2015: 33) for discussing the third rescue package.  
Finally, under a fourth trajectory, there is no direct or indirect legal 
enabling clause either and the government is opposed to substantial 
parliamentary involvement. Here, the key to a vote on a rescue package is an 
effective mobilisation of the opposition. In the Netherlands, the government 
is (only) obliged to inform parliament in a plenary debate about a new 
 Examples are the provision of Article 50 (1) of the French Constitution and the motion of no-60
confidence put upon the Dutch government by the opposition party PVV. Most national 
parliaments would be able to activate such procedures in one way or another, if domestic 
political dynamics invited political actors to do so.
 See Appendix B, debating the third rescue package in plenary (B.4 French Assemblée 61
nationale: If it suits the government; B.5 German Bundestag: Same procedure as every time).
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financial assistance package  and Prime Minister Mark Rutte had explicitly 62
rejected the very idea that parliamentary consent was needed for the 
approval of the financial assistance package , but a motion of no-confidence 63
put on the agenda by the Eurosceptic PVV and another opposition motion 
against the bailout led to substantial parliamentary involvement in relation 
to the third rescue package for Greece.   64
The last two trajectories (no legal enabling clause, see Table 4.7) exemplify 
that substantial parliamentary involvement can also solely depend on 
domestic political dynamics. In such cases, parliamentary votes follow a 
party-political self-interest. These drivers have until now not been 
sufficiently taken into account in research on national parliaments and the 
ESM.  
Table 4.7  Trajectories of parliamentary involvement into the third 
rescue package for Greece (2015) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Direct  
legal 
enabling 
clause
to vote on a mandate for the 
representative in the ESM 
Board of Governors
Austria (Nationalrat) 
Estonia (Riigikogu) 
Germany (Bundestag)
Indirect 
legal 
enabling 
clause
to vote on a mandate for the 
national Finance Minister in 
meetings of the Eurogroup
Finland (Eduskunta) 
Latvia (Saeima)
No  
legal 
enabling 
clause
but the political will of the 
government to have a motion 
voted by parliament
France (Assemblée nationale & 
Sénat)  
Spain (Congreso)
but a vote in relation to a 
rescue package on a motion 
tabled by the opposition
Netherlands (Tweede Kamer)
 Tweede Kamer, Brief van de Minister van Financiën (Kamerstuk 21501-07, Nr. 942), 13 62
September 2012, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-07-942.html. 
 It is “up to the cabinet to make policy, and parliamentary approval […] not required”, see: 63
Dutch parliament endorses Greece bailout after grilling PM, Reuters, 19 August 2015, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-dutch-idUSKCN0QO0Z820150819.
 See Appendix B (B.7 Dutch Tweede Kamer: Opposition mobilisation).64
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Four trajectories and one rescue package 
Parliamentary activities related to an ESM rescue package can be considered 
exceptional: They take place under pressure to act fast in case of an economic 
or financial emergency affecting a Euro area member. In addition, more than 
half of the national parliaments in the Euro area were, as the previous 
section has shown, not substantially involved in the context of the 
negotiations on the third rescue package for Greece in 2015. The four 
trajectories (see Table 4.7) can nevertheless contribute to a better 
understanding of the role of national parliaments in relation to ESM rescue 
packages.   
Domestic political discussions about the third rescue package for Greece 
emerged in the entire Euro area. Only in three countries (France, the 
Netherlands and Spain) genuine political dynamics were, on their own, 
sufficient to trigger substantial parliamentary involvement with respect to 
the third rescue package for Greece. This suggests that domestic political 
dynamics gave legislatures a substantial role in the context of the third 
rescue package for Greece. It remains to be seen whether national 
parliaments that were involved under one of these two trajectories will also 
be substantially involved in case of future ESM financial assistance packages.  
In Finland and Lithuania, domestic political dynamics were triggered by 
junior coalition partners. The substantial involvement of the Finnish 
Eduskunta on the basis of an indirect legal enabling clause was reinforced 
through this kind of political dynamics and possibly led to higher public 
visibility of substantial parliamentary involvement. In other countries, the 
rescue package was debated in the governing coalition (Lithuania), but the 
national parliament did not become substantially involved. If the rescue 
package reached parliament (as in Ireland), parliamentary involvement did 
not become substantial. 
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4.4.2  What kind of parliamentary involvement? 
Previous research has shown that in eight national parliaments votes took 
place in committee and/or in plenary (Kreilinger 2015a), before the start of 
the actual negotiations on the third rescue package for Greece (ex-ante) and/
or after their conclusion (ex-post). The involvement of national parliaments 
can be classified along two dimensions: timing and setting. On the one hand, 
with respect to the timing, ex-ante involvement and ex-post involvement 
must be distinguished ; on the other hand, plenary or committee are the 65
alternative settings for parliamentary involvement. Five national parliaments 
(Austria, Estonia, Finland, France and Germany) voted ex-ante, before the 
start of negotiations with Greece. After the negotiations, when the 
negotiators had reached an agreement, seven national parliaments (Austria, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands and Spain) held a vote 
in relation to the result of the negotiations (ex-post). Only the German 
Bundestag voted on the launch and on the result of negotiations with Greece 
in plenary sessions (see Table 4.8).  
Among those eight national parliaments that were substantially involved, 
the relative level of parliamentary involvement varies greatly in terms of 
when (ex-ante or ex-post), which bodies (plenary and/or committee) and how 
exactly national parliaments are involved.  Generally, the national 66
parliaments, in which substantial parliamentary involvement is based on a 
direct legal obligation and in which these powers are embedded in a high 
degree of strength in EU scrutiny, are those with the highest relative level of 
involvement (usually ex-ante and ex-post).  
 National parliaments can be involved before the start of the actual negotiations on stability 65
support (ex-ante) and/or after the conclusion of these negotiations (ex-post).
 See Appendix B for the in-depth country studies which examine in detail which 66
parliamentary bodies were involved on these occasions, the timing and different frames for 
parliamentary participation as well as the preferences that were expressed by individual 
political actors, struggles over parliamentary procedures and the voting results.
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Table 4.8  Substantial parliamentary involvement in the third rescue 
package for Greece (2015) 
Source: Kreilinger (2015b), slightly adapted.  
Notes: In case of bicameral systems, “national parliament” refers to the lower chamber. 
“Substantial parliamentary involvement” means that the national parliament voted at 
least once in plenary or committee related to financial assistance for Greece in July or 
August 2015. The recipient country (Greece) is not included.  
In terms of the parliamentary bodies involved, votes in meetings of 
European affairs committees and other committees were approximately as 
common as votes in plenary sessions in the case of the third rescue package 
for Greece: Committee meetings took place in five national parliaments and 
plenary sessions in seven national parliaments (see Table 4.8). The latter, 
however, commonly receive more public attention, because plenary debates 
respond to legislatures’ function of communicating policies to the public (Auel 
and Raunio 2014: 4). If the plenary of a national parliament is involved, it 
debates and approves new rescue packages, but does not oversee the details 
of a financial assistance programme.  In a number of national parliaments, 67
committees play an important role with respect to the normal oversight of the 
ESM’s financial operations, as the following explanation about the division of 
labour in the German Bundestag by one interviewee shows:  
Substantial involvement 
by the respective 
national parliament
Ex-post
None Committee Plenary
Ex-ante
None
Belgium, Cyprus, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia (10)
Latvia Netherlands, Spain
Committee –– Finland Estonia
Plenary France Austria Germany
 This suggests that there is a trade-off between public visibility and scrutiny detail/expertise. 67
See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (sub-section 
2.3.3 Cross-cutting issues of parliamentary involvement).
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“The Budget committee has the whole responsibility for accompanying 
the operations and controlling the activities of the ESM, not related to 
the question of whether to grant stability support, but how to do it. 
This task is being actively undertaken by the Budget committee in the 
context of regular briefings of the Federal government on the subject 
and in specific cases where the Federal government approaches the 
Budget committee for approving tranches within a programme and 
where the committee has the right to issue a motion.”  68
To sum up, one must distinguish different levels of relative parliamentary 
involvement in relation to the ESM: A high level of parliamentary 
involvement exists in Austria, Estonia, Finland and Germany where national 
parliaments voted twice. In these countries, substantial ex-ante and 
substantial ex-post involvement represents a double-lock. The prominent role 
of the German Bundestag (with two plenary votes) is the result of judgements 
of the Federal Constitutional Court which “responded to the quest for 
solidarity on the part of the member states in difficulty by making the signing 
of the memoranda contingent upon the approval of the Bundestag” (Joerges 
2016: 326). It is no exaggeration when one senior MP from Germany claimed 
“we were always sitting as a shadow somewhere at the negotiation table”  69
and argued that every colleague, who wanted, had been informed about every 
detail.  In Estonia, Finland and Austria, national parliaments also voted 70
twice, but deliberation and voting were partly or entirely restricted to 
committees. The relative level of parliamentary involvement was lower in 
France, Latvia , the Netherlands and Spain, where national parliaments 71
voted only once: either ex-ante or ex-post. 
Table 4.9 summarises when parliamentary votes took place, in which body 
and what the exact result of the vote was. Besides the deep asymmetry 
between the national parliament of the recipient country (Greece) and the 
substantially involved legislatures of creditor countries, actual involvement 
also varied inside the group of eight substantially involved national 
 Interview with a clerk in the EU affairs directorate of the German Bundestag, 2 March 2017. 68
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (CDU), 22 March 2017.69
 Ibid.70
 In Latvia this happened on the basis of an indirect legal provision related to the Eurogroup.71
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parliaments and has led to additional asymmetries with respect to timing, 
setting and the factors driving the parliamentary vote. 
Table 4.9  Parliamentary votes in relation to the third rescue package 
for Greece (2015) 
If “approval” is reported as the voting result, detailed results are not available.  
* The vote in the Tweede Kamer (Netherlands) rejected a motion against financial 
assistance for Greece by 81 to 52.  
Source: Own elaboration.  
Date National Parliament Body
Result of the 
vote 
(Yes / No / 
Abstentions)
E
X 
-
A
N
T
E
15 July 2015 France (Assemblée nationale) Plenary 412 / 69 / 49 
15 July 2015 France (Sénat) Plenary 260 / 23 / ––
16 July 2015 Austria (Nationalrat) Standing sub-committee 
on ESM matters
approval
16 July 2015 Finland (Eduskunta) Grand Committee 16 / 4 / 5
17 July 2015 Austria (Nationalrat) Plenary approval
17 July 2015 Estonia (Riigikogu)
European affairs 
committee approval
17 July 2015 Germany (Bundestag) Plenary 439 / 119 / 40
E
X 
-
P
O
S
T
13 August 2015 Finland (Eduskunta) Grand Committee 18 / 4 / 0
17 August 2015 Latvia (Saeima)
European affairs 
committee 9 / 3 / 1
18 August 2015 Austria (Nationalrat)
Standing sub-committee 
on ESM matters approval
18 August 2015 Estonia (Riigikogu) Plenary 50 / 37 / 0
18 August 2015 Spain (Congreso) Plenary 297 / 20 / 5
19 August 2015 Germany (Bundestag) Plenary 453 / 113 / 18
19 August 2015
Netherlands (Tweede 
Kamer)* Plenary 81 / 52 / ––
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4.5  Conclusion: The tangled web of the ESM 
Some drivers of substantial parliamentary involvement are, as section 4.3 
has shown, more relevant than others. It is not necessary for a national 
parliament to meet all conditions in order to become substantially involved. 
Debates and votes on a salient issue like ESM financial assistance already 
take place if there is a legal enabling clause to trigger them and if it would be 
illegal or costly to avoid substantial parliamentary involvement. The previous 
institutional strength of a national parliament in EU affairs and the specific 
motivation of political actors to exploit the issue domestically are the drivers 
that this study has identified as explaining substantial parliamentary 
involvement in the case of the third rescue package for Greece. 
The magnitude of parliamentary involvement in case of the third rescue 
package for Greece in 2015 (with more than 2000 MPs  in eight countries 72
being substantially involved and voting in relation to the rescue package), 
however, cannot not be taken for granted. This concluding section argues that 
a more symmetric way of involving elected representatives from/in all Euro 
area members would have to build on some kind of joint parliamentary 
structure, but simultaneously maintain national parliaments’ current 
prerogatives, since parliamentary powers or agenda setting powers cannot be 
simply taken away in democratic political systems.  
Towards less asymmetries, but how? 
Besides the four trajectories for substantial parliamentary involvement, there 
is also the possibility that a country lacks relevant legal provisions for a 
substantial involvement of the national parliament and that no political actor 
with sufficient influence to trigger substantial parliamentary involvement 
has seen the need to do so or the incentive has not been strong enough. This 
 Own calculation based on Table 4.9 in sub-section 4.4.2 (What kind of parliamentary 72
involvement?).
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means that the national representative in the Board of Governors decides on 
an ESM financial assistance package without parliamentary instructions. 
Substantial involvement and the existence of parliamentary debates on 
the third rescue package for Greece must be considered positive from a 
normative democratic theory point-of-view. To some extent, parliamentary 
involvement follows the ideal-typical models for EU affairs (Rozenberg and 
Hefftler 2015): There is ex-ante involvement and plenary involvement, some 
national parliaments are thus able to act as “policy shaper” and “public 
forum”. Major trends in general EU affairs also apply to ESM rescue 
packages.  For an intergovernmental and non-legislative economic 73
governance domain like the ESM this is already noteworthy in itself.  
Discrepancies in parliamentary involvement between the ten national 
parliaments that were not involved at all (or not substantially involved) and 
the eight national parliaments that were substantially involved, but whose 
relative level of involvement also varies significantly (the German Bundestag 
is the only national parliament in which every MP is substantially involved 
before the start and after the conclusion of negotiations on an ESM rescue 
package ), reinforce concerns about asymmetric parliamentary powers in the 74
Euro area, especially when considering that the national parliament of the 
recipient country, Greece, must acquiesce to the conditionality of the MoU. 
The channel of legitimacy that national parliaments provide for Euro area 
governance is thus not as viable as it could be.  
In order to remedy asymmetries in parliamentary involvement, the 
previous chapter suggested minimum standards for parliamentary 
involvement in the European Semester.  While this might also seem like an 75
attractive solution for the ESM, involving each national parliament in Euro 
area rescue packages would make ESM decision-making (even more) 
 See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (sub-section 73
2.3.3 Cross-cutting issues of parliamentary involvement).
 National parliaments’ relative level of substantial involvement is examined in greater depth 74
in the country studies of Appendix B.
 See Chapter 3 National parliaments in the European Semester (section 3.4 Opportunities 75
and constraints for scrutinising the European Semester).
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cumbersome. Therefore, proposals for a sub-committee of the European 
Parliament or for a specific Eurozone Parliament have (amongst other EMU 
issues) always had decision-making and the accountability of the ESM in 
mind. A more symmetric way of involving elected representatives from/in all 
Euro area members, in any case, would have to build on some kind of joint 
parliamentary structure and simultaneously maintain national parliaments’ 
current prerogatives, since parliamentary powers or agenda setting powers 
cannot be simply taken away from legislatures in democratic political 
systems. As a consequence, the tangled web of parliamentary procedures 
related to rescue packages of the ESM is likely to remain a prominent feature 
of the ESM governance  and of any future negotiations on a rescue package.  76
 See Chapter 6 Conclusion (sub-section 6.3.2 National parliaments and reforming the 76
Economic and Monetary Union), on what a European Monetary Fund would change.
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Appendix B (Appendix to Chapter 4): Voting on 
the third rescue package for Greece in eight 
national parliaments      
This dissertation now turns to the individual national paths of parliamentary 
approval in national parliaments that voted in relation to the third rescue 
package: The Appendix provides eight country studies related to the ESM. It 
examines the unfolding of parliamentary involvement in each of those eight 
national parliaments that Chapter 4 identified as “substantially involved”, 
because they voted at least once in relation to the third rescue package for 
Greece (see also Kreilinger 2015a).  
Each country study (B.1 to B.8) examines the specific national legal 
provisions for ESM-related parliamentary involvement and then turns to the 
parliamentary vote(s) in relation to the third rescue package for Greece. The 
empirical chapter on the ESM already contained numerous references to 
these in-depth analyses on Austria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Latvia, the Netherlands and Spain. 
For France (B.4) and Germany (B.5), the country studies also contain a 
brief qualitative analysis of MPs’ speeches in the ex-ante plenary debate, 
because in these two countries, the “in principle”-agreement to start 
negotiations with Greece on a new financial assistance programme at the 
Euro summit on 13 July 2015 led to two plenary debates and votes  –– in the 1
French Assemblée nationale on a declaration of the government that was 
neither binding nor mandatory and in the German Bundestag on a motion 
that was binding and required by the law.  In both countries, MPs from all 2
 Assemblée nationale, Journal officiel, Session extraordinaire de 2014-2015, XIVe législature, 1
Compte rendu intégral, 1re séance du mardi 15 juillet 2015, 2. Déclaration du Gouvernement 
sur l’accord européen relatif à la Grèce. 
Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/117, Stenografischer Bericht der 117. Sitzung vom 
17. Juli 2015, Tagesordnungpunkt 1 “Antrag des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen: 
Stabilitätshilfe zugunsten Griechenlands”.
 Parliamentary involvement in Germany is based on §4 ESMFinG. 2
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parliamentary party groups took the floor and members of the government 
also participated actively.  The debate in the Assemblée nationale lasted for 3
one hour and 45 minutes on a Wednesday afternoon; the Bundestag debated 
for nearly three-and-a-half hours on a Friday morning.  4
In the following, the variation in the parliamentary procedures among the 
eight legislatures is examined in depth.  
B.1  Austrian Nationalrat: Following the Constitution 
Legal provisions in Austria 
In Austria, a constitutional provision and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Nationalrat ensure the involvement of parliament. Article 50b of the 
Constitution  stipulates that the Austrian representative in the ESM may 5
only to agree or abstain from voting a proposal to grant stability support to a 
member state in principle, if the Nationalrat has authorised the 
representative to do so on the basis of a proposal of the Federal government 
(via an ex-ante plenary vote). Two sub-committees of the Finance committee 
were set up for preliminary deliberation about the ESM: the Standing sub-
committee on ESM matters and the Standing sub-committee on ESM 
secondary market matters (see Miklin 2015: 393-94). According to Article 50d 
of the Constitution, the Rules of Procedures of the Nationalrat may provide 
for additional ESM-related competences. The legal provision for an ex-post 
vote is contained there: 
 Besides the two directions for further research on interparliamentary cooperation in Europe’s 3
post-crisis economic governance, outlined in the concluding section of Chapter 5, another 
possible direction is a cross-cutting Franco-German comparison of parliamentary involvement 
in the European Semester and the ESM.
 In comparison, see Appendix A (A.1 French Assemblée nationale: Adaptation without 4
obligation) and A.2 German Bundestag: Parliamentary inertia) for the analysis of plenary 
debates on the European Semester in 2016.
 Austrian Federal Constitutional Law (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), modified by ESM-5
Begleitnovelle, BGBl. I - 25. Juli 2012 - Nr. 65.
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“The Standing sub-committee on ESM matters may authorise the 
Austrian representative in the ESM to agree to […] the adoption of a 
financial assistance facility agreement […] and a corresponding 
Memorandum of Understanding under Art. 13 (4) ESM Treaty […] or 
to abstain from voting. In the absence of such authorisation, the 
Austrian representative shall vote against the proposal for a 
decision.”  6
Voting in relation to the rescue package 
The Standing sub-committee on ESM matters of the Austrian Nationalrat 
approved the start of negotiations on 16 July 2015 and the plenary voted in 
favour on 17 July 2015.  In both cases, the majority in favour was constituted 7
by the governing parties SPÖ and ÖVP; all opposition parties voted against.  8
On 18 August 2015, the Standing sub-committee on ESM matters approved 
the terms of the bailout.  9
The Austrian parliament has often been regarded as an example of a 
parliament with a scrutiny system that is strong on paper. The provisions 
related to ESM rescue packages were established in order to obtain 
opposition support for the constitutional amendments that had to be adopted 
(Miklin 2015: 401; Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013: 579). Austria is 
among those countries with direct legal enabling clauses for ESM-related 
substantial parliamentary involvement that demand from the government to 
obtain a parliamentary mandate for its representative in the ESM’s Board of 
Governors who cannot approve a rescue package without a prior mandate 
from the national parliament. Previously, Austria did not have such 
provisions related to the EFSF; the provisions for parliamentary involvement 
 §32h of the Austrian Federal Law on the Rules of Procedure of the National Council.6
 Koalition beschließt Griechen-Hilfspaket ohne Opposition, Kurier, 17 July 2015, https://7
kurier.at/politik/ausland/schlagabtausch-ueber-hilfspaket-im-nationalrat-gruenes-licht-fuer-
griechen-hilfe/141.941.194
 Austrian Nationalrat, Nationalrat gibt Finanzminister Schelling Verhandlungsmandat für 8
Griechenland-Hilfspaket, Press Release, 17 July 2015, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/
AKT/SCHLTHEM/SCHLAG/J2015/2015_07_17_Sondersitzung_Griechenland.shtml 
 Griechenland-Hilfspaket in Österreich abgesegnet, Kurier, 18 August 2015, https://kurier.at/9
politik/ausland/griechenland-hilfspaket-in-oesterreich-abgesegnet/147.740.404
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by the German Bundestag may have served as the blueprint for substantial 
parliamentary involvement by the Austrian Nationalrat. 
B.2  Estonian Riigikogu: Involved as usual  
Legal provisions in Estonia 
Estonia became a member of the Euro area on 1 January 2011. The 
procedures for parliamentary involvement of the Estonian Riigikogu in ESM 
affairs are laid down in the Act on Ratification and Implementation of the 
ESM Treaty.  They provide for “special fast-track procedures for adopting 10
Riigikogu resolutions in situations where the financial stability of the 
Eurozone or its member states is at stake” (Ehin 2015: 515). The procedures 
stipulate an ex-ante vote in the European affairs committee after the 
government submits a draft decision on the basis of Article 13(2) ESM Treaty 
(on granting in principle financial assistance) to the European affairs 
committee for an opinion. The Estonian representative is required to adhere 
to the opinion of the committee when voting in the Board of Governors (§4). 
The committee may decide that a resolution of the Riigikogu is required 
(§4(3)). In addition (§5(1)), a Resolution of the Riigikogu (ex-post plenary vote) 
is required to authorise the Estonian representative to participate in a vote 
and to vote in favour of a draft memorandum in the Board of Governors of the 
ESM (see also Laatsit 2014). 
Voting in relation to the rescue package 
The ex-ante vote in the European affairs committee of the Riigikogu took 
place on 17 July 2015. In parliament there was a clear split between 
government and opposition: While the opposition questioned the economic 
logic and the approach of the new bailout, Finance Minister Sven Sester 
stressed that Estonia would not have to make new payments to the ESM; 
 Estonian Act on Ratification and Implementation of Treaty Establishing European Stability 10
Mechanism, passed 30.08.2012, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013029/consolide.
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other members of the ruling coalition emphasised that aid should only be 
given under the strictest conditions and that the financial risks from Greece 
leaving the Eurozone would make them prefer an agreement.  After the 11
conclusion of the negotiations, the Estonian parliament approved the 
agreement in plenary on 18 August 2015 (with 50 MPs in favour and 37 
against) in its ex-post vote.   12
Despite the ex-post involvement of the plenary, the centrality of the 
European affairs committee in issues related to the ESM has been criticised 
at the time of the adoption of the Act on Ratification and Implementation of 
the ESM Treaty: If the committee issues binding opinions in EU affairs on 
behalf of the entire parliament, the role of MPs not belonging to the 
European affairs committee is reduced (see Ehin 2015: 526).  Estonia is 13
nevertheless clearly among those countries where direct legal provisions 
prescribe substantial parliamentary involvement. 
B.3  Finnish Eduskunta: Mandates for the Minister 
Legal provisions in Finland 
Parliamentary involvement of the Finnish Eduskunta in ESM matters is 
based on the requirement concerning its participation in national decision-
making according to Sections 96 and 97 of the Finnish Constitution related to 
EU affairs (see Leino-Sandberg and Salminen 2014). There were no 
institutional reforms in response to the ESM treaty (Winzen 2017: 168), but 
ESM decisions that relate to granting stability support are deemed to be  
“so significant that they require the provision of relevant information 
by the responsible Cabinet minister prior to decision-making within 
 Estonian opposition parties against new Greek bailout, 15 July 2015, http://news.err.ee/11
116304/estonian-opposition-parties-against-new-greek-bailout.
 Riigikogu shines green light on rescue package for Greeks, 19 August 2015, http://12
news.postimees.ee/3298927/riigikogu-shines-green-light-on-rescue-package-for-greeks.
 Members of a committee are agents of the entire parliament which acts as their principal. 13
See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (sub-section 
2.2.1 Executive-legislative relations, principals and agents).
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the ESM in order to safeguard the prerogatives of the [Finnish] 
parliament” (Leino and Salminen 2013: 468).  
The Eduskunta has pointed out to the government that “it should be kept 
fully informed regardless of the status of EU-level meetings, as the Prime 
Ministers and Finance Ministers of the Euro area meet in various 
combinations” (Raunio 2015: 415). The committee-based ESM involvement of 
the Eduskunta follows the practice in a “working parliament” that 
emphasises the scrutiny of the government and mandating ministers for 
negotiations in Brussels (see Raunio 2015: 409). In Finland, substantial 
parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs relies on indirect legal enabling 
clauses.  But these practices would be difficult to overturn. 14
Voting in relation to the rescue package 
In its ex-ante vote on 16 July 2015 , the Grand Committee of the Eduskunta 15
approved the government’s position in favour of opening ESM negotiations 
with Greece (16 votes for, 4 against and 5 abstentions ). The second vote in 16
the Grand Committee took place on 13 August 2015, before a meeting of the 
Eurogroup on 14 August 2015. Committee members accepted (by 18 votes to 
4) the terms of the agreement that had been reached. Only the SDP and 
Christian Democrat committee members voted against.  Finland’s Finance 17
Minister Alexander Stubb received what he called a “strong and steady 
negotiating mandate”  with a first instalment for Greece and a bridging loan 18
as the two options that were acceptable to Finland.  
 See Chapter 4 National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism.14
 Finnish parliament approves new Greek bailout talks, Reuters, 16 July 2015, http://15
www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-finland-idUSKCN0PQ0W420150716.
 Finnish Eduskunta, Grand Committee Approved Government’s Position on Greece 16
negotiations, Press Release of the Finnish Parliament, https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/tiedotteet/
Pages/GrandCommittee_16.7.2015.aspx.
 Soini defends U-turn as Finland accepts third bailout for Greece, 13 August 2015, https://17
yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/soini_defends_u-turn_as_finland_accepts_third_bailout_for_greece/
8226493.
 Ibid.18
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Contrary to an electoral pledge that they would oppose any new bailout, 
the members of the Eurosceptic Finns Party –– part of the governing coalition 
since May 2015 –– voted in favour of the rescue package. The leader of the 
Eurosceptic Finns Party, Foreign Minister Timo Soini explained that if his 
party had voted against the deal, it would have had to leave the government 
and would have no longer been able to work for change from within. Another 
reason was that his party’s opposition to the bailout “would not have been 
enough to stop it going through.”  In addition to that, the chairman of the 19
Finns’ parliamentary party group referred to the ESM emergency procedure 
and declared that “[i]rrespective of Finnish support[,] it could have been 
pushed through with emergency powers.”   20
B.4  French Assemblée nationale: If it suits the 
government  
Legal provisions in France 
No specific provisions exist for substantial involvement of the French 
parliament in ESM affairs (Gadbled and Fromage 2014). In relation to the 
third rescue package for Greece, Article 50-1 of the French Constitution 
provided the basis for involving parliament, at the discretion of the 
government:  
“The Government may, before either House, upon its own initiative or 
upon the request of a Parliamentary group, as set down in article 51-1, 
make a declaration on a given subject, which leads to a debate and, if 
it so desires, gives rise to a vote, without making it an issue of 
confidence.”  21
 Soini defends U-turn as Finland accepts third bailout for Greece, 13 August 2015, https://19
yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/soini_defends_u-turn_as_finland_accepts_third_bailout_for_greece/
8226493.
 Ibid.20
 République française, Constitution of 4 October 1958, http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/21
langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly#Title5.
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France is therefore an example where the aim of parliamentary involvement 
was to showcase support for the government. This is in line with the 
persisting weakness of the French parliament in the political system (Thomas 
and Tacea 2015: 171-73). Parliamentary involvement was not constraining, 
but a purely political move.  On 8 July 2015 Prime Minister Manuel Valls 22
had made a first indication that a parliamentary debate should be held if an 
agreement with Greece was reached. Both chambers debated and voted on 15 
July 2015, but without any major risks : “The President knew that by doing 23
this he would have a consensus.”   24
Debating the third rescue package for Greece in plenary  25
In the debate in the Assemblée nationale on 15 July 2015, the main 
governing party (Parti socialiste) fully supported the government and the 
leader of the Socialist’s parliamentary group expressed his hope that the 
French parliament manifested the largest possible support for the agreement: 
“We will vote for this agreement which allows Greece not to sink into 
bankruptcy. We will vote for this agreement which allows the 
European Union to be faithful to what it is and to envisage the 
future.” (Bruno Le Roux, PS, AN-ESM-2015: 6718) 
Opposition MPs were in a more difficult position as to whether they should 
vote for or against the declaration (or abstain) and how they could criticize 
the government. The leader of the main opposition group Les Républicains 
said that he would vote in favour of the government’s declaration, but 
criticised the conduct of the negotiations by President François Hollande (“he 
was isolated”) and claimed that the government’s decision to hold a debate 
 Interview with an EU affairs advisor in the French Assemblée nationale, 7 November 2016.22
 En France, un vote sans enjeux sur l’accord grec, Le Monde, 14 July 2015, http://23
www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/14/au-parlement-un-vote-sans-
enjeux_4682477_3214.html 
 Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016.24
 Assemblée nationale, Journal officiel, Session extraordinaire de 2014-2015, XIVe législature, 25
Compte rendu intégral, 1re séance du mardi 15 juillet 2015, 2. Déclaration du Gouvernement 
sur l’accord européen relatif à la Grèce, 6709-6725 (quoted in the following as AN-ESM-2015). 
All quotes were translated by the author. 
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followed by a vote according to Article 50-1 of the Constitution was 
insufficient: 
“We solemnly ask you, Prime Minister, to undertake to submit to us 
the final plan which will set the European agreement in motion. [...] 
We also demand to set up a monitoring group for this agreement 
between the Government and the Finance committee of our 
Assembly.” (Christian Jacob, Les Républicains, AN-ESM-2015: 6720) 
Regarding the role of the French Parliament in the process, Prime Minister 
Manuel Valls defended the government’s decision not to hold an earlier vote. 
He promised that, when the government would see it as necessary and useful, 
parliament would be informed, consulted and eventually called to vote, and 
thus rejected criticisms about how the domestic scrutiny had been conducted: 
“As regards the vote on a declaration by the Government, you know 
that I am extremely attached to the institutions of the Fifth Republic. 
[...] Therefore, we are voting today in the Assembly and in the Senate 
[...]. At each stage, when the Government deems it useful and 
necessary, Parliament will be informed, consulted and eventually 
called to vote. But there is no imperative mandate. That’s why there 
could not be a vote last week.” (Manuel Valls, Prime Minister, AN-
ESM-2015: 6724) 
In addition to that, the Prime Minister and speakers from different political 
groups articulated a soft criticism of European procedures  when they 26
referred to the EU’s democratic deficit, proposed to establish a “Eurozone 
parliament” or to move forward with governance reforms of the Eurozone: 
“It is our duty to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the euro 
area. This concerns Europe, of course, because today the European 
Parliament is not sufficiently involved […] we should invite it to 
organize itself so that the specific subjects of the euro area are taken 
more into account as such. This is not the case, and this is the 
meaning of yesterday’s speech of the President of the Republic to set 
up a Parliament of the Euro area. It must also involve national 
parliaments.” (Manuel Valls, Prime Minister, AN-ESM-2015: 6713) 
 See, for the distinction between objections against policy or procedural issues at the national 26
level or the EU level, Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance 
(section 2.4 Three comparative studies of national parliaments in the post-crisis economic 
governance). 
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“Only democratic institutions and political steering of the Eurozone 
will help to avoid the errors of recent weeks and to fill the democratic 
deficit from which we are suffering now.” (Bruno Le Roux, PS, AN-
ESM-2015: 6718) 
Interestingly, these views were shared by opposition parties:  
“We should go much further in the governance of the Eurozone, and 
you have not proposed anything in this area.” (Christian Jacob, Les 
Républicains, AN-ESM-2015: 6720) 
“We support [...] a Parliament of the Euro to deal specifically with 
issues relating to the budgets, debts and deficits of European states, 
under conditions of democracy, transparency and co-responsibility, 
commensurate with Europe’s ambitions.” (François de Rugy, EELV, 
AN-ESM-2015: 6722) 
Voting in relation to the rescue package   
The motions that supported the government’s policy received large majorities 
in the Assemblée nationale (412 in favour, 69 against, 49 abstentions ) and 27
the Sénat (260 in favour, 23 against ). The two votes were neither legally 28
binding nor  mandatory, but their political value was not negligible (see 
Fromage 2015). Les Republicains, the major opposition party, were internally 
divided (93 votes in favour, 41 against, 35 abstentions in the Assemblée 
nationale). The parliamentary involvement offered support to the French 
government in the international bargaining, where the President François 
Hollande used all his political weight to obtain that Greece could stay in the 
Euro area (see Rozenberg 2018a: 75), against those countries which were 
more reluctant towards the rescue package. Possibly the government wanted 
to encourage German MPs to smoothly approve the start of negotiations as 
well: “It was a […] decision aimed at demonstrating that France stands to its 
responsibility and a way of putting pressure on Germany and the Bundestag 
 Assemblée nationale, Analyse du scrutin n° 1155, Première séance du 15/07/2015, Scrutin 27
public sur la déclaration du Gouvernement sur l'accord européen relatif à la Grèce (en 
application de l'article 50-1 de la Constitution), http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/
detail/(legislature)/14/(num)/1155.
 Sénat français, Scrutin n° 226 - séance du 15 juillet 2015, sur la déclaration du 28
Gouvernement sur l'accord européen relatif à la Grèce, https://www.senat.fr/scrutin-public/
2014/scr2014-226.html.
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to do the same.”  In France, these political dynamics triggered substantial 29
parliamentary involvement.  
B.5  German Bundestag: Same procedure as every time 
Legal provisions in Germany 
In Germany, a request for stability support in the form of a financial 
assistance facility specified in the ESM Treaty as well as the adoption of such 
an agreement and an MoU are defined as affecting the overall parliamentary 
budgetary responsibility and, according to the Act on Financial Participation 
in the ESM, require the approval of the entire chamber: 
“[T]he Federal government may, through its representative, approve a 
proposal for a decision in matters concerning the European Stability 
Mechanism or abstain from voting on such a proposal only after the 
plenary has taken an affirmative decision to that effect. In the absence 
of such a plenary decision, the German representative must reject the 
proposal for a decision.”  30
The German representative in the ESM Board of Governors is thus only 
allowed to agree to the start of negotiations and to a new rescue package if 
the plenary has adopted decisions supporting this. The Bundestag is the only 
national parliament of the Euro area in which the plenary is required to vote 
both ex-ante and ex-post.  This is the effect of several judgements of the 31
German Federal Constitutional Court that enhanced the role of the 
Bundestag in European affairs (see Höing 2015a). 
 Interview with a Member of the French Assemblée nationale, PS, 7 November 2016.29
 ESM Financing Act of 13 September 2012 [Gesetz zur finanziellen Beteiligung am 30
Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESMFinG)], Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1918. Working 
translation provided by the Language Service of the Federal Ministry of Finance.
 See Chapter 4 National parliaments and the ESM (sub-section 4.4.2 What kind of 31
parliamentary involvement?), Table 4.8.
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Debating the third rescue package for Greece in plenary  32
An ex-ante debate and vote in plenary took place on 17 July 2015. In the 
debate, many speakers, including Chancellor Angela Merkel, weighed the 
pros and cons of the deal and whether the result fulfilled the requirements to 
grant a mandate for negotiations with Greece on a third rescue package. The 
following extract from Chancellor’s speech exemplifies this: 
“The question is: can I ask the German Bundestag to give the Federal 
government a mandate to start negotiations on an ESM programme 
for Greece on the basis of all that I have presented to you? So, 
therefore, do the advantages of Monday’s result outweigh the 
disadvantages? My answer is, out of full conviction: Yes.” (Angela 
Merkel, Federal Chancellor, BT-ESM-2015: 11354B-C) 
The two governing parties’ positions diverged on whether the previous rescue 
packages had failed: While Sigmar Gabriel, party leader of the SPD and Vice 
Chancellor, claimed that they had not led to success (BT-ESM-2015: 11359C), 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) insisted that the two previous 
rescue packages had not failed (BT-ESM-2015: 11366C). Naturally, the 
opposition challenged government policy on the third rescue package for 
Greece. The Left Party accused the Finance Minister of “destroying the 
European idea” (BT-ESM-2015: 11355B) and the Green Party praised the 
Chancellor’s counterparts Hollande and Renzi:  
“I am relieved that Mr Hollande and Mr Renzi took over responsibility 
in Brussels. [...] [I am] glad that the Europeans stopped the German 
way.” (Katrin Göring-Eckhardt, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, BT-
ESM-2015: 11363C) 
The debate also allowed softly criticising EU integration , confirming that 33
there is a possibility to depart from the narrow focus on the ESM package, as 
 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/117, Stenografischer Bericht der 117. Sitzung vom 32
17. Juli 2015, Tagesordnungpunkt 1 “Antrag des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen: 
Stabilitätshilfe zugunsten Griechenlands”, 11352A-11396D (quoted as BT-ESM-2015). All 
following quotes were translated by the author.
 See, for the distinction between objections against policy or procedural issues at the national 33
level or the EU level, Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance 
(section 2.4 Three comparative studies of national parliaments in the post-crisis economic 
governance). 
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the examples of two leading MPs from the governing parties show: 
“The Eurozone needs a stable institutional foundation, as the current 
debate shows. Economic and monetary union must be made weather-
proof. […] I am pleased that [...] we are now actively discussing the 
need for a parliamentary representation for the Eurozone, the need for 
a separate budget to finance investments and to balance fluctuations 
in the Eurozone.” (Thomas Oppermann, SPD, BT-ESM-2015: 11371C) 
“[W]e should not only discuss Greece but also how the European 
Union's constitutional order should look in the future. Simply to say 
that the only solution is even more integration, an even faster 
integration and even more institutions: I think that goes too 
short.” (Ralph Brinkhaus, CDU, BT-ESM-2015: 11386D) 
Finally, the leader of the opposition in the German Bundestag raised more 
fundamental concerns about parliamentary democracy in Greece and the role 
of the Troika:  
“This is the de facto abolition of the parliamentary democracy that you 
organized there [in Greece]. [...] The decisive power is with three 
democratically not legitimated institutions –– the European Central 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Commission[.]” (Gregor Gysi, DIE LINKE, BT-ESM-2015: 11356B-C) 
Voting in relation to the rescue package 
In the ex-ante vote, 439 MPs voted in favour, 119 against and 40 MPs 
abstained.  Subsequently, the result of the negotiations was debated and 34
voted ex-post on 19 August 2015 : 453 MPs approved it, 113 voted against 35
and 18 MPs abstained.  The centre-left overwhelmingly supported the rescue 36
package in the two plenary votes. Only the Left Party rejected the agreement 
between the (radical) left Syriza government and the rest of the Euro area. A 
senior MP from the SPD recalls that “[i]n its result, in my political group, the 
 Deutscher Bundestag, Bundestag stimmt für Griechenland-Hilfspaket [Bundestag in favour 34
of rescue package for Greece], Press Release, 17 July 2015, https://www.bundestag.de/
dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw29_de_griechenlandhilfe/383332.
 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/118, Stenografischer Bericht der 118. Sitzung vom 35
19. August 2015, 11455B-11489D.
 Deutscher Bundestag, Bundestag befürwortet weitere Griechenlandhilfe [Bundestag 36
approves further aid to Greece], Press Release, 19 August 2015, https://www.bundestag.de/
dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw34_de_griechenland/385532. 
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rescue package was not controversial at all. The disputes mainly took place in 
the conservative camp.”  Indeed more than 60 CDU/CSU MPs defected from 37
the line of party leader and Chancellor Angela Merkel for the ex-ante vote 
and for the ex-post vote. The overall majority in favour of starting 
negotiations and agreeing the deal, however, was never in question (see Table 
B.1). 
The position of the German government in the negotiations on the third 
rescue package for Greece can be considered strong (see Moschella 2017) and 
advantageous from a two-level game perspective (Benz 2013; Putnam 1988) , 
because the German Finance Minister had little room for manoeuvre due to 
growing resistance within his own parliamentary party group, as a senior 
CDU/CSU lawmaker acknowledges: 
“Q: How did the participation of the Bundestag specifically influence 
the negotiations on the third rescue package for Greece?  
A: Quite simply, the Finance Minister always keeps at the back of his 
mind that one must organise a majority here in the German 
Bundestag, especially in the CDU/CSU group, and this is, of course, 
guiding the negotiations. So I mean, you can once come along and say 
‘I have agreed this in Brussels and you must now back it!’ […] It has 
become more difficult, of course, from package to package [to organise 
a majority]. And accordingly, the minister has less leeway in the 
negotiations.”  38
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (SPD), 8 March 2017.37
 Interview with a Member of the German Bundestag (CDU), 22 March 2017. 38
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Table B.1  Voting results in the German Bundestag by political groups 
Source: Own elaboration, Data: abgeordnetenwatch.de, bundestag.de.  
Defections from the line of a political group are highlighted in grey.  
B.6  Latvian Saeima: A new role 
Legal provisions in Latvia 
The third rescue package for Greece was the first rescue package in which 
Latvia participated after becoming a member of the Euro area (and the ESM) 
on 1 January 2015. Parliamentary involvement is not a legal requirement in 
Latvia (Höing 2015b: 52), but “nothing prevents the government from turning 
to parliament.”  The procedure to approve the governmental position for 39
Eurogroup meetings provides an opportunity for parliamentary 
involvement.  Despite earlier promises of the government, the plenary of the 40
Saeima was not involved. The decision of whether or not to hold a plenary 
debate or vote remains fully at the discretion of the government. The 
approval of the terms of an ESM rescue package by the European affairs 
 
Total 
Ex-ante vote 
17 July 2015
Ex-post vote 
19 August 2015
Yes No Abstain Yes No Abstain
All MPs 631 439 119 40 453 113 18
CDU/CSU 311 241 60 5 228 63 3
SPD 193 175 4 0 173 4 0
Die Linke 64 0 53 2 0 45 7
B'90 Die Grünen 63 23 2 33 52 1 8
 PM: the Saeima should approve the decision in regard to bailout deal for Greece, Baltic 39
News Network, 15 July 2015, http://bnn-news.com/pm-saeima-approve-decision-regard-
assistance-greece-130849.
 See the Latvian response to Höing’s questionnaire: Oliver Höing, 'Asymmetric Influence: 40
National Parliaments in the European Stability Mechanism', PhD thesis (Universität zu Köln, 
2015b) at p. 258 (Table 39).
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committee of the Saeima is considered “a politically important formality; […] 
not binding on the government” (Rasnača 2015). 
Voting in relation to the rescue package 
On 15 July 2015, before the start of negotiations, members of the European 
affairs committee discussed the latest developments in Greece and the Euro 
area, but did not vote.  Outcomes of any kind of negotiations at the EU level 41
are often “discussed only informally by the more motivated […] 
members” (Ikstens 2015: 555). The European affairs committee was involved 
again ex-post: It debated the third rescue package at its meeting on 14 
August 2015, but the quorum of 9 out of 17 committee members present for a 
vote on the government’s position in the Eurogroup  was not reached after 42
MPs from the National Alliance (governing party) and Unity (opposition 
party) had left the room (see Rasnača 2015). The session continued on 17 
August 2015 and the committee was finally able to vote on the government’s 
position supporting the deal: 9 MPs were in favour and 3 against while one 
member of the ruling coalition abstained. Lolita Čigāne, the chairperson of 
European affairs committee, described the session as “quite dramatic”.  The 43
final position of the Latvian government on the Greek bailout plan included 
amendments proposed by the European affairs committee, because the 
committee notably insisted to include that no Latvian money could be used to 
write off Greek debt and added an obligation to veto any such measure unless 
Latvia was fully compensated.   44
 Latvian Saeima, European affairs committee: Greece bailout deal will not affect Latvian tax 41
payers, Press Release, 16 July 2015, http://saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/23669-european-
affairs-committee-greece-bailout-deal-will-not-affect-latvian-tax-payers.
 Latvia goes along with Greek bailout - for now, 15 August 2015, http://eng.lsm.lv/article/42
politics/politics/latvia-goes-along-with-greek-bailout-for-now.a141641/.
 Latvia approves third Greek bailout but keeps veto in reserve, 17 August 2015, http://43
eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/latvia-approves-third-greek-bailout-but-keeps-veto-in-
reserve.a141843/. 
 Ibid., and Government approves Latvia’s final position on Greek bailout plan, Baltic News 44
Network, 18 August 2015, http://bnn-news.com/government-approves-latvias-final-position-
greek-bailout-plan-131998.
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Despite the confusion during the committee proceedings, the involvement 
of the Latvian Saeima’s European affairs committee in ESM negotiations 
corresponds to its role with respect to the Council or European Council (see 
Ikstens 2015: 560) and might become a “political practice from which it is 
difficult to deviate in the future” (Höing 2015b: 53). Substantial 
parliamentary involvement in approving the government’s position is not 
binding and remains at the discretion of the government; the European 
affairs committee relies on a procedure to mandate government’s position in 
the Eurogroup (indirect legal enabling clause). 
B.7  Dutch Tweede Kamer: Opposition mobilisation 
Legal provisions in the Netherlands 
According to an agreement between the Dutch government and parliament, 
laid down in an information protocol that has a “weak judicial 
status” (Poppelaars 2018: 5), the position of the government is debated in 
parliament before decisions in the ESM Board of Governors, but no binding 
vote is taken.  The agreement itself Only proposals to grant financial 45
assistance beyond the amount of capital already pledged to the ESM require 
a binding vote in the Tweede Kamer (see Mulder 2014). This was not the case 
for the third rescue package for Greece which was debated without a vote in 
plenary on 16 July 2015, before the start of negotiations with Greece.  
Voting in relation to the rescue package 
On 19 August 2015, the result of the negotiations was debated in plenary 
again. This ex-post plenary debate provided the basis for substantial 
parliamentary involvement on a legal basis unrelated to the ESM: The leader 
of the Eurosceptic PVV, Geert Wilders, had put forward a motion of no-
 Tweede Kamer, Brief van de Minister van Financiën (Kamerstuk 21501-07, Nr. 942), 13 45
September 2012, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-07-942.html.
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confidence on the government.  Prime Minister Mark Rutte survived the no-46
confidence vote and parliament rejected a motion against the rescue package 
for Greece by 81 votes to 52.  This motion was tabled by the CDA (opposition 47
party), but a motion by another opposition party, the liberal D-66, supporting 
the bailout, did not find a majority in parliament either , because, according 48
to the Prime Minister, “it was up to the cabinet to make policy, and 
parliamentary approval [of the bailout] was not required.”  49
In the Netherlands, plenary debates took place ex-ante and ex-post, but 
neither of them would have counted as substantial parliamentary 
involvement. Only political dynamics, triggered by the opposition, led to votes 
in relation to the third rescue package for Greece after the negotiations had 
been concluded. 
B.8  Spanish Congreso: Surprise involvement 
Legal provisions in Spain 
The Spanish government does not need parliamentary approval before 
making ESM-related decisions (Winzen 2017: 155-56). The Spanish 
parliament is generally considered rather weak in EU affairs and “not an 
essential element in formulating Spain’s position […] in Brussels” (Kölling 
and Molina 2015: 349). Nevertheless, in August 2015, the Congreso de los 
Diputados held a debate and vote on a financial assistance package for the 
first time (Höing 2015b: 53).  
 Tweede Kamer, Stemmingen over de moties ingediend bij het debat over het 46
leningenprogramma voor Griekenland, Plenaire vergadering 19 August 2015, https://
www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/stemmingsuitslagen/detail?id=2015P12236.
 Eurozone approves first round of Greece bailout, Deutsche Welle, 19 August 2015, http://47
www.dw.com/en/eurozone-approves-first-round-of-greece-bailout/a-18658799.
 Tweede Kamer, Stemmingen over de moties ingediend bij het debat over het 48
leningenprogramma voor Griekenland, Plenaire vergadering 19 August 2015, https://
www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/stemmingsuitslagen/detail?id=2015P12236.
 Dutch parliament endorses Greece bailout after grilling PM, Reuters, 19 August 2015, http://49
www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-dutch-idUSKCN0QO0Z820150819.
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Voting in relation to the rescue package 
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy had promised the parliamentary vote during a 
plenary debate on the results of the July 2015 European Council.  Thus the 50
new rescue package for Greece was debated and an ex-post vote took place 
during a plenary session on 18 August 2015. It was put on the agenda at the 
initiative of the government. 297 MPs voted in favour, 20 against and 5 
abstained. Only the United Left (opposition party) voted against the 
programme.  The centre-right government was criticised for trying to exploit 51
the issue in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The centre-
left newspaper El País, for instance, wrote:  
“There is no obligation to ask the MPs, nor was the parliament 
consulted about saving the Spanish banks in 2012 when the same 
head of government was in office with the same majority. The 
opportunism is evident in this change of opinion about the 
parliament’s functions. … The government is making a last-minute 
attempt to exploit the issue for its election campaign. Also lamentable 
is the insinuation that Podemos is ‘Tsipras’s party’ and the attempt to 
tar the socialist candidate Pedro Sánchez with the same brush.”   52
Parliamentary involvement allowed the government to obtain broad 
support and to divide the opposition composed of PSOE, United Left and 
Podemos. Initiating Spain’s first parliamentary vote on a financial assistance 
package in the run-up to parliamentary elections on 20 December 2015 can 
therefore be considered a purely political move by the centre-right 
government. In line with this observation the argument has been made that 
“[t]he salience of the EU has grown during the crisis and both the 
government and the opposition have begun using plenary debates 
 Spain to put Greek deal to parliament vote, 15 July 2015, http://www.ekathimerini.com/50
199544/article/ekathimerini/news/spain-to-put-greek-deal-to-parliament-vote. 
 Spanien, Österreich und Estland stimmen für Hilfspaket, 18 August 2015, http://51
www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2015-08/griechenland-hilfspaket-parlament-spanien-estland-
oesterreich.
 Eurotopics.net, The next hurdle in the Greek bailout, http://www.eurotopics.net/en/151008/52
the-next-hurdle-in-the-greek-bailout?zitat=151014#zitat151014 (referring to an editorial in El 
País: Excesivo electoralismo, Los que debaten sobre Grecia en España deben abstenerse de 
simplismos, 17 July 2015, https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/07/16/opinion/
1437071586_185447.html).
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strategically” (Kölling and Molina 2015: 361). This echoes the findings for 
France, where the government was also the driving force behind substantial 
parliamentary involvement.  
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Chapter 5: 
5  The Interparliamentary 
Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance  1
The previous two empirical chapters argued that parliamentary control of the 
European Semester and the European Stability Mechanism could benefit from 
interparliamentary cooperation. Besides the individual scrutiny of economic 
governance by national parliaments (and the European Parliament), cooperation 
would allow for exchanging information and best practices and possibly even for 
conducting joint scrutiny. In fact, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG) asked national parliaments and the European Parliament to 
set up an interparliamentary conference.  
The specific challenge in the context of agreeing on the institutional design of 
the new body, however, were differences between the European Parliament and 
national parliaments as well as among national parliaments. The provision of 
Article 13 TSCG was the starting point for long discussions after which they 
eventually reached a compromise. This chapter examines the different phases of 
interparliamentary negotiations from 2012 to 2015 and is particularly interested 
in how and into what direction the legal basis, preferences, rules and practices 
have shaped the functioning of the new Conference.  
Among competing models for interparliamentary cooperation, two models (EP-
led scrutiny and creating a collective parliamentary counterweight) did not 
prevail: Parliaments agreed that the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance (SECG) would follow the “standard” 
COSAC model. Even though it falls short of being a venue for joint scrutiny, 
national parliaments see an added value in the SECG Conference. In terms of 
their actual participation, attendance records are stable over time and 
participating MPs are still twice as likely to be members of Budget or Finance 
committees than to be members of European affairs committees. 
 This chapter has been published as an article in Perspectives on Federalism: 1
Valentin Kreilinger (2018), ‘From procedural disagreement to joint scrutiny? The 
Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance’, 
Perspectives on Federalism, 10 (3), pp. 155-184, https://doi.org/10.2478/pof-2018-0035. 
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In Europe’s post-crisis economic governance, interparliamentary cooperation 
between national parliaments and the European Parliament takes place in 
an interparliamentary conference which was established on the basis of 
Article 13 TSCG in 2013. Interparliamentary cooperation is a possible 
remedy against shortcomings in the parliamentary control of EU economic 
governance. During the negotiations about the TSCG the provision to 
establish an interparliamentary conference was included after the French 
Parliament, in particular, had demanded to put such a provision into the 
treaty. As a consequence, the TSCG did not only strengthen the coordination 
and surveillance of fiscal and economic policies, but also provided for the 
creation of an interparliamentary conference in order to “discuss budgetary 
policies and other issues covered by this treaty.”  2
Composed of representatives of the relevant committees of the European 
Parliament and national parliaments, the Conference has met twice a year 
since October 2013 and was named the “Interparliamentary Conference on 
Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance” (SECG) in 2015. 
Executive dominance in fiscal and economic policies might motivate national 
parliaments and the European Parliament to work together and “exert 
countervailing power, both individually and collectively” (Curtin 2014: 30), 
but in the early years of its existence the Conference has not been able to 
meet expectations. Due to disagreements between national parliaments and 
the European Parliament, the Conference was busy negotiating its Rules of 
Procedure for more than two years instead of addressing the fiscal and 
economic challenges of the EU. The challenges are similar to those 
encountered in other policy areas: The general relationship between the two 
parliamentary levels has been characterised by conflict and rivalry, rather 
than cooperation (see Martucci 2017; Neunreither 2005).  
The Rules of Procedure eventually adopted by the SECG Conference in 
November 2015 reflect a lowest common denominator compromise about the 
role that this Conference should play. It allows to accommodate very different 
 Article 13 TSCG.2
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parliamentary preferences about what functions and tasks the conference 
should fulfil. The SECG Conference could still become a venue for the joint 
scrutiny of EU economic governance, as the participation records and conduct 
of its meetings show. In EU affairs, joint scrutiny basically means that MPs 
and MEPs meet, exchange, and cooperate in order to address the information 
asymmetries that they have vis-à-vis other EU institutions as well as 
national governments, and to engage in a collective dialogue with 
representatives of this executive branch. 
Methodologically, this chapter pursues a qualitative examination of the 
negotiations about the institutional design of the SECG Conference on the 
basis of a variety of written sources and participating observation (Schöne 
2005) at several meetings of the Conference. In addition to that, it analyses 
attendance records of the Conference from 2013 to 2018.  3
After briefly examining the history of Article 13 TSCG (section 5.1), this 
chapter puts forward three competing models for interparliamentary 
cooperation as the analytical framework for studying the emergence of the 
SECG Conference (section 5.2). It asks how and in what direction the legal 
basis, rules and practices shape the functioning of the SECG Conference and 
examines the parliamentary preferences and negotiations concerning the 
institutional design of this arena of interparliamentary cooperation. The 
Rules of Procedure of the SECG Conference, adopted in Luxembourg on 10 
November 2015, are, for now, the basis for the functioning of the Conference 
(section 5.3). The model that has prevailed is a COSAC-style venue (section 
5.4) whose attendance is stable, but unequal, and which attracts both 
members of Budget or Finance committees and European affairs committees 
(section 5.5). The chapter concludes in section 5.6 with a summary of the 
findings and highlights two possible directions for further research. 
 See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (section 2.4 3
Three comparative studies of parliamentary involvement in the post-crisis economic 
governance) for more details on the methods used in this chapter.
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5.1  The creation of an Interparliamentary 
Conference under Article 13 TSCG 
The theoretical rationale behind resorting to interparliamentary cooperation 
in EU economic governance can be found in the need to respond to the use of 
intergovernmentalism in that area: “[T]he European Council needs to be 
balanced with an equally strong voice of parliamentary represen-
tation” (Neyer 2014: 135) and “the intergovernmental logic brings with it an 
interparliamentary balancing” (S. Fabbrini 2013: 12). Article 13 TSCG is the 
product of intergovernmental negotiations in December 2011 and January 
2012 and has undergone significant changes during the negotiating process, 
revealing difficulties of member states in reaching an agreement on this point 
(Kreilinger 2013: 8-10). The original objective of the provision was that 
national MPs meet regularly and that this would happen in close association 
with the European Parliament. During the negotiations, Article 13 TSCG was 
completely revised twice and only the later drafts of the TSCG made an 
explicit link to the existing interparliamentary formats and Protocol No 1 
(Kreilinger 2013: 10). Article 13 TSCG was finally agreed by the Contracting 
Parties as follows: 
“As provided for in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national 
Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union 
Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of 
the Contracting Parties will together determine the organisation and 
promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant 
committees of the European Parliament and representatives of the 
relevant committees of national Parliaments in order to discuss 
budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.”   4
The treaty article explicitly entrusted national parliaments and the 
European Parliament to “determine the organisation and promotion” of the 
Conference.  
 Article 13 TSCG. 4
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The broader legal basis for interparliamentary cooperation in the EU can 
be found in Protocol No 1, Title II on Interparliamentary Cooperation. The 
prevailing legal interpretation sees an equal involvement of the European 
Parliament and national parliaments on the basis of Article 9 Protocol No 1 , 5
taking decisions by consensus. Sector-specific conferences “on specific 
topics” (as provided for in Article 10 Protocol No 1) would then be set up on 
the basis of principles that were agreed by the Speakers’ Conference by 
consensus (and not by COSAC which could theoretically decide by a majority 
of three-quarters). Some national parliaments, in particular a group of 
chairpersons of European affairs committees led by the Danish Folketing (see 
section 5.3, below), however, argued that Article 10 Protocol No 1 would 
empower COSAC to establish sector-specific interparliamentary conferences 
and did not see the Speakers’ Conference in such a role (see Esposito 2016: 
326-27). 
There is a “small but growing body of research on inter-parliamentary 
cooperation between the EU’s national legislatures (and the European 
Parliament)” (Raunio 2014b: 554) which has a long tradition in the EU and 
evolved over time with the emergence of policy-specific formats such as the 
SECG Conference (Hefftler and Gattermann 2015: 95-101). From early 
studies on interparliamentary cooperation (Bengtson 2007; Costa and Latek 
2001; Larhant 2005; Neunreither 1994, 2005), the literature has specialised 
into more detailed analyses of interparliamentary conferences and the “line of 
argument on conflict and cooperation [between the national parliaments and 
the EP] has been extended” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 21), when two new 
policy-specific interparliamentary conferences (on CFSP/CSDP and economic 
governance) were created in 2012/2013. Setting them up “has been all but 
smooth” (Fasone and Lupo 2016b: 345). 
 “[T]he organisation and promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation 5
within the Union shall be determined by the European Parliament and National 
Parliaments” (Article 9 Protocol No 1).
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5.2  Competing models for the relationship 
between national parliaments and the 
European Parliament in EU Economic 
Governance  
One of the main political reasons behind promoting (inter)parliamentary 
involvement in EU economic governance is the perceived lack of national 
ownership of national (economic) reforms. Even though in the European 
Semester most national governments submit the annual National Reform 
Programme to their parliament before transmitting it to the European 
Commission (Hallerberg et al. 2018; Raimla 2016), national parliamentarians 
often see economic reforms as being “imposed” by Brussels. At the same time, 
it is also true that they (and their governments) sometimes lose control of the 
different multilevel coordination and surveillance processes.  
As explained below, different models for a better parliamentary input in 
EU economic governance have been debated. This chapter agrees that greater 
interaction between the national level and the EU level via an 
interparliamentary conference could, for instance, help create better national 
ownership of the European Semester through a greater dialogue between 
parliamentarians and the different economic governance actors and bodies.  6
The added value of this Conference cannot be found in decision-making 
powers, but in deliberation that informs and potentially legitimises the 
overall process (Jančić 2016: 245). Interweaving the levels of governance 
would also generally facilitate the coordination of economic and budgetary 
policies: If national parliaments were aware of indicators such as the 
aggregate fiscal stance of the Euro area, if they debated them at the EU level 
and then had the task to transpose these orientations into national fiscal and 
economic policies, one could hope for stronger coordination and convergence 
(Kreilinger and Larhant 2016: 7). If diverse political views are represented in 
 See Chapter 3 National parliaments in the European Semester (section 3.4 Opportunities and 6
constraints for scrutinising the European Semester).
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an interparliamentary conference, this could also lead to greater politicisation 
of these topics (Hix 2014). But as long as fiscal and economic policy decisions 
are seen as numeric rules (such as the obligation of the balanced budget rule 
of the Fiscal Compact) and not as political choices, their acceptance in 
national political arenas will remain greatly reduced (Schmidt 2015). In an 
interparliamentary setting (some of) these problems could be tackled. The 
implementation of the legal provision of Article 13 TSCG was, however, 
complicated by the existence of several competing institutional designs that 
relevant political actors had in mind for the Conference. 
The views of the European Parliament and of national parliaments 
The European Parliament has traditionally been sceptical about enhancing 
the role of national parliaments, fearing that this could undermine its 
position (Crum 2013: 255). Already back in 2012 it had described the 
possibility of creating a mixed parliamentary body as “both ineffective and 
illegitimate” and insisted that only itself, “as parliamentary body at the 
Union level for a reinforced and democratic EMU governance” , had full 7
democratic legitimacy to exercise control in that area. For the European 
Parliament, nobody else is able “to stress the points of convergence and the 
shared interests amongst the parliamentarians and citizens of different 
Member States” (Fasone 2012: 18). But since the European Parliament only 
has very limited powers in EU economic governance (Crum 2018: 277; 
Fromage 2018) and national parliaments have kept prerogatives such as the 
adoption of national budgets, economic reforms and holding national 
governments accountable, it is difficult to see how the European Parliament 
could be solely responsible for scrutinising the aggregate fiscal stance of the 
Euro area (Kreilinger and Larhant 2016: 9) or for decision-making in the 
ESM (respectively in a European Monetary Fund), whose resources come 
 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012 with 7
recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union’, point EE./13. (P7_TA(2012)0430).
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from national sources in the form of initial capital and guarantees.  8
Unsurprisingly, the European Parliament does not subscribe to arguments in 
favour of strong interparliamentary cooperation in EU economic governance.  
Many national parliaments are, in return, suspicious of giving a greater 
role to the European Parliament (Winzen et al. 2015; Winzen 2017: 121-75) 
and/or of including it in interparliamentary cooperation beyond the absolute 
minimum. Some of them could ultimately even imagine pursuing cooperation 
among national parliaments in economic governance without the European 
Parliament (Kreilinger 2014: 67), but over time national parliaments’ 
involvement has not developed into a direct EU role (see Winzen 2017).  
The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that national parliaments “contribute 
actively to the good functioning of the Union [...] by taking part in the 
interparliamentary cooperation between national Parliaments and with the 
European Parliament.”  The legal provisions do not prescribe a particular 9
institutional design for the interparliamentary cooperation. This helped to 
agree on the wording of Article 13 TSCG in early 2012, but Protocol No 1, 
Title II on Interparliamentary Cooperation allows for two different 
interpretations with respect to the role of the EU Speakers’ Conference and 
COSAC (see section 5.1).  
Three models for organising interparliamentary relations 
The fundamental preferences of national parliaments and the European 
Parliament (about how the parliamentary scrutiny of economic governance 
should be organised) have not fully converged. This confirms earlier research 
under the lenses of the conceptual frameworks of the “Multilevel 
Parliamentary Field” (Crum and Fossum 2009) and the “Euro-national 
parliamentary system” (Lupo and Fasone 2016). As they tried to attribute 
tasks and competences to an interparliamentary conference in economic 
 See Chapter 4 National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism.8
 Article 12 TEU; the crisis and the TSCG thus only accelerated a process that was already 9
foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty.
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governance, national parliaments, the European Parliament and other 
actors  sticked to three competing models which are developed in the 10
following. These models provide the framework against which this chapter 
assesses the debates and negotiations about setting up the SECG Conference.  
According to the first model for the relationship between national 
parliaments and the European Parliament in EU economic governance, 
scrutiny in the area of economic governance should take place under the sole 
and unique leadership of the European Parliament (see Fasone 2012: 18). The 
European Parliament would occasionally invite national parliaments to join 
MEPs in Interparliamentary Committee Meetings of the ECON committee or 
other relevant committees and during the European Parliamentary Week as 
part of the European Semester. National parliaments are supposed to 
scrutinise their national government in EU economic governance without 
playing a particular role at the EU level or intervening collectively. The 
provision of Article 13 TSCG would mostly be fulfilled through an expansion 
of the existing Interparliamentary Committee Meetings. 
Under the second model for the relationship between national parliaments 
and the European Parliament in EU economic governance, the 
Interparliamentary Conference is a COSAC-style venue for the exchange of 
information and best practices (see Kreilinger 2013). Proponents of this 
model wanted to build upon the example of COSAC and, like in the case of 
the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, they created a policy-
specific Conference for economic governance. Parliamentary scrutiny would 
still be conducted by each national parliament at the national level and by 
the European Parliament at the EU level, but the Interparliamentary 
Conference would allow them to discuss budgetary issues and parliaments 
would possibly have better information for their individual scrutiny activities.  
In the third model (collective parliamentary counterweight), Article 13 
TSCG would provide the basis for creating a powerful interparliamentary 
 Examples for preferences by other actors can be found in the Four Presidents’ Report of 2012 10
and the Five Presidents’ Report of 2015.
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body that could effectively scrutinise and act as a counterweight to executive 
decision-making in the area of economic governance (Curtin 2014: 30). After 
all, besides Article 13 TSCG, the TSCG and the ESM Treaty do “little or 
nothing to anchor new regulatory functions for the Union in democratic 
institutions” (Dawson and de Witte 2013: 834). Establishing a collective 
parliamentary counterweight would possibly also require a more exclusive 
component for the Euro area, in which the national parliaments of member 
states whose currency is the Euro would coordinate their activities and 
exercise parliamentary control at the level of the Euro area.  Under this 11
model, parliamentary scrutiny would be pooled and shared, based on Article 
13 TSCG. But Ben Crum and John E. Fossum already stressed in 2013 that  
“[i]nterparliamentary coordination suffers from the major limitation 
that it remains inherently fragmented. However much parliaments 
coordinate, they are unlikely to add up to a single coherent voice that 
can control the actual decisions adopted by the collective of 
governments that they scrutinise” (Crum and Fossum 2013b: 3).  
Many of the actors involved in the negotiations on the procedural 
arrangements for the SECG Conference, in particular the Rules of Procedure, 
have aligned with the key characteristics of one model, for instance in letters, 
reports or working papers. Their preferences for organising interparlia-
mentary cooperation can therefore, in most cases, be classified as close to 
either EP-led relations, to a COSAC-inspired conference or to creating a 
collective parliamentary counterweight.  
Some contributions have pointed out that parliamentary preferences 
would align along only two models: Winzen (2017: 163-64) distinguishes 
support for and opposition against a broad mandate of the Conference while 
others classified parliamentary preferences as centralised versus joint 
scrutiny (Cooper 2016; Kreilinger 2015b). But far-reaching proposals, such as 
by the French Assemblée nationale, that go beyond the lowest common 
denominator compromise underline the value of having three distinct models 
 This would be less far-reaching than a “Eurozone Parliament” (see Kreilinger and Larhant, 11
2016).
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(with the collective parliamentary counterweight model as the strongest 
interparliamentary option).  
5.3  Negotiations about the functioning of the 
Conference in 2012/13 and 2015 
This section tracks the negotiations between national parliaments and the 
European Parliament about how the Interparliamentary Conference should 
function. Negotiations proceeded as follows: The first discussions took place 
from November 2012 onwards in sub-groups of national parliaments (see sub-
section 5.3.1). The Speakers’ Conference then agreed general organisational 
principles in April 2013 and, after little progress had been made in adopting 
Rules of Procedure, re-considered the issue and agreed “principles for 
transposition into Rules of Procedure”  in April 2015 (see sub-section 5.3.2). 12
The final round of negotiations about the Rules of Procedure took place at the 
meeting of the SECG Conference in November 2015 (see sub-section 5.3.3).  
5.3.1  First discussions in sub-groups of national 
parliaments 
The Danish Folketing and the French Assemblée nationale have been 
particularly vocal actors in the ex-ante coordination of national parliaments’ 
positions on their preferred institutional design of the Interparliamentary 
Conference of Article 13 TSCG which later became the SECG Conference (see 
Kreilinger 2015b). These ad-hoc meetings in sub-groups among Speakers and 
committee chairpersons of national parliaments from November 2012 to April 
2013 as well as the preparatory work at these meetings were crucial for 
 EU Speakers’ Conference, Presidency Conclusions, April 2015, http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-12
WEB/dossier/files/download/082dbcc54ce35cd0014ce64535e5028a.do, pp. 5-6. 
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advancing the discussion of fundamental issues concerning the arrangements 
of the Conference (Fromage 2016a; Griglio and Lupo 2018; Kreilinger 2015b).  
On the one hand, the Danish Folketing and the chairperson of its 
European affairs committee, Eva Kjer Hansen, invited to two meetings on the 
subject in November 2012 and March 2013 (see Table 5.1). At their second 
meeting, the chairpersons of European affairs committees from 15 member 
states declared their preference for “establishing a small effective conference 
focused on substantial issues – to be held in the margins of the biannual 
COSAC-meetings.”  The Conference on the basis of Article 13 TSCG would 13
not be a separate body, but an appendage to COSAC. The 15 chairpersons 
stated that they had “no desire to build new inter-parliamentary bodies. […] 
[E]xisting structures and resources should be exploited to their full 
potential.”  14
On the other hand, the French Assemblée nationale argued that it was 
“necessary to implement this Conference as soon as possible, by taking the 
initiative to make specific proposals that engage in constructive negotiations 
with our European partners”  and proposed to follow the model for CFSP 15
and CSDP with 6 MPs per national parliament and 16 MEPs in order to 
accompany and control the European Semester. Inside the Conference, a 
specific Euro area “component” should be established. While the entire 
Conference would follow the COSAC model, the French plans for the Euro 
area amount to creating a collective parliamentary counterweight (third 
model). In January 2013, at a meeting that took place in Luxembourg, the 
Speakers of the national parliaments from the other five founding member 
 Danish Folketing, Joint letter of 15 Chairpersons of European Affairs Committees to the 13
Speakers’ Conference, 8 April 2013, http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/
082dbcc53dbcb6ed013e07d2d31930a6.do 
 Ibid.14
 Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°202 sur le projet de loi de ratification du 15
Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et 
monétaire, 25 September 2012, p. 65.
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states  endorsed the proposals to implement the provision of Article 13 16
TSCG in that way (see Table 5.1).  17
Table 5.1  Preferences about interparliamentary cooperation under 
Article 13 TSCG 
Source: Own elaboration. For references to the quotes, see sub-section 5.3.1. 
DATE AUTHOR(S) KEY STATEMENT(S)
NOV.  
2012
Chairpersons of 
European affairs 
committees of 11 
national parliaments, 
incl. Danish Folketing 
“worrying lack of proposals as to how the role of 
national parliaments can be strengthened more 
concretely”
European Parliament
“the creation of a new mixed parliamentary 
body […] would be both ineffective and 
illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional 
point of view”
JAN.  
2013
Speakers of six 
national parliaments, 
incl. French 
Assemblée nationale
“consider that […] a conference […] must be set 
up. […] [T]his conference would discuss topical 
issues of Economic and Monetary Union, 
including agreements in the framework of the 
European Semester, in order to reinforce 
dialogue between the national Parliaments and 
with the European Parliament”
MARCH 
2013
Chairpersons of 
European affairs 
committees of 15 
national parliaments, 
incl. Danish Folketing 
“[w]e [...] have no desire to build new inter-
parliamentary bodies. Instead, we believe that 
existing structures and resources should be 
exploited to their full potential”
 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.16
 National parliaments, Working Paper of the meeting of the Speakers of Parliament of the 17
Founding Member States of the European Union and the European Parliament in Luxembourg 
on January 11th, 2013. Note that the Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Italy did not 
participate in the meeting and did not endorse the document.
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5.3.2  Two years of discussions and little progress 
In April 2013, the Speakers’ Conference agreed on the general organisational 
principles for the Interparliamentary Conference of Article 13 TSCG  (which, 18
as noted, later became known as the SECG Conference), but the discussions 
between national parliaments and the European Parliament about the Rules 
of Procedure for the Conference lasted for another two years. Interestingly, 
the German Bundestag did not articulate an institutional position about the 
functioning of the Conference (Deubner 2013: 48), although its President took 
part in the meeting in Luxembourg in January 2013 and endorsed the 
resulting working paper. Only at a very late stage, in the run-up to the first 
meeting of the Conference in Vilnius in October 2013, the German position 
was made clear in a letter by the Bundestag’s Head of Delegation, Norbert 
Barthle (CDU). According to him, it would be “premature” to seek the 
adoption of Rules of Procedure at that point, but he welcomed the idea to 
discuss the aims and functions of the Conference.  19
The constituent meeting of the Conference in October 2013 failed to agree 
on Rules of Procedures: The draft Rules of Procedure , prepared by the 20
Lithuanian Presidency Parliament, were not endorsed by the Conference. The 
Speakers’ Conclusions of April 2013 therefore provided the procedural basis 
for the meetings of the Conference from October 2013 onwards. 
In order to overcome the stalemate, the following Presidency Parliament 
(Greece) asked all parliaments for input. The internal organisation of the 
Conference was again an item on the agenda of the September 2014 meeting 
(organised by the Italian parliament), but no agreement was reached either 
and further discussions were postponed to 2015.  
 EU Speakers’ Conference, Presidency Conclusions, April 2013, http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-18
WEB/dossier/files/download/082dbcc53dbcb6ed013e3b68418b5327.do, pp. 4-6.
 Deutscher Bundestag (2013), Letter by the Head of the German delegation, Nobert Barthle, 19
http://renginiai.lrs.lt/renginiai/EventDocument/0f6147e3-6125-40b9-93d8-edc7c31e085f/
Barthle_Lithuanian%20Presidency_EN_courtesy%20translation.pdf.
 Interparliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance, Draft Rules of 20
Procedure, prepared by the Lithuanian Seimas, October 2013. On file with the author.
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When the Speakers’ Conference re-examined the issue of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Conference in Rome in April 2015, parliaments had already 
discussed for two years what the Conference should do and how it should be 
organised. The Speakers’ Conclusions changed its provisional name from 
“Interparliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance” into 
“Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 
Governance in the European Union” (see Table 5.2). This made the link to the 
TSCG (more) obvious. In addition to that, the Speakers agreed principles “[to] 
be transposed into detailed Rules of Procedure”  at the next SECG 21
Conference in Luxembourg in November 2015. These guidelines arguably left 
“very little discretion” (Cooper 2017: 241) to the SECG Conference as the 
Speakers’ Conference “essentially dictated the terms” (Cooper 2017: 241) of 
the Rules of Procedure.  
Even though many of the Speakers’ principles did not go beyond the 
common ground of previous agreements (see Table 5.2), two of them are 
noteworthy. First, the purpose of the Conference was defined more clearly: It  
“should provide a framework for debate and exchange of information 
and best practices in implementing the provisions of the Treaty in 
order to strengthen cooperation between national Parliaments and the 
European Parliament and contribute to ensuring democratic 
accountability in the area of economic governance and budgetary 
policy in the EU, particularly in the EMU, taking into account the 
social dimension and without prejudice to the competences of EU 
Parliaments.”  22
Second, the Speakers referred to the timing of the Conference, a long-
standing issue, and stated that meetings “should be convened before the 
presentation of the Annual Growth Survey and the adoption of the National 
Reform Programmes” . The timing of the SECG Conference is of particular 23
importance to make the voice of parliaments heard in the European Semester 
(see section 5.4, below). The provisions regarding the composition of 
 EU Speakers’ Conference, Presidency Conclusions, April 2015, http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-21
WEB/dossier/files/download/082dbcc54ce35cd0014ce64535e5028a.do, p. 5.
 Ibid., p. 5.22
 Ibid., p. 6.23
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delegations and meetings of the Conference remained unchanged (see Table 
5.2). 
Table 5.2  Evolution of the Speakers’ principles related to the SECG 
Conference  
Source: Own elaboration.  
5.3.3  Final negotiations on the Rules of Procedure 
The adoption of the Rules of Procedure at the fifth meeting of the Conference 
in Luxembourg on 10 November 2015 was supposed to be a mere formality: A 
EU SPEAKERS 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 2013 
(NICOSIA)
INTERMEDIATE 
STEPS
EU SPEAKERS 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 2015 (ROME)
NAME  
OF THE  
CONFERENCE
not defined / 
Conference of 
Article 13 TSCG
Interparliamentary 
Conference on 
Economic and 
Financial 
Governance
Interparliamentary 
Conference on 
Stability, Economic 
Coordination and 
Governance in the 
European Union
PURPOSE discuss budgetary 
policies and other 
issues covered by 
the TSCG (Article 
13 TSCG)
[no consensus on 
the propose of the 
Conference]
- framework for debate 
and exchange of 
information and best 
practices  
- contribute to ensuring 
democratic 
accountability in the 
area of economic 
governance and 
budgetary policy
COMPOSITION Composition and size of delegations shall be determined by each 
Parliament.
MEETINGS Twice a year; first semester: in Brussels; second semester: capital 
of the Parliament of the member state holding the rotating 
Council Presidency
TIMING not defined not defined Conferences should be 
convened before the 
presentation of the 
Annual Growth Survey 
and before the adoption 
of the National Reform 
Programmes
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draft of the Rules of Procedure had been prepared by the Presidency 
Parliament (Luxembourg) and circulated to all other parliaments before the 
meeting. The final discussion of the draft of the Rules of Procedure should 
take place in a short session among the Heads of delegations at the end of the 
Conference. 
But at that session, several of the provisions in the Rules of Procedure had 
been modified without prior notice and without making these changes visible. 
To the surprise of many delegations, the European Parliament was at the 
origin of these changes. The dispute grew sharply when the Head of the 
delegation of the European Parliament, Roberto Gualtieri , made it clear 24
that the adoption of the Rules of Procedure would fail unless the amendments 
of the European Parliament were accepted. The Heads of many national 
delegations urged the representative of the European Parliament to pave the 
way for the unanimous adoption of the Rules of Procedure by dropping the 
amendments that had quietly found their way into the document. One 
technical change only clarified the term “Presidency Parliament”, but the 
provision on possible amendments to the Rules of Procedures in §7.2, stating 
that these “shall be subject to a decision by consensus by the 
Interparliamentary Conference on SECG” , was adjusted by adding another 25
phrase that these “must be in accordance with the framework set by the 
Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments” . It is clear that the 26
European Parliament tried to consolidate and advance its legal interpretation 
of a SECG Conference that operates under the auspices of the Speakers’ 
Conference.   
After the session had been suspended for 15 minutes to allow Mr Gualtieri 
to call his officials in Brussels (the President of the European Parliament was 
on an airplane to an EU summit in Valletta and could not be reached), the 
intensive mediation efforts succeeded in obtaining the necessary approval 
 Chairman of the ECON Committee of the European Parliament.24
 SECG Conference, Initial draft Rules of Procedure, circulated ahead of the session among 25
Heads of delegations on 10 November 2015, §7.2. On file with the author.
 SECG Conference, Draft Rules of Procedure, version tabled at the session among Heads of 26
delegations on 10 November 2015, §7.2 (EP). On file with the author.
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from the Head of delegation of the European Parliament on the Rules of 
Procedure. To that end, the request of the European Parliament to include a 
reference to the agreement on the framework for the SECG Conference 
reached by the Speakers’ Conference in Rome in April 2015 was added in 
§7.2. The Rules of Procedure were then adopted unanimously. The final 
version of §7.2 reads as follows: 
“Any amendments shall be subject to a decision by consensus by the 
Interparliamentary Conference on SECG, and must be in accordance 
with the framework set by the Conference of Speakers of the EU 
Parliaments.”  27
5.4  And the winner is…? 
Based on the tracking of interparliamentary negotiations in the previous 
section, this section evaluates the compromise on the Rules of Procedure as 
the outcome of an interparliamentary struggle that lasted from 2012 to 2015. 
Although an interparliamentary compromise, it is nevertheless possible to 
identify how the final provisions of the Rules of Procedure align with the 
three competing models for interparliamentary relations.   28
Profound disagreements, like the ones described in the previous section, 
are a common phenomenon in interparliamentary cooperation (see Fasone 
and Lupo 2016b: 345-46). In the case of Article 13 TSCG, they concerned 
“general questions of legitimacy, basic issues such as the formal weight to be 
given to the two parliamentary levels, and […] the competences and 
objectives of such a conference” (Kreilinger 2014: 58). The underlying 
diverging preferences about the institutional design of a conference involved 
in the parliamentary scrutiny of EU economic governance prevented a 
smooth implementation of Article 13 TSCG: While the European Parliament 
 SECG Conference, Rules of Procedure of the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, 27
Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union, as adopted on 10 November 
2015, http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/
082dbcc552572ef9015259413ba101a0.do.
 See above, section 5.2, on the three competing models.28
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clearly favoured an institutional design in which it would lead the scrutiny 
(first model), the national parliaments were split between the second model of 
a COSAC-style conference and the third model of a collective parliamentary 
counterweight. Simon Sutour, the chairman of the European affairs 
committee in the French Sénat, described in 2013 that the European 
Parliament was putting “pressure on other EU institutions to convince them 
that parliamentary oversight of the new governance is primarily ensured by 
itself.”   29
The first-hand evidence from participating observation in the final round 
of negotiations about the Rules of Procedure (see sub-section 5.3.3) indicates 
how interparliamentary relations were still characterised by conflict and 
rivalry rather than cooperation (see Martucci 2017; Neunreither 2005). Some 
have argued that, just like for the CFSP/CSDP Interparliamentary 
Conference, “overlapping authority claims” (Herranz-Surrallés 2014) between 
the European Parliament and national parliaments can explain 
disagreements in economic governance to a great extent (e.g. Kreilinger 
2015b). According to Herranz Surralles’ assessment of “overlapping authority 
claims” (2014), the underlying explanation of the profound disagreements 
between national parliaments and the European Parliament is a mismatch 
between the daily EU policy making and formal treaty powers: an 
incremental and informal empowerment of the European Parliament clashes 
with national parliaments and their constitutional role linked to 
intergovernmental treaties and their domestic role in controlling national 
governments. 
In the end, the SECG Conference has become a COSAC-style venue 
(second model), although with some institutional peculiarities. The linkage to 
the European Parliamentary Week at the first annual meeting of the 
Conference and the absence of a provision regarding the size of delegations in 
the Rules of Procedure of the SECG Conference (which remain at the 
discretion of each parliament) are the most important ones. As a 
 Sénat français (2013), Compte rendu de la Commission des affaires européennes, 31 January 29
2013, http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20130128/europ.html. 
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consequence, the second model did not fully prevail, but has been followed to 
a great extent. The SECG Conference certainly did not become a collective 
parliamentary counterweight against executive dominance in EU economic 
governance (third model). 
The final version of the Rules of Procedure essentially confirmed 
previously existing practices (Rozenberg 2017: 47), but in terms of their 
actual content, organisational arrangements in Rules of Procedure are 
important for assessing interparliamentary cooperation (see Hefftler and 
Gattermann 2015: 107-12). The Conference, for instance, has a rotating (and 
not a permanent) secretariat. This means that it lacks dedicated resources of 
its own and is dependent on the respective Presidency Parliaments and the 
administration of the European Parliament (see Cooper 2017). In addition, a 
“troika” of the current, preceding and upcoming Presidency Parliaments and 
the European Parliament plays a coordinating role through informal 
meetings which take place at the margins of the Conference (§3.3, §3.4). In 
these respects, the Conference settled on a design similar to the cases of 
COSAC and the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP (Winzen 
2017: 26). As previously pointed out with respect to the Speakers’ principles 
of April 2013, the new Conference 
“largely follows the characteristics of the ‘standard’ interparlia-
mentary conference. The Speakers’ decision did not have the ambition 
to be innovative, but rather to duplicate a model that worked in the 
past.” (Kreilinger 2013: 19)  
The size of delegations to the SECG Conference is, as noted above, not 
fixed (§4.1 of the Rules of Procedure, see also section 5.5, below). 
Furthermore, the significance of the European Parliament’s last-minute 
amendment to §7 of the Rules of Procedure, as also explained by Ian Cooper 
(2017: 242), is that the SECG Conference may amend its Rules of Procedure, 
but must (always) adhere to the framework established by the Speakers’ 
Conference. This strengthens the role of the Speakers’ Conference which has, 
although it is not explicitly recognised by the EU Treaties, moved into an 
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overall coordinating function for interparliamentary cooperation (Fasone 
2016).  
The real impact of the European Parliament’s amendment remains to be 
seen: The current Rules of Procedure do not differ from the framework set by 
the Speakers’ Conference in April 2015. If better working methods of the 
Conference (as for instance proposed by Griglio and Lupo 2018; Rozenberg 
2017) can be applied without codification in the Rules of Procedure, the 
amendment will have no effect. But far-reaching changes to the Rules of 
Procedure, as for instance proposed by Kreilinger and Larhant (2016), become 
more difficult to implement. In terms of decision-making, §7.2 of the Rules of 
Procedure represents a double-lock, because any changes to the Rules of 
Procedure must be adopted by consensus in the SECG Conference and, at the 
same time, conform with the guidelines by the Speakers’ Conference that 
were also adopted by consensus. Whether the European Parliament’s 
insistence on this double-lock was necessary (or whether it has, on the 
contrary, led to a deterioration of interparliamentary relations) is another 
open question.  
Regarding the timing and organisation of the meetings, in the first 
semester of each year, the Conference convenes in Brussels, co-hosted and co-
presided by the Presidency Parliament and the European Parliament (§3.1, 
Rules of Procedure). In the second semester of each year, it is held in the 
member state holding the EU Presidency and presided over by the Presidency 
Parliament (§3.1). The first of the two annual meetings of the SECG 
Conference is embedded into the so-called European Parliamentary Week. 
The creation of the European Parliamentary Week predates Article 13 TSCG 
and, in particular, contains a set of parallel interparliamentary sessions 
organised by different committees of the European Parliament and to a 
certain extent aligns with the model of EP-led scrutiny. The first meeting of 
the SECG Conference is therefore dominated by the European Parliament, 
although formally the Presidency Parliament co-chairs all sessions (§3.1, 
Rules of Procedure). Related to the overall timing of the Conference’s two 
meetings per year, the Rules of Procedure state that they “should be 
National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !197
Chapter 5: Interparliamentary Conference on SECG
convened before the presentation of the Annual Growth Survey and the 
adoption of the National Reform Programmes” (§3.2). Here, the provisions in 
the Rules of Procedure also fully adhere to the Speakers’ principles of April 
2015 (see Table 5.2, above). The relevant stages of the European Semester 
are programmed for April (national governments must submit their Stability 
or Convergence Programme and National Reform Programme, in which they 
put forward their fiscal and economic policy, by the end of April) and 
November (the European Commission usually presents the Annual Growth 
Survey, which sets the overall economic priorities for the EU, by the end of 
November).   30
If one looks at the issues that are put on the agenda of the SECG 
Conference, they have moved beyond budgetary policies and other issues 
covered by the TSCG, narrowly defined. In this respect, the Danish Folketing 
and its allies (see sub-section 5.3.1) did not get their way. In February 2017, 
for instance, structural reforms, conditionality and ESM programmes were 
addressed in one session; economic policy, social affairs, growth and jobs were 
covered at other meetings. Many centre-left parties, like the French Socialists 
(initially opposed to tighter budgetary surveillance), had supported the TSCG 
back in 2012 in exchange for a symbolic “Pact for Growth and Jobs” that did 
not alter the fiscal rules (Rozenberg 2015: 7) and subsequently wanted to use 
the provision for creating the Interparliamentary Conference as a vehicle to 
counterbalance the dominant pro-austerity discourse in EU economic 
governance. This hope has not been fulfilled, but is still the reasoning behind 
some ideas to create a Parliamentary Assembly of the Euro area, e.g. in 
Thomas Piketty et al.’s “Pour un traité de démocratisation de 
l’Europe” (Hennette et al. 2017).  
Finally, according to the Rules of Procedure, “[t]he Presidency Parliament 
may present non-binding conclusions on the outcome of the meeting […]. In 
 On the different stages of the European Semester, see Appendix A (Scrutinising the 30
European Semester in four national parliaments). 
The SECG Conference could also be linked to different stages of the European Semester by 
taking place “in November or December after the Annual Growth Survey is presented and in 
June after country-specific recommendations are issued” (Rozenberg 2017: 47-48).
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the first semester of each year the latter may be presented together with the 
European Parliament” (§6.1). The respective Presidency Parliaments have 
usually only presented a “Presidency Summary” after the second meeting of 
the SECG Conference recapitulating the issues discussed in the different 
sessions. No conclusions have been issued after the meetings co-presided by 
the European Parliament. This means that the SECG Conference is not 
producing the same amount and the same type of written documentation as 
other interparliamentary conferences (e.g. COSAC and CFSP/CSDP).  
The Conference thus suffers from some organisational and functional 
weaknesses that must be taken into account in order to understand how the 
SECG Conference works on the basis of the status-quo in terms of its 
organisation. The institutional design of the Conference mostly corresponds 
to the second model of a COSAC-style venue. The interparliamentary 
compromise of November 2015 did not assign a direct European role to 
national parliaments (Winzen 2017: 121-75), but provides a possibility for 
undertaking joint scrutiny that is examined in the following section on the 
basis of attendance records at the Conference. 
5.5  An assessment of the SECG Conference on 
the basis of attendance records 
The SECG Conference has, by now, met ten times in total. Since the adoption 
of the compromise on the Rules of Procedure of the SECG Conference in 
November 2015, five meetings of the SECG Conference have taken place 
(from February 2016 to February 2018). This allows taking stock of how the 
Interparliamentary Conference has worked in practice so far. On the basis of 
the previous findings, it is clear that the COSAC-inspired institutional design 
(second model) prevailed, but attendance patterns can shed additional light 
on its development. After all, neither the size of national delegations, nor the 
affiliation of participants to certain parliamentary committees have been 
fixed; they remain the responsibility of each parliament. Furthermore, Article 
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13 TSCG, the Conclusions of the Speakers’ Conference and §4.1 of the Rules 
of Procedure only mention representatives of “relevant committees”:  
“The Interparliamentary Conference on SECG shall be composed of 
delegations from the relevant committees of the national Parliaments 
of EU Members States and the European Parliament. The composition 
and size of delegations shall be determined by each Parliament.”  31
In the early years of its existence, the Conference was not able to meet the 
far-reaching expectations by some actors and thus confirmed the difficulties 
encountered by all interparliamentary initiatives since 1989 (see Larhant 
2005). But if assessed by the objective set in §2.1 of its Rules of Procedure, 
according to which the Conference “shall provide a framework for debate and 
exchange of information and best practices” and “contribute to ensuring 
democratic accountability in the area of economic governance and budgetary 
policy in the EU, particularly in the EMU” (§2.1, Rules of Procedure), the 
Conference actually does what it is supposed to do. After the procedural 
disagreements were solved, national parliaments and the European 
Parliament would still be able to embark on jointly scrutinising the executive 
decision-makers of EU economic governance.   32
Meeting with colleagues from other EU member states is a firmly 
established part of the work of parliamentarians (see Wagner 2013: 195). In 
the following, this section examines variation in attendance at the SECG 
Conference over time (sub-section 5.5.1), across member states (sub-section 
5.5.2) and across committees (sub-section 5.5.3). For the three dimensions, 
the attendance records from 2013 to 2018 are examined.  33
 §4.1, Rules of Procedure of the SECG Conference.31
 Joint scrutiny essentially means that national parliaments and the European Parliament 32
cooperate in order to remedy the information asymmetries that they have vis-à-vis the 
executives.
 The data have been extracted from the lists of participants, available on IPEX. 33
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5.5.1  Variation over time 
SECG Conferences are usually attended by around 120 MPs when they take 
place in Brussels (as it is the case for the first meeting in connection with the 
European Parliamentary Week) and by around 90 MPs when they take place 
in the national capital of the Presidency Parliament (as it is the case for the 
second meeting).  From 2013 to 2018 a total of ten meetings of the 34
Conference took place. Over the years, there has been a slight decrease in the 
total numbers of participating MPs to 105 and in the average number of 
participants per national parliament to 3.7 (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1  Overall attendance at the SECG Conference
!  
Source: Own elaboration.  
Data: Fromage (2016a) for 2013(II)-2015(I); own data collection for 2015(II)-2018(I). 
 Own calculation on the basis of lists of participants.34
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In general, however, the attendance can be considered stable. After an all-
time low at the meeting in Luxembourg in November 2015 (60 MPs), the 
number of participants has recovered at the following meetings (see Figure 
5.1). This means that despite struggles about the Rules of Procedure, 
attendance has not declined. Parliamentarians thus remain attached to the 
Conference that corresponds to the second model. They dedicate time and 
resources to it. 
5.5.2  Variation across member states 
The data also confirm that over the years interparliamentary relations 
between national parliaments have “not develop[ed] into a balanced 
multilateral interplay including parliaments from all member states on the 
same footing” (Benz 2011: 11). Similar to the case of COSAC (Kreilinger 2013: 
4), national parliaments’ participation in the early years of the SECG 
Conference was unequal (Fromage 2016a) and the great variation in the 
number of MPs attending the SECG Conference has persisted (see Figure 
5.2). If the average participation is below two MPs (as for Denmark, Croatia, 
Slovenia and the United Kingdom), the delegation of a national parliament 
does not allow for representation of governing parties and opposition parties 
–– not to mention representation of both chambers in case of bicameral 
systems. At the same time, it is clear that MPs have limited time and 
resources for the SECG Conference. They may also already feel well-
informed. Since the creation of the Conference in 2013, only 13 out of 28 
national parliaments have had average delegation sizes of four or more MPs. 
Four MPs is generally considered the ideal number of MPs in order to have a 
“solid foundation for a genuine network of high flyer specialists” (Rozenberg 
2017: 50), where the chair and deputy chair of the Budget or Finance 
committee, belonging to different political camps (and assemblies in case of 
bicameral systems), would be represented. Unsurprisingly, the national 
parliaments of the biggest Euro area members (France, Germany and Italy) 
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have, on average, sent large delegations of six or more MPs to the SECG 
Conference (see Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2  Attendance per national parliament at the SECG 
Conference  
!  
Source: Own elaboration based on data collection from lists of participants from 2013 to 
2018. 
Delegation sizes also vary in other interparliamentary settings, for example 
COSAC (Kreilinger 2013: 4). As long as the SECG Conference is not asked to 
take binding decisions, such a variation is not a problem. If, at some point, 
the SECG Conference evolved into this direction, different delegation sizes (or 
voting powers) might be necessary in order to ensure an equal representation 
of citizens from EU member states. 
5.5.3  Variation across committees 
Finally, one interparliamentary struggle during the early negotiations about 
the institutional design of the Conference concerned the role of European 
affairs committees. The institutional self-interest of European affairs 
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committees had been to keep control over economic governance and possibly 
avoid an empowerment of their fellow MPs who are most likely to come from 
Budget or Finance committees. They did not succeed, although in 2012/2013, 
the Danish Folketing was able to build a large coalition among the 
chairpersons of European affairs committees.  35
The lists of participants allow examining the committee affiliation of 
participating MPs and whether MPs affiliated to sectoral committees (e.g. 
Budget or Finance committees) or to European affairs committees attend the 
Conference. This has evolved over time (see Figure 5.3): At the constituent 
meeting of the Conference in Vilnius in October 2013, roughly 50% of the 
participating MPs belonged to the Budget or Finance committees of their 
national parliament, 28% were affiliated to the European affairs committee 
and the remaining participants (over 20%) were members of other sectoral 
committees such as Economic or Social affairs.  In November 2015, about 36
33% (+5 percentage points compared to the constituent meeting in 2013) of 
the MPs attending the Conference were members of European affairs 
committees, 44% (-6) were members of Budget or Finance committees and 
23% (+3) of participating MPs did not belong to either of these two 
committees (Kreilinger 2016: 49). More recently, at the meeting in Tallinn in 
October 2017, only 17% of participating MPs belonged to the European affairs 
committee of their national parliament (-16 compared to the meeting in 
Luxembourg, two years earlier); 83% of them were affiliated to other sectoral 
committees (among them 53% to Budget or Finance committees). This 
proportion of European affairs committee members has recovered slightly to 
23% at the most recent meeting in Brussels in February 2018 (see Figure 
5.3). 
 See sub-section 5.3.1 (First discussions in sub-groups of national parliaments): Chairpersons 35
from 15 national parliaments/chambers (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK House of Lords, the 
Belgian Senate and the Romanian Senate signed a letter in April 2013 arguing that the Article 
13 Conference should meet at the margins of COSAC (see also Table 5.1).
 Own calculation on the basis of the list of participants.36
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Figure 5.3  Committee-affiliation of MPs at the SECG Conference 
!  
Source: Own elaboration based on data collection from lists of participants from 2015 to 
2018. 
This suggests that the Euro crisis has not only affected the power balance 
within national parliaments (Fasone 2018b), but also interparliamentary 
cooperation and a “mainstreaming” of EU affairs (see Gattermann et al. 2016) 
has taken place at the SECG Conference through a greater involvement of 
MPs from sectoral committees (Fromage 2016b; Rozenberg 2017: 48): If MPs 
who cover budget or finance issues become involved in interparliamentary 
cooperation, the domestic experts on the topic become active at the EU level 
(and not primarily MPs from European affairs committees who are already 
quite Europeanised). This strengthens what has been called 
“interparliamentarism by committee” (Fasone and Lupo 2016b: 355) and 
exposes MPs from sectoral committees to the positions and views of 
parliamentarians from other EU countries.  
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5.6  Theory and practice of interparliamentary 
cooperation 
This chapter examined the difficulties in making interparliamentary 
cooperation work. The Rules of Procedure of the SECG Conference represent 
a lowest common denominator compromise about the role that this new body 
should play in EU economic governance. In that respect, the findings are in 
line with previous theoretical assumptions about and practical examples for 
challenges in interparliamentary cooperation (Crum and Fossum 2013a; Lupo 
and Fasone 2016).  
National parliaments and the European Parliaments agreed that the 
institutional design of the SECG Conference would follow the model of 
COSAC, although with two institutional peculiarities: The linkage to the 
European Parliamentary Week at the first annual meeting gives the 
European Parliament some additional leverage and there is no provision 
regarding the size of delegations. Thus, the second model did not fully prevail, 
but it has been followed to a great extent. The SECG Conference certainly did 
not become a collective parliamentary counterweight to executive dominance 
in economic governance. Despite this, the number of participants is stable 
over time, the size of national delegations continues to vary and participating 
MPs are still twice as likely to be members of Budget or Finance committees 
than to be members of European affairs committees.  
After two years of procedural disagreements, the Rules of Procedure are 
the current basis on which the Conference works and interparliamentary 
cooperation in the post-crisis economic governance is now characterised by a 
high degree of stability. The SECG Conference could still become a genuine 
venue for joint scrutiny in EU economic governance in which national 
parliaments and the European Parliament cooperate in order to remedy the 
information asymmetries that they have vis-à-vis the executives. MPs and 
MEPs would then engage in a real dialogue with representatives of the EU’s 
executive and jointly scrutinise those actors and bodies who carry 
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responsibility in the post-crisis economic governance. But despite proposals 
for creating some kind of joint parliamentary body , there is currently little 37
momentum in that direction. 
Directions for further research  38
The analysis of this chapter provides an opportune starting point for further 
research on interparliamentary cooperation in EU economic governance –– 
first, in relation to the notion of “joint scrutiny” and, second, with respect to 
transmission to the national parliamentary arena. Each of these two 
directions is now developed briefly. 
On the one hand, the concept of “joint scrutiny” could be developed much 
more. After all, scrutiny is more than interparliamentary debate as it 
assumes an object that is being scrutinised. This begs the question what can 
jointly be done by national parliaments and the European Parliament in EU 
economic governance and what would distinguish “joint scrutiny” from “non-
joint scrutiny”. In this respect, it would be tempting to develop thinking about 
a “new inter-parliamentarism” at a theoretical and operational level.  
On the other hand, a mechanism like the SECG Conference that connects 
the European level and the national level can only work properly if there are 
transmission channels and if SECG Conference delegation members that are 
agents of their entire assembly report back to committee(s) and parliament. 
The SECG Conference delegation of the German Bundestag, for instance, 
drafts a written report (“Unterrichtung”) after each conference , but the 39
 See Chapter 6 Conclusion (sub-section 6.3.2 National parliaments and reforming the 37
Economic and Monetary Union) on whether a distinct parliamentary body for the Euro area is 
necessary.
 The following paragraphs are not included in the article ‘From procedural disagreement to 38
joint scrutiny? The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 
Governance’, Perspectives on Federalism, 10 (3), pp. 155-184. 
 For example, Deutscher Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch die Delegation des Deutschen 39
Bundestages in der Interparlamentarischen Konferenz gemäß Artikel 13 des Vertrags über 
Stabilität, Koordinierung und Steuerung in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion 
(Fiskalvertrag). Tagung der Interparlamentarischen Konferenz über Stabilität, 
wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung und Steuerung in der Europäischen Union vom 9. und 10. 
November 2015 in Luxemburg, Drucksache 18/7400, 11 February 2016.
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initial evidence available suggests that nothing else happens in committee or 
plenary. In the French Assemblée nationale, however, there have only been a 
few written reports of that kind, whereas short oral reports in the European 
affairs committee about meetings of interparliamentary conferences have 
been more common. Analysing the actual impact of the SECG Conference and 
whether national parliaments’ individual scrutiny of the national government 
or the European Commission is able to benefit from information received at 
SECG Conference would be the next step under this direction for further 
research.  
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Chapter 6: 
6  Conclusion 
The concluding chapter of this dissertation connects the findings of Chapters 
3, 4 and 5 in the context of the overall framework for assessing parliamentary 
involvement in EU economic governance that was developed in Chapter 2. 
This chapter proceeds in four steps: First, the assessment of national 
parliaments in this dissertation is summarised (section 6.1). In light of these 
findings, the following sections evaluate the theoretical implications (section 
6.2) and the practical implications (section 6.3). After that, this chapter draws 
some lessons for the role of national parliaments in turbulent times (section 
6.4). 
6.1  The assessment of national parliaments in 
this dissertation 
The findings of the three comparative studies in this dissertation (Chapters 3, 
4 and 5 on the European Semester, the European Stability Mechanism and 
the SECG Conference) challenge the persisting view that the Euro crisis has 
only reduced the powers of national parliaments.  The assessment of national 1
parliaments’ actual involvement in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance 
combined a political and institutional analysis of the role of national 
parliaments with comparative qualitative and quantitative examinations (see 
also Auel et al. 2015a). The three comparative studies provide ample evidence 
that many national parliaments were able to “fight back” (Raunio and Hix 
2000) and have responded to the Euro crisis. But this happened in an 
asymmetric way. The uneven involvement of national parliaments threatens 
 See also the discussion of the de-parliamentarisation thesis in Chapter 1 Introduction 1
(section 1.2 National parliaments in the European Union).
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the possible contribution that this source of democratic representation and 
legitimacy can make to Europe’s overall post-crisis economic governance. 
Chapter 3 on the European Semester 
More specifically, Chapter 3 provided a fine-grinned analysis of how the 
European Semester is scrutinised and asked what factors have driven 
parliamentary activities in the French Assemblée nationale, the German 
Bundestag, the Irish Dáil and the Portuguese Assembleia between 2012 and 
2017. Although the European Semester possibly has a far-reaching impact on 
national parliaments’ “power of the purse” (Wehner 2006), national 
parliaments are only to some extent willing and able to participate in the 
multilevel coordination and surveillance process of the European Semester.  
Legal provisions for a parliamentary debate and vote on the Stability 
Programme have sometimes been ignored in France and the German 
Bundestag is much less active in the European Semester than in general EU 
affairs or in the budget process. Moreover, the weakness of Ireland’s 
parliament in the annual budget procedure affects its role in the European 
Semester. Viewed from the ideal-typical models for parliamentary scrutiny in 
EU affairs (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015), only the Portuguese Assembleia 
has been able to play an active role in the European Semester as a “public 
forum” (and to some extent also as “watchdog” and “European player”).   2
The four case studies on the European Semester thus confirm that 
national parliaments “find themselves on the losing side of a reinforced two-
level game” (Crum 2018: 270). Compared to reports that cover all 28 national 
parliaments (Hagelstam et al. 2018; Hallerberg et al. 2018; Raimla 2016), 
Chapter 3 has provided additional insights about the relevance of domestic 
political dynamics as a possible driving factor. Finally, the findings suggest 
that the role of national parliaments could be fostered through the definition 
of minimum standards for their involvement in the European Semester. The 
 These ideal-typical models were developed by Olivier Rozenberg and Claudia Hefftler for EU 2
affairs (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). Chapter 2 applied them to EU economic governance and 
Chapter 3 to the European Semester.
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deliberation on creating these standards could be assigned to a working group 
of national parliaments convened in the context of the SECG Conference.  3
Chapter 4 on the European Stability Mechanism 
When a national parliament votes in relation to an ESM rescue package, it 
participates in the Economic and Monetary Union. Chapter 4 examined this 
complex interplay between national procedures and European procedures as 
part of a long chain of delegation. Eight national parliaments were 
substantially involved in the case of the third rescue package for Greece while 
ten national parliaments were not. Some national parliaments, for example 
the German Bundestag, are able to preserve their budgetary autonomy when 
it comes to rescue packages, but only “at the cost of those who experience the 
constraints of ‘conditionality’” (Joerges 2016: 326-27).  
For some other national parliaments substantial involvement in ESM 
affairs did not follow the expectations derived from earlier research on 
parliamentary prerogatives (Höing 2015b; Rittberger and Winzen 2015). The 
analysis in Chapter 4 did not find significant differences in terms of economic 
strength between those countries with substantial parliamentary 
involvement and those without: Voting in national parliaments in relation to 
the negotiations on the third rescue package for Greece was often rooted in a 
path dependency logic (previous institutional strength of a national 
parliament in EU affairs), but additional votes were triggered by the 
government or by opposition parties. Domestic political dynamics have also 
shaped parliamentary participation in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
They stand for two trajectories of parliamentary involvement in the third 
rescue package for Greece that were followed by the French Assemblée 
nationale, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the Spanish Congreso. Two other 
national parliaments followed the trajectory of indirect legal enabling clauses 
(Finnish Eduskuntu and Latvian Saeima) while three national parliaments 
 See below, sub-section 6.3.2 (National parliaments and reforming the Economic and 3
Monetary Union).
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voted on the basis of direct legal enabling clauses (Austrian Nationalrat, 
Estonian Riigikogu and German Bundestag).  4
Chapter 5 on Interparliamentary Cooperation 
EU economic governance also requires collective engagement from national 
parliaments (see Chapter 5). Together with the European Parliament they 
agreed that the new Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance (SECG) would follow the “standard” 
interparliamentary conference (called the COSAC model in Chapter 5). Two 
other competing models for the institutional design of the Conference did not 
prevail. In terms of national parliaments’ actual participation, attendance 
records are stable over time, the size of national delegations continues to vary 
and participating MPs are still twice as likely to be members of Budget or 
Finance committees than to be members of European affairs committees.  
This suggests that interparliamentary struggles and an outcome under 
which national parliaments “once again failed to be collective actors at the 
EU level” (Kreilinger 2013: 17) did not have a negative impact on 
participation. The Conference does not entrust national parliaments with a 
direct European role (see Winzen 2017: 173-75) and has not become a venue 
for “joint scrutiny” yet, but, as the participation records and conduct of its 
meetings show, it might still become such a venue. 
Overall assessment 
In the 1990s, a major development in national parliaments was the creation 
of European affairs committees (Raunio and Hix 2000). This also meant that 
EU affairs became somehow encapsulated among a few specialists (Fromage 
2016b; Gattermann et al. 2016). As pointed out by Crum (2017: 830),  
“[o]ne trend that gives some credence to the claim that national 
parliaments become ever more an integral part of the EU 
 See Chapter 4 National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism (sub-section 4
4.4.1 Trajectories of substantial parliamentary involvement), in particular Table 4.7.
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constitutional system is the recurring observation that European 
Affairs Committees are losing their central role in the involvement of 
national parliaments in EU affairs.”  
In EU economic governance, this mainstreaming of EU affairs 
(Gattermann et al. 2016) makes sectoral committees considerably more active 
and implies a shift from European affairs committees to Budget and Finance 
committees (Fasone 2018b). This is most evident at the SECG Conference 
where about one in two participating MPs is a member of the Budget or 
Finance committee while only 20% belong to European affairs committees.  5
In case of the third rescue package for Greece, however, substantial 
involvement of parliamentary committees mostly took place in European 
affairs committees.   6
With respect to the “aggregate level of parliamentary participation” (Lord 
2013: 248) in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance, the findings of this 
dissertation require making a differentiated assessment of the activities of 
national parliaments. On the one hand, national parliaments do not achieve 
the level of parliamentary involvement that would be needed in the European 
Semester (see Crum 2018; Lord 2017; Rozenberg 2017). The French 
Assemblée nationale is the prime example of a national parliament that has 
not always met the legal obligations for a parliamentary debate and vote on 
the Stability Programme.  On the other hand, with respect to the ESM and 7
the third rescue package for Greece, Chapter 4 found that national 
parliaments’ substantial parliamentary involvement exceeded what was 
required (and expected) according to national legal provisions (see Höing 
2015b; Rittberger and Winzen 2015). This is a noteworthy finding, because 
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 5
Governance (section 5.5 An assessment on the basis of attendance records).
 See Chapter 4 National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism: European 6
affairs committees were substantially involved in Estonia, Finland and Latvia. In Austria, the 
“Standing sub-committee on ESM matters” is responsible.
 See Chapter 3 National parliaments in the European Semester (sub-section 3.3.1 To 7
scrutinise or not to scrutinise) and Appendix A (A.1 French Assemblée nationale: Adaptation 
without obligation): A debate and vote on the Stability Programme took place in 2011, 2013, 
2014 and 2018. In 2016 there was a debate without a vote. In 2015 the Assemblée nationale 
did not debate and did not vote on the Stability Programme. This was also the case in 2012 and 
2017, but in both cases due to the end of the legislative term.
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national parliaments very often do not exploit their possibilities for 
parliamentary involvement. Finally, the contribution of the SECG Conference 
to the aggregate level of parliamentary participation is limited, but it is a 
useful place for exchanges and discussions between national parliaments and 
the European Parliament.  
6.2  Theoretical implications for studying 
national parliaments 
This section highlights four major theoretical implications that the findings of 
this dissertation have for studying national parliaments and suggests that 
some theoretical considerations for analysing the involvement of national 
parliaments in the post-crisis economic governance, outlined in Chapter 2, 
might have to be developed further.  
First of all, research on parliaments should indeed focus on what they 
actually do. Second, when it comes to the EU’s democratic deficit, national 
parliaments are part of the problem and part of the solution: Asymmetries 
between them affect the channel of legitimacy that they provide for the EMU, 
but redistributive effects of the EMU and its new elements (in particular the 
European Semester and the ESM) make an equal involvement of national 
parliaments more necessary. Third, research under the lens of the “new 
parliamentarism” contributes to a better understanding of contemporary 
developments in the EU. The findings of this dissertation, fourth, suggest 
that the exceptionality of EU affairs in national legislatures might come to an 
end.  
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What do national parliaments actually do? 
The first theoretical implication is that the move from analysing prerogatives 
to analysing activities and actual involvement (see also Auel et al. 2015a) is 
without any doubt a step into the right direction for studying national 
parliaments in the EU.  Both the empirical chapters on the European 8
Semester and the ESM, for instance, reported that existing rules were 
sufficient for the Finnish Eduskunta to control the government. If research 
solely focuses on parliamentary reforms in reaction to the new economic 
governance, the Finnish case of reliance on existing prerogatives might be 
easily missed. 
In addition, as outlined in Chapter 2, national parliaments are “not just 
involved” in the post-crisis economic governance, but the complex interplay 
between prerogatives and activities could be driven by three different action 
logics. The two action logics of institutional path dependency and economic 
strength are able to explain parliamentary prerogatives and institutional 
capacities, but they cannot account for the whole picture of parliamentary 
involvement. The previous institutional strength of a national parliament in 
EU affairs and domestic political dynamics triggered by the government or by 
the opposition are the drivers that Chapter 4 has identified as explaining 
substantial parliamentary involvement in the case of the third rescue 
package for Greece. 
The financial crisis has led to an “ad-hoc technocratisation of economic 
policy-making” (Enderlein 2013: 732). An important question has been 
whether national parliaments have, once again, been able to “fight 
back” (Raunio and Hix 2000), this time against the “ad-hoc technocratisation” 
of the economic and financial crisis. The reply is a cautious “yes, but…”.  
Another question is how national parliaments fill their ideal-typical 
scrutiny roles  with life. These roles are not mutually exclusive (Rozenberg 9
 See Chapter 1 Introduction (section 1.2 National parliaments in the European Union).8
 See Chapter 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance (sub-section 9
2.3.2 Models of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs).
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and Hefftler 2015: 28), national parliaments can play more than one role and 
shifts between ideal typical scrutiny roles have taken place. The existence of 
plenary sessions that deal with Europe’s post-crisis economic governance 
means that in several national parliaments not only major constitutional 
moments of European integration, such as the ratification of EU Treaties (see 
Thomas 2016; Wendler 2016), but also ESM rescue packages, Stability 
Programmes or National Reform Programmes are treated and debated in 
plenary. EU economic governance is no longer a purely technocratic and 
committee-based affair. In that respect, this dissertation also examined 
parliamentary life and what kind of objections were raised by MPs in plenary 
debates (procedural or policy objections) and to whom these objections were 
directed (to the government or to the EU). One of the broader trends 
regarding national parliaments’ involvement in EU economic governance 
(outlined in Chapter 2, sub-section 2.3.3), becoming a “public forum”, if the 
time pressure allows, is thus confirmed.  
Philip Norton has pointed out that “what is remarkable about […] 
legislatures is not their power to say no to government but rather their 
reluctance to employ that power” (Norton 1998: 192). Besides the move 
towards analysing actual parliamentary involvement, it is therefore equally 
important to note that even an active response and actual involvement by 
national parliaments are “no guarantee for them effectively taking back 
control” (Crum 2017: 822) and that they could still be “trapped in a rescue 
discourse” (Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013).  
Asymmetries, Channels of legitimacy and the EU’s democratic deficit  
A second theoretical implication is linked to the asymmetries between 
national parliaments in the different domains of Europe’s post-crisis 
economic governance. They have reached a level that creates “new forms of 
inequality and domination” (Fossum 2016: 5). The findings of this 
dissertation also affect the two channels of legitimacy and the common 
understanding of the democratic deficit in the EU.  
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The EU is no longer a limited-purpose organisation that restricts its 
activities to non-redistributive and regulatory issues, because the EMU as a 
whole, the European Semester and the ESM have created far-reaching 
redistributive effects.  With respect to the democratic deficit, the analysis of 10
the post-crisis economic governance in this dissertation shows that national 
parliaments are part of the problem and part of the solution: Redistribution 
at the European level “requires the involvement of national parliaments since 
the European Parliament alone is unlikely to have sufficient democratic 
legitimacy” (Börzel 2016: 26), but asymmetries between national parliaments 
make the channel of legitimacy that national parliaments are supposed to 
provide for Euro area governance measures not as viable and symmetric as it 
could be. Furthermore, Chapter 5 confirmed that on issues with 
redistributive implications, “national parliaments may prefer to operate on 
their own or in coalitions that involve smaller subsets of the parliaments in 
the system” (Crum 2016: 15). Parliamentary actors followed the two options 
for parliamentary counterbalancing strategies that were put forward in 
Chapter 2: In order to limit intergovernmental tendencies they have proposed 
or enacted stronger oversight by national parliaments at the domestic level 
(Patzelt 2014: 90-93), new interparliamentary bodies or empowering the 
European Parliament as a counterweight to intergovernmental institutions at 
the EU level. Against supranational tendencies, scrutiny by the European 
Parliament to which the European Commission is accountable (Patzelt 2014: 
87-88) or EP-led scrutiny in interparliamentary committee meetings have 
been seen as effective measures. 
Regarding national parliaments that are not involved at all, it is important 
to note that these national parliaments delegated powers to the national 
government and the ESM in a legitimate way, when they ratified the ESM 
Treaty in 2012: Why would these parliaments see a need to acquire new 
competences? The possibility that some national parliaments are genuinely 
uninterested must also be taken into consideration. The tangled web of 
parliamentary procedures related to the ESM is therefore unlikely to change, 
 See Chapter 1 Introduction (section 1.3 Why Economic Governance is different).10
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because the competences of powerful national parliaments cannot be simply 
taken away from them either. A more symmetric way of parliamentary 
involvement that includes all members of the Euro area (via some kind of 
joint parliamentary structure) would have to keep the current prerogatives of 
national parliaments intact.  
Research under the lens of the “new parliamentarism” 
The third theoretical implication is related to the “new parliamentarism”. 
This dissertation asked a more specific question than the “who gained 
power?”-question of the two main protagonists in contemporary theoretical 
debates about European integration, the “new intergovernmentalism” and 
the “new supranationalism” (Crum 2018: 273; Schmidt 2016). Although they 
remain mostly silent about how they see the role of national parliaments, 
scrutiny activities that are directed to the European Council or the European 
Stability Mechanism matter for the “new intergovernmentalism”, while the 
“new supranationalism” would have to consider the role of the European 
Parliament and interparliamentary cooperation in EU economic governance 
under the model of EP-led scrutiny  and take into account that the European 11
Parliament has preserved its ultimate weapon: to censor the European 
Commission (Lord 2017: 686). As suggested in Chapter 2, the emergence of 
the “new parliamentarism” might be helpful in this regard. 
The analysis of national parliaments in EU economic governance in this 
dissertation contributes to the “new parliamentarism” with a broad 
comparative perspective on parliamentary practices in Europe’s post-crisis 
economic governance. The “new parliamentarism” (Schmidt 2016) puts, as 
previously explained, 
“continuous parallel process[es] in which parliaments at different 
levels (national and European) and in different configurations are 
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 11
Governance (section 5.2 Competing models for the relationship between national parliaments 
and the European Parliament in EU Economic Governance). 
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involved to make […] EU executive decisions visible and to hold those 
who take them to account” (Crum 2017: 835)  
at the centre of attention in its research. Parliamentary power (or weakness) 
should indeed not be considered “in relation to individual parliaments or 
single-system representative structures, but with a view to the overall system 
of representative relations” (Fossum 2015a: 56).  
When national parliaments have adapted their scrutiny activities to the 
new realities of the post-crisis economic governance, such developments 
should receive special attention by disciples of the “new parliamentarism”. 
But cases of non-adaptation, such as the ten national parliaments which were 
not substantially involved in relation to the third rescue package for Greece, 
can also provide important insights.  12
It is also worth considering what the findings of this dissertations might 
imply for the understanding of the Multilevel Parliamentary Field (Crum and 
Fossum 2009, 2013a). Above all, with respect to the question of whether 
interparliamentary relations are more akin to a “field” or a “system” (see 
Crum 2017; Lupo 2018; Patzelt 2014), this dissertation confirms the “field 
character” of interactions in the European Semester, in relation to the ESM 
and in interparliamentary cooperation: Whatever parliamentary institutions 
do in the post-crisis economic governance, the empirical chapters find no 
evidence that the “field” would be so dense and structured that one could 
speak of a “system”. 
With respect to broader trends regarding national parliaments’ 
involvement in EU economic governance, the creation of the SECG 
Conference seems to have prompted many national parliaments to put a 
greater emphasis on their role as “European players”. The findings in 
Chapter 5 are mostly in line with previous theoretical assumptions about and 
practical examples for challenges in interparliamentary cooperation (Crum 
and Fossum 2013a; Lupo and Fasone 2016). National parliaments and the 
European Parliament interact with each other, but there is “no automatic 
 See Chapter 4 National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism.12
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way in which their voices cohere or can be aggregated” (Crum 2016: 9). 
Interparliamentary cooperation therefore faces difficulties to act as a 
“democratic coping mechanism” (Fossum 2015b) for the post-crisis economic 
governance. Chapter 5 also outlined a few directions for further research, in 
order to contribute to the emerging “new parliamentarism” and create an 
interparliamentary research component that could focus on the notion of 
“joint scrutiny” and channels of transmission from interparliamentary 
conferences to the national parliamentary arena.  13
The “new normal” for budgetary and EU issues in legislatures  
In addition to the previous theoretical implications, the fourth implication is 
that the common understanding of the role of EU affairs inside national 
parliaments might have to be developed further. Chapter 1 referred to a 
mismatch between existing classifications of national parliaments in general 
EU affairs and the adaptation of national parliaments to EU economic 
governance and subsequently also noted that EU economic governance differs 
from normal EU affairs with respect to the legal framework, the procedures 
under which the instruments operate, the “inability to rely on existing 
mechanisms of parliamentary involvement” (Fromage and van den Brink 
2018: 241), depoliticised rules and redistributive effects. Another of the three 
broader trends regarding national parliaments’ involvement in EU economic 
governance, outlined in Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.3.3), stronger involvement of 
Budget and Finance committees, was confirmed, for instance with respect to 
the composition of delegations to the SECG Conference.  14
Ultimately, some of the findings may also have implications for 
researching legislatures in the budget process (e.g. Wehner 2014). The 
budgetary role of legislatures of EU member states and Euro area members 
cannot be properly understood without taking into account the supranational 
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 13
Governance (section 5.6 Theory and practice of interparliamentary cooperation).
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 14
Governance (section 5.5 An assessment on the basis of attendance records).
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fiscal norms to which they have subscribed (the European Semester and the 
TSCG) and considering the financial guarantees which are also situated 
beyond the nation-state (the EFSF and ESM). The responsibility of national 
governments to these norms and institutions has created a situation that 
complicates their responsiveness to citizens (see Mair 2009; Rose 2014). 
Parliamentary involvement could be a remedy. In this regard, two aspects 
must be taken into consideration: First, recurring involvement by national 
parliaments when these norms and measures are executed could enhance the 
credibility of national commitments in the context of the European Semester 
or in the ESM (Bellamy and Weale 2015; Lord 2017). This should not just be 
a pro-forma involvement as during the crisis (Enderlein 2013: 732), but take 
place on the basis of well-defined standards and in a symmetric way.  EU 15
economic governance does not necessarily suffer from a zero-sum trade-off 
between parliamentary involvement in the European Semester and 
compliance with Country-specific recommendations, as the example of 
Denmark shows (Kreilinger 2016: 6-7, 35-36). Parliamentary involvement can 
enhance the stability of fiscal norms, commitments and institutions in 
Europe’s post-crisis economic governance, if fiscal institutions push national 
parliaments “to fix prudent aggregate parameters and to focus debate on 
allocative choices within a hard budget constraint” (Wehner 2010: 141).  
6.3  Practical implications for parliamentary 
involvement 
The findings of this dissertation also have practical implications for national 
parliaments. As economic governance generally implies a shift from EU 
legislation to executive action (Crum 2017: 835), it became clear in this 
dissertation that many national parliaments must still find an appropriate 
 See sub-section 6.3.2 National parliaments and reforming the Economic and Monetary 15
Union. 
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response to this.  The empirical chapters of this dissertation have clarified 16
the different roles that national parliaments play in Europe’s post-crisis 
economic governance and the functions that they fulfil. These roles 
correspond but are not congruent to the ideal types of parliamentary scrutiny 
in general EU affairs (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015).  
6.3.1  Old tools for new challenges? 
The conditions for national parliaments’ involvement in the European 
Semester (identified in Chapter 3) and in the context of an ESM rescue 
package (identified in Chapter 4) have important practical implications, too. 
These conditions are more similar than one would expect considering the 
differences between the European Semester and the ESM.  The four national 17
parliaments studied in the chapter on the European Semester showed that 
sustainable parliamentary involvement faces big hurdles even if a legislature 
is powerful in the budget process or formally has strong prerogatives in EU 
affairs. In the case of the third rescue package for Greece, the question 
whether the ESM should provide stability support had a high salience. The 
conditions for substantial parliamentary involvement identified in Chapter 4 
are parliamentary strength in EU affairs and domestic political dynamics. 
As strength in EU affairs matters, one conclusion that can be drawn from 
the findings is that, instead of focusing on the toolbox of the Lisbon Treaty 
with the Early Warning Mechanism and other procedures, the “good old task 
of governmental scrutiny” (Crum 2017: 835) needs to receive more attention 
from national parliaments and the traditional means of legislatures to control 
the government must be used for EU affairs in a precisely targeted manner 
(Patzelt 2014: 92-93).  
 The legislative productivity in the EU has decreased. From 2010 to 2016, the European 16
Commission proposed an average of 127 texts, compared to 271 texts from 2004 to 2009 
(Rozenberg 2017: 26).
 See Chapter 1 Introduction (section 1.3 Why Economic Governance is different).17
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In terms of counterbalancing to “maintain the vitality of the democratic 
process” (Dahl 1994: 33), Pieter de Wilde and Tapio Raunio have advised 
national parliaments to redirect their priorities towards non-legislative 
business like the European Semester or the European Council (see de Wilde 
and Raunio 2018). They have argued that “networking and constituting a 
collective actor in EU affairs are not among the core functions of national 
parliaments” (de Wilde and Raunio 2018: 315). Chapter 5 of this dissertation 
examined these functions (networking and constituting a collective actor) 
which manifest themselves in the SECG Conference and, contrary to de 
Wilde and Raunio, came to a positive assessment. 
Another practical implication of the findings is that they support calls to 
“find ways for re-synchronising the rhythms of political cycles and decision-
making” (Lupo 2018: 207; Rozenberg 2017). Here it is important to 
distinguish that the European Semester and the SECG Conference are 
normal EU economic governance activities, while an ESM rescue package is 
an emergency measure. The European Semester cycle provides possibilities 
for structured interaction between the different levels and actors and for an 
appropriate timing of parliamentary involvement which have not been 
exploited sufficiently.  
6.3.2  National parliaments and reforming the Economic and 
Monetary Union 
National parliaments are objects and actors in the ongoing debate about 
reforming the Economic and Monetary Union. The different reports by the 
European Council and the European Commission in 2012 and 2015 only 
contained general references to the role of national parliaments (see Crum 
2018: 268-69; Kreilinger 2013: 10-12) and mostly saw them as objects which 
should ensure legitimacy and accountability at the national level. In late 
2017, the European Commission proposed to bring the ESM and the TSCG 
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back under the umbrella of the EU’s institutional framework.  These 18
proposals were made under the Community method. It is not surprising, but 
still worth noting, that national parliaments scrutinised them as part of the 
Early Warning Mechanism for subsidiarity concerns. This is one example 
where national parliaments have already become actors in the debate about 
reforming the Economic and Monetary Union.  19
This sub-section considers linkages from the findings of this dissertation to 
the debate on reforming the Economic and Monetary Union. It deals with 
three major questions in the debate about enhancing the role of parliaments 
in EU economic governance: First, is there an ideal model of parliamentary 
involvement in the European Semester? Second, what would a European 
Monetary Fund change? And, third, is a distinct parliamentary body for the 
Euro area necessary? On the basis of the findings and proposals in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5, each of these three questions is now discussed in turn. 
An ideal model of parliamentary involvement in the European 
Semester? 
As national parliaments follow quite different roles and functions in general 
EU affairs (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015), the question of whether there could 
or should be an ideal model of EU scrutiny has been raised occasionally 
(Crum 2017: 824-26). This is the first major question for which the findings of 
this dissertation have practical implications. 
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a 18
European Monetary Fund, COM(2017) 827 final, 6 December 2017; European Commission 
(2017), Proposal for a Council Directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal 
responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in the Member States, COM(2017) 
824 final, 6 December 2017.
 In the German Bundestag, the opposition parties FDP, Die Linke and AfD criticised the 19
EMF proposal and formulated proposals, i.a. to adopt reasoned opinions. See Deutscher 
Bundestag: Antrag der Fraktion Die Linke, Drucksache 19/579, 30 January 2018; Antrag der 
FDP-Fraktion, Drucksache 19/582, 30 January 2018; Antrag der FDP-Fraktion, Drucksache 
19/583, 30 January 2018; Antrag der AfD-Fraktion, Drucksache 19/593, 31 January 2018.  
In April 2018 the CDU/CSU parliamentary group considered to table a motion under Article 23 
GG. See Reformeifer abrupt erlahmt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 April 2018, http://
www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/europaeische-union-reformeifer-abrupt-erlahmt-1.3943218
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In October 2015, the European Commission announced its intention to put 
forward “model arrangements” for the interaction between national 
parliaments and itself in the European Semester.  No such “arrangements” 20
or reflections on how they could look like have been issued or published since 
then.  Although an ideal model might be useful for the reflection about 21
parliamentary involvement in the European Semester, it might interfere with 
the principle of national constitutional self-organisation.  
One national parliament whose scrutiny of the European Semester, 
despite having an opt-out from the Euro, has often been considered 
exemplary is the Danish Folketing (Kreilinger 2016: 35-36). The European 
affairs committee and the Finance committee scrutinise the Annual Growth 
Survey, the National Reform Programme and the Convergence Programme 
and the draft Country-specific recommendations of the European Commission 
in three joint sessions.  When these provisions were adopted in 2013, the 22
Danish People’s Party, the Red-Green Alliance and Liberal Alliance criticised 
this level of parliamentary involvement with respect to the National Reform 
Programme and the Convergence Programme as insufficient, because “the 
Government will merely need to discuss its general ideas regarding the 
economic situation with the Danish Parliament on a non-binding basis.”  23
This means that even the Danish Folketing faces problems in fully 
scrutinising the European Semester (Buskjaer Rasmussen 2018: 348-53; 
Kreilinger 2016: 35-36). 
Instead of singling out one national parliament or a set of best practices 
which might be contradictory if they are followed simultaneously and ill-
 European Commission, On steps towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, 20
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Central Bank, COM(2015) 600 final, 21 October 2015, p. 15.
 The European Commission’s 2017 Reflection paper on the deepening of the Economic and 21
Monetary Union floats the idea of an “agreement on the democratic accountability of the Euro 
area” (2017: 28), but remains mostly silent about national parliaments. 
 Danish Folketing, Report on Consideration of the European Semester by the Danish 22
Parliament, issued by the European Affairs Committee and the Finance Committee on 21 June 
2013, Report No. 5 – 2012-13, http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/
082dbcc53eea9b80013f759affec56d0.do, p. 2.
 Ibid., p. 3.23
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suited for established national patterns of interaction between national 
parliaments and their government, Chapter 3 suggested to develop minimum 
standards for parliamentary involvement in the European Semester.  This 24
would also help to address the uneven involvement of national parliaments in 
the European Semester. Christopher Lord has also put forward the “difficult 
and controversial thought” that “maybe minimum standards of 
parliamentary oversight are needed” (Lord 2017: 688) and points out that the 
Committee of Regions suggests a code of conduct for the involvement of local 
and regional assemblies in the European Semester.  The European 25
Parliament has supported the Committee of Regions on this matter and, in 
addition, reminded the national governments that it was their responsibility 
“to ensure a proper democratic scrutiny of their National Reform 
Programmes in their respective national parliaments.”  26
Chapter 3 of this dissertation pointed out that minimum standards could 
define basic principles of when and how national parliaments should be 
involved in the European Semester. The elaboration of these principles 
should be put in the hands of a working group composed of members of 
national parliaments.  The working group could specify procedural aspects of 27
the interaction between national governments and national parliaments on 
the one hand, as well as between national parliaments and the European 
Commission on the other hand. It could also address substantive aspects of 
scrutinising the European Semester in order to provide a basis for a common 
understanding about the role of national parliaments in the European 
Semester.  
 See Chapter 3 “National parliaments in the European Semester” (section 3.4 “Opportunities 24
and constraints for scrutinising the European Semester”).
 European Committee of the Regions, Opinion on “Improving the governance of the European 25
Semester: a Code of Conduct for the involvement of local and regional authorities”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2017, C 306/24.
 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 26 October 2016 on the European 26
Semester for economic policy coordination: implementation of 2016 priorities 
(P8_TA(2016)0416), para 6.
 COSAC has occasionally convened working groups to deepen the interparliamentary 27
reflection on specific topics. The SECG Conference could follow this example.
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National governments currently “appear to retain full control over the 
national phase of the Semester” (Vanheuverzwijn and Crespy 2018: 290). 
Minimum standards for parliamentary involvement could contribute to better 
national ownership of the process and, possibly, increase the compliance with 
Country-specific recommendations (Kreilinger 2016), but contestation of 
European Semester policies in national parliamentary arenas  might also 28
decrease compliance and would then be “the price to pay for the longer-term 
legitimacy of the European Semester as a process” (Crum 2018: 282). 
In the reflection on minimum standards, an emphasis should be put on 
information flows: the information about the European Semester that 
national parliaments receive as well as when and how they are able to 
process this information. With respect to the National Stability and Reform 
Programmes, it would be the task of the governments to give national 
parliaments an opportunity to discuss the drafts of these programmes before 
the government transmits them to the European Commission by 30 April. 
During the following stage of the European Semester, national parliaments 
currently receive the draft Country-specific recommendations and other 
documents from the European Commission under the normal procedures for 
transmitting documents to them.  This would already enable them to discuss 29
the Country-specific recommendations with their national government before 
the Council adopts them by reversed qualified majority. However, only few 
national parliaments do so (Hallerberg et al. 2018; Kreilinger 2016).  
Interactions between national governments and the European Commission 
before the European Commission issues the draft Country-specific 
recommendations are not visible to parliaments or the public. This could 
explain the decline in amendments to these drafts in the Council (Baerg and 
Hallerberg 2016). In order to tackle this element of in-transparency in the 
European Semester, the French Assemblée nationale has asked the 
government to be included in these discussions between the government and 
 For examples, see Chapter 3 National parliaments in the European Semester (sub-section 28
3.3.2 Raising objections against the European Semester).
 Article 1, Protocol N°1 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.29
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the European Commission.  Ideas like this one could be discussed in a 30
working group in the framework of the SECG Conference, whose task (as 
described above) would be to elaborate minimum standards for parliamentary 
involvement in the European Semester.  
What would a European Monetary Fund change? 
The second major question in the debate about enhancing the role of 
parliaments in EU economic governance is what a European Monetary Fund 
(EMF) would change. Several proposals for reforming the EMU envisage the 
creation of an EMF which would “upgrade” the ESM and entrust the new 
institution with additional competences. While one can only speculate about 
the concrete institutional design of a future EMF, it could either be set up by 
changing the ESM Treaty (and remain intergovernmental) or the ESM-then-
EMF could be brought closer to the community framework, as envisaged in 
the European Commission’s proposal for a Council regulation.  This proposal 31
would make the operating mode of the new institution slightly more 
supranational, while the operating mode of an intergovernmental EMF would 
mostly correspond to the status-quo. Adjustments to the ESM’s current 
institutional design could alter the involvement of national parliaments and 
threaten the powers that they have acquired and exercised since 2012 , but 32
the effects of such adjustments on national parliaments will depend on the 
concrete changes to the current institutional design.  
With respect to parliamentary involvement, the name of the new 
institution matters: On the one hand, if the ESM is not renamed into EMF, 
 See Appendix A (A.1 French Assemblée nationale: Adaptation without obligation) and 30
Assemblée nationale, Rapport d'information N°3195 sur le traitement des affaires européennes 
à l'Assemblée nationale, 3 November 2015, pp. 45-46.
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a 31
European Monetary Fund, COM(2017) 827 final, 6 December 2017
 For instance in case of the third rescue package for Greece in 2015, see Chapter 4.32
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but the name of the upgraded institution remains unchanged , existing 33
provisions for national parliaments’ involvement will not be affected: 
National parliaments might only need new prerogatives for controlling 
additional competences that are assigned to the ESM. On the other hand, if 
the name of the ESM is changed, direct legal enabling clauses for 
parliamentary involvement  could become obsolete and need modification. 34
But as long as an EMF relies on capital and guarantees from Euro area 
members, national parliaments that have veto power will insist on keeping it, 
Any changes to the ESM Treaty also require ratification by national 
parliaments. 
Under the proposal of the European Commission for establishing an EMF, 
the name of the ESM would be changed and the new institution would 
become subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament.  With respect to 35
national parliaments, the European Commission calls democratic 
accountability “fragmented and unevenly implemented”, national procedures 
“cumbersome […] and […] often difficult to reconcile with the speed needed 
for an effective crisis management” , but the Commission promises that the 36
current role of national parliaments would remain “fully preserved”.  
Parliamentary prerogatives are indeed not a zero-sum game. In the long 
term, the involvement of national parliaments and the European Parliament 
might develop into “Multilevel Parliamentarism” (Benz 2013) as a specific 
constellation of the Multilevel Parliamentary Field under which both 
parliamentary levels, national parliaments and the European Parliament, 
 See German Federal Government (Press and Information Office), Meseberg Declaration, 33
Renewing Europe’s promises of security and prosperity, 19 June 2018, https://
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2018/2018-06-19-meseberg-
declaration.html : “The ESM could be renamed” (author’s emphasis). 
 See Chapter 4 National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism (sub-section 34
4.4.1 Trajectories of parliamentary involvement). 
 Article 5 (1) of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a European 35
Monetary Fund (COM(2017) 827 final): “The EMF shall be accountable to the European 
Parliament and the Council for the execution of its tasks.”
 All quotes from the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council regulation on 36
the establishment of a European Monetary Fund (COM(2017) 827 final), p. 3. It also states 
that the Regulation “provides for a more explicit scrutiny role of national parliaments in 
comparison to the state of play in the ESM Treaty” (p. 14). See Article 6.
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are strong and cooperate in order to hold the EMF accountable. But until a 
modification to the ESM’s institutional design enters into force, the tangled 
web of parliamentary procedures related to ESM affairs that Chapter 4 
analysed in detail  will remain a key feature of Europe’s post-crisis economic 37
governance and shape the two-level game of negotiations on future rescue 
packages as well as the Multilevel Parliamentary Field of the EU. In the end, 
it remains to be seen if a possible EMF with a fundamentally different 
institutional design is able to change the role of national parliaments or not. 
Is a distinct parliamentary body for the Euro area necessary and 
feasible? 
Whether a distinct parliamentary body for the Euro area (or Eurozone 
parliament) is necessary has also been an important issue in the debate on 
reforming the Economic and Monetary Union. This is the third of the three 
major questions for which the findings of this dissertations have practical 
implications.  
Proposals to set up a distinct parliamentary body for the Euro area (or 
Eurozone parliament) have been put forward regularly and would ensure 
that the legitimacy structures of the EMU also “fulfil the requirements of a 
true multilevel governance system” (Enderlein 2016). “Some sort of 
interparliamentary cooperation seems indispensable” (Crum 2017: 835), but 
the analysis of the negotiations on the SECG Conference in Chapter 5 has 
shown that establishing a Eurozone parliament would be difficult in the 
short- and medium-term. The difficulties of agreeing on the functioning of the 
SECG Conference advise against undertaking the adventure of embarking on 
 According to the European Commission, “the coexistence of the Union institutions and of a 37
permanent intergovernmental mechanism such as the ESM generates a complex landscape 
where judicial protection, respect of fundamental rights and democratic accountability are 
fragmented and unevenly implemented. Furthermore, the decision-making process under an 
intergovernmental method usually requires cumbersome national procedures and is therefore 
often difficult to reconcile with the speed needed for ensuring an effective crisis management”.  
(COM(2017) 827 final, p. 3)
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negotiations for setting up such a new body, however necessary it might be to 
address the shortcomings of parliamentary control in the Euro area. 
The three competing models for the relationship between national 
parliaments and the European Parliament in EU economic governance  also 38
guide the debate about a distinct parliamentary body for the Euro area: The 
first model is EP-led scrutiny, the second model a COSAC-like conference, 
and the third model a collective parliamentary counterweight. 
Following the first model and putting the European Parliament at the 
heart of parliamentary scrutiny of the Euro area, Wolfgang Schäuble, at that 
time Germany’s Finance Minister, said in an interview with the Italian 
newspaper La Repubblica in May 2017 that he was open to a Eurozone 
chamber in the European Parliament.  Such a chamber could have an 39
advisory status and information rights vis-à-vis the ESM.  In this proposal 40
for a Eurozone chamber, national parliaments are not included. Other, 
similar proposals have been raised in the debate and are in line with the 
thinking in the European Parliament  and the European Commission: Jean-41
Claude Juncker stressed in his State of the Union speech in September 2017 
that he was “not fond of the idea of having a separate euro area parliament. 
The Parliament of the euro area is this European Parliament.”    42
Linked to the second model (the current SECG Conference is a “COSAC-
style” conference) is a proposal with limited change compared to the status-
quo. It would improve the functioning of the SECG Conference, following an 
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 38
Governance (section 5.2 Competing models for the relationship between national parliaments 
and the European Parliament in EU Economic Governance).
 Schäuble: Così Francia e Germania cambieranno la Ue, La Repubblica, 11 May 2017, http://39
www.repubblica.it/economia/2017/05/11/news/
scha_uble_cosi_francia_e_germania_cambieranno_la_ue-165144892/.
 Differentiation inside the European Parliament could also happen via the creation of a sub-40
committee for Euro area matters.
 See e.g. European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012 with 41
recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup “Towards a 
genuine Economic and Monetary Union’”, point EE./13. (P7_TA(2012)0430).
 European Commission, President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017, 42
13 September 2017, SPEECH/17/3165
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idea that was first articulated in the working paper adopted by the Speakers 
of the national parliaments from the six founding member states in January 
2013 : create a sub-group within the Conference and make that sub-group 43
specifically responsible for Euro area matters. Similar to the functioning of 
Eurogroup and ECOFIN, the sub-group could meet the day before the SECG 
Conference (Fromage 2016a: 14). The Rules of Procedure of the SECG 
Conference would have to be amended and they could, where appropriate, be 
improved, for example by providing for the possibility to convene emergency 
meetings (Kreilinger and Larhant 2016: 9-10).  
Interestingly, the European Parliament’s resolution on a “budgetary 
capacity for the Eurozone” of February 2017 points out that  
“[t]he European Parliament and national parliaments should exercise 
a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in 
order to reinforce democratic accountability. This includes […] a 
reform of the interparliamentary conference provided for in Article 13 
of the Fiscal Compact to give it more substance, in order to develop a 
stronger parliamentary and public opinion”.  44
This resolution of the European Parliament suggests that a modest 
strengthening of the joint parliamentary control of EU economic governance 
might be possible. One of the practical implications of the findings in this 
dissertation is that in view of the difficulties in agreeing on the institutional 
design of the SECG Conference, establishing a genuine Eurozone parliament 
is difficult in the short- and medium-term. 
Finally, relating to the third model of an effective parliamentary 
counterweight to executive dominance, there have been various calls for 
ambitious institutional reforms of the Economic and Monetary Union (e.g. 
Enderlein and Letta 2016). The proposal “Pour un traité de démocratisation 
de l’Europe” (Hennette et al. 2017) of a group of scientists around Nobel 
laureate Thomas Piketty envisages, inter alia, a Parliamentary Assembly for 
 See Chapter 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 43
Governance (sub-section 5.3.1 First discussions in sub-groups of national parliaments).
 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on budgetary 44
capacity for the euro area, point 1./iii (P8_TA(2017)0050).
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the Euro Area.  French President Emmanuel Macron had also supported a 45
“Parlement de la zone euro” when he had been Minister of Economic Affairs 
(see Kreilinger and Larhant 2016). A smaller, committee-like body (Enderlein 
and Letta 2016) or a directly elected separate Eurozone Parliament (Lionello 
2017: 192) might be other options. All options have in common that they are 
more difficult to implement than the two previous models and likely to meet 
fierce resistance from the European Parliament and even some national 
parliaments.  
These considerations seem to explain why, in its 2016 report on 
strengthening the Economic and Monetary Union, even the French 
Assemblée nationale refrained from insisting on the creation of a 
parliamentary assembly for the Euro area, but instead proposed that a “card 
mechanism” (similar to the Early Warning Mechanism) would give to 
national parliaments a veto right on certain EMU issues if they met a pre-
defined threshold.  46
6.4  National parliaments’ involvement in 
turbulent times 
Ultimately, the findings of the empirical chapters have allowed to point to 
some broader theoretical and practical implications. In order to conclude the 
dissertation, the final section of this chapter, in a first step, recalls how 
national parliaments were involved in turbulent times. In a second step, this 
section looks at the possible future development of national parliaments’ 
broader involvement in the EU’s institutional system. 
 For an in-depth discussion of T-DEM, see a special section of European Papers - A journal on 45
law and integration 3 (1), 2018: “Democratising the Euro area through a treaty?”, edited by 
Ségolène Barbou des Places.
 Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information N°4257 sur le renforcement de l’Union 46
économique et monétaire, 29 November 2016, p. 101.
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Chapter 4 has provided examples for ex-ante activities by national 
parliaments which do not merely rubber-stamp mandates for the government 
representative in the ESM Board of Governors or ratify decisions only ex-
post. These parliamentary debates and votes in relation to ESM rescue 
packages did not ease the life of the national governments of creditor 
countries, but they strengthened the governments’ positions in the two-level 
game (Putnam 1988). Whether national constitutional courts imposed legal 
obligations on governments to ask the national parliaments for mandates for 
the national representative in the ESM Board of Governors, whether a few 
national parliaments have been able to exploit indirect legal enabling clauses 
for ESM-related substantial parliamentary involvement, whether junior 
coalition partners have been “policing the bargain” (L. W. Martin and 
Vanberg 2004) by insisting on the adoption of mandates, or whether 
opposition parties have occasionally been able to trigger votes in relation to 
ESM rescue packages, many backbenchers did fight back (see Raunio and Hix 
2000) and were able to build on previous prerogatives when they became 
substantially involved in relation to ESM rescue packages. 
Nothing illustrates many of these developments better than the case of 
Germany which arguably dictated the terms to Greece: The Bundestag’s 
powers were the result of judgements of the Federal Constitutional Court and 
the fact that one in five of her own party’s MPs did not back German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in parliamentary votes related to the third rescue 
package for Greece  actually constitutes a backbencher rebellion. 47
The future of national parliaments’ involvement 
Jean-Claude Juncker declared in his State of the Union speech in September 
2017 that “the wind is back in Europe’s sails” . But a reconfiguration of the 48
 See Appendix B (B.5 German Bundestag: Same procedure as every time), Table B.1 Voting 47
results in the German Bundestag by political groups. In the ex-ante vote, 241 CDU/CSU MPs 
voted in favour, 60 against and 5 abstained. In the ex-post vote, 228 CDU/CSU MPs voted in 
favour, 63 against and 3 abstained.
 European Commission, President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017, 48
13 September 2017, SPEECH/17/3165
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political cleavages that shape legislatures in European integration is 
underway. This affects the future of national parliaments’ involvement 
which, in economic governance, still depends on forward-looking decisions 
regarding the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
National parliaments are often not split along left-right lines on EU 
economic governance issues, but into a pro-EU and an anti-EU camp. 
Governing parties have acted “responsibly” and supported anti-crisis 
measures in national parliaments while opposition parties have tended to be 
divided and Eurosceptic opposition parties rejected anti-crisis measures 
(Maatsch 2016). National parliaments’ adaptation to European integration in 
terms of parliamentary reforms has also been explained through a cleavage 
between constitutional preferences for a federalist or an intergovernmentalist 
EU polity shaping the EU and national political parties (Winzen 2017). 
Electoral victories like by M5S and Lega in Italy suggest that EU polity 
preferences might no longer be shaped by the federalist-intergovernmentalist 
cleavage, but that these two types of “polity ideas” (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998) 
are superseded by an existential pro-EU vs. anti-EU cleavage. The rise of the 
pro-EU vs. anti-EU cleavage has also been visible in the 2014-19 term of the 
European Parliament, during which that cleavage dominated over the left-
right cleavage in many policy areas (see Hix et al. 2018). All this also has an 
effect on the future role of national parliaments’ in Europe’s post-crisis 
economic governance and beyond. 
Eurosceptic movements have become increasingly prominent in many 
parliaments (Crum 2017: 834), but even though the ultimate objective of 
many anti-EU parties seems to be to destroy the EU from within, it is 
important to ensure that national parliaments’ delegations to 
interparliamentary conferences are pluralistic: “Given the multiple crises 
that Europe is facing today, it seems that EU decision-makers can no longer 
afford the luxury of closing their doors to people who do not share their […] 
views” (Rozenberg 2017: 53). Involving anti-EU parties in interparliamentary 
cooperation would integrate them into EU politics and make their proposals 
and EU polity ideas (some of them advocating the disintegration of the EU) 
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visible, but also offer them the possibility to give input to the agenda-setting 
of EU institutions (see also Fasone 2018a: 274). 
The immediate crisis has faded and Greece completed its third rescue 
package in July 2018. It is therefore possible to assess Europe’s current 
economic governance structure as “post-crisis”, but the rise of Eurosceptic 
parties and the new cleavage confirm that the EU is facing turbulent times. 
The roof of the EMU is also far from weather-proof and in need of a general 
overhaul (see Enderlein 2016).  
According to Jacques Delors, “[e]n Europe, il faut le pompier mais aussi 
l’architecte.”  He has also argued that the Council of Ministers should have 49
made it its business to police the economies of the Euro area and ensure that 
member states were following the criteria of economic convergence.  The 50
post-crisis governance still needs policemen (acting through the different 
European Semester surveillance procedures) and firefighters (in the form of 
possibilities to provide ESM stability support in case of a need for emergency 
liquidity), but it also requires architects who pay attention to democratic 
legitimacy and accountability.  National parliaments will then, for their 51
part, be called upon undertaking police-patrol and fire-alarm oversight (see 
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) of executive action in Europe’s post crisis 
economic governance.  
 Europe needs the firefighter, but also the architect. Jacques Delors : “En Europe, il faut le 49
pompier mais aussi l’architecte”, La Croix, 14 October 2012, https://www.la-croix.com/
Actualite/Europe/Jacques-Delors-En-Europe-il-faut-le-pompier-mais-aussi-l-architecte-
_EP_-2012-10-14-864491 
 See Jacques Delors interview: “Euro would still be strong if it had been built to my plan”, 50
Daily Telegraph, 2 December 2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/
8932640/Jacques-Delors-interview-Euro-would-still-be-strong-if-it-had-been-built-to-my-
plan.html  
 See also Valentin Kreilinger, Fire-Fighters, Policemen and Architects for European 51
Integration (Synthesis: Notre Europe, 2012a).
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Appendix C
Appendix C: List of Interviews 	1
Function Anonymity 
granted
Recorded Date of 
interview
1 Clerk in the EU Directorate, 
Deutscher Bundestag
Yes No 26/07/2016 DE
2 Clerk in the EU Directorate, 
Deutscher Bundestag
Yes No 26/07/2016 DE
3 Clerk in the European affairs 
committee, Deutscher Bundestag
Yes No 31/08/2016 DE
4 Advisor in charge of European 
affairs, Groupe socialiste, 
Assemblée nationale
Yes Yes 07/11/2016 FR
5 Member of Parliament (PS), 
Member of the European affairs 
committee, Assemblée nationale
No Yes 07/11/2016 FR
6 Clerk in the Finance committee, 
Assemblée nationale
Yes Yes 08/11/2016 FR
7 Member of Parliament (EELV), 
Member of the European affairs 
committee, Assemblée nationale
No Yes 08/11/2016 FR
8 Clerk in the European affairs 
committee, Assemblée nationale
Yes Yes 08/11/2016 FR
9 Clerk in the EU Directorate, 
Deutscher Bundestag
Yes Yes 02/03/2017 DE
10 Member of Parliament (SPD), 
Member of the European affairs 
committee, Deutscher Bundestag
Yes Yes 08/03/2017 DE
11 Member of Parliament (CDU), 
Deutscher Bundestag
Yes Yes 22/03/2017 DE
 All quotes are anonymised and French MPs treated in the same way as German MPs.1
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Appendix D: Interview Guide 
(English version, interviews were conducted in German or French) 
My doctoral thesis deals with the role of national parliaments in fiscal and 
economic coordination and surveillance in the European Union and analyses 
the European Semester, the European Stability Mechanism, and the 
Interparliamentary Conference on the basis of Article 13 of the Fiscal Treaty. 
I have prepared a series of questions for this expert interview. […] 
1. Did the Euro crisis result in a fundamental weakening or strengthening of 
parliament in EU economic governance or was there no real change?  
The European Semester provides a framework for the coordination and 
surveillance of fiscal and economic policies. 
2. How involved is parliament in the European Semester? Can it actually 
influence the drafting of the National Reform Programme and/or the Stability 
Programme within the European Semester?  
2.1 Which parliamentary actors are significantly involved in the 
parliamentary scrutiny?  
2.2 How are the parliamentary participation rights implemented in practice?  
2.3 Are there practical difficulties in using the formal participation rights? 
Are there any gaps? 
2.4 What informal and not legally enshrined participation opportunities are 
there? How are they used? 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has given “stability support” to 
Eurozone members, most recently with the third Greek rescue package of 
August 2015. 
3. Which influence does parliament have related to the day-to-day decision-
making of the ESM? Was parliament able to influence the negotiations on the 
Memorandum of Understanding of the third rescue package for Greece?  
3.1 Which parliamentary actors are significantly involved in the 
parliamentary scrutiny?  
3.2 How are the parliamentary participation rights implemented in practice?  
3.3 Are there practical difficulties in using the formal participation rights? 
Are there any gaps?  
3.4 What informal and not legally enshrined participation opportunities are 
there? How are they used? 
From a broader perspective… 
4. In how far is the handling of EU economic governance issues different from 
the scrutiny of ordinary EU legislation? How well do different parliamentary 
committees cooperate on EU economic governance issues?  
5. What has been the impact of the crisis on cooperation with other national 
parliaments and the European Parliament in EU economic governance? Are 
there greater incentives to exchange information and to cooperate?  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Appendix E: Statistical appendix to 
Chapter 4 
Table E.1  Correlation table between scores and indices related to 
institutional path dependency 
Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04. 
 
OPAL institutional 
strength 

(Auel et al. 2015a)
OPAL activity 

(Auel et al. 
2015a)
Budgetary 
power 

(Wehner 2006)
Budgetary 
strength 
(Hallerberg et al. 
2012)
Control rights EU 

(Winzen 2012) 0.774 *** 0.495 * 0.076 0.136
OPAL institutional 

(Auel et al. 2015a) 1 0.682 ** 0.197 0.273
OPAL activity 

(Auel et al. 2015a) — 1 0.207 0.302
Budgetary power 

(Wehner 2006) — — 1 0.765 **
Note: Correlations based on Pearson’s r, n = 18, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two tailed).
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Table E.2  National parliaments’ scores in EU affairs and budgetary 
strength 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Note: Grey background colour used for substantially involved national parliaments. 
Parliament
ary control 
rights in EU 
aﬀairs 
(Winzen 
2012) 
OPAL 
score 
institutional 
strength 
(Auel, 
Rozenberg 
and Tacea 
2015a)
OPAL 
activity 
score (Auel, 
Rozenberg 
and Tacea 
2015a)
Index of 
Legislative 
Budget 
Institutions 
(Wehner 
2006)
Formal 
strength of 
parliament 
in budget 
process 
(Hallerberg 
et al. 2012)
Euro area  
(19 national parliaments)*
1.59 0.51 0.23 37.5 2.60
Austria Nationalrat 2.17 0.51 0.22 55.6 5.0
Belgium Chamber 0.67 0.24 0.18 47.2 4.0
Cyprus 0.33 0.27 0.10 n/a 3.0
Estonia 2.17 0.67 0.30 n/a 1.0
Finland 2.50 0.84 0.60 38.9 5.0
France Assemblée 
nationale 1.17 0.55 0.21 19.4 1.0
Germany Bundestag 1.83 0.78 0.34 52.8 4.0
Ireland Dáil 1.50 0.46 0.19 16.7 1.0
Italy Camera 1.67 0.46 0.29 33.3 1.0
Latvia 2.00 0.53 0.15 n/a 4.0
Lithuania 2.50 0.73 0.26 n/a 4.0
Luxembourg 0.67 0.40 0.16 n/a 4.0
Malta 1.50 0.46 0.07 n/a 1.0
Netherlands Tweede 
Kamer 1.83 0.66 0.30 59.7 4.0
Portugal 1.50 0.43 0.34 38.9 2.0
Slovakia 2.50 0.49 0.21 27.8 1.0
Slovenia Chamber 2.00 0.60 0.19 36.1 2.0
Spain 0.83 0.40 0.23 41.7 1.0
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Table E.3  Indicators for the macroeconomic situation of Euro area 
members 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table E.4  Correlation table between indicators for the macroeconomic 
situation of Euro area members 
Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04. 
Name of 
variable  
(ESM 
chapter)
GDP growth 
rate, 2014-15 
(%)
GDP per capita 
relative to 
EU28, 2015
Unemployment 
(%, 2015)
Current 
account 
balance, 3-
year average 
(% of GDP, 
2013-15)
Government 
deficit/surplus 
(% of GDP, 
2015)
Name of 
variable 
(Eurostat)
Real GDP 
growth rate - 
percentage 
change on 
previous year
GDP per capita 
in PPS - Index 
(EU28 = 100)
Unemployment 
rate - annual 
data
Current 
account 
balance - 3 
year average
Government 
deficit/surplus, 
debt and 
associated 
data
Code [tec00115] [tec00114] [tipsun20] [tipsbp10] [gov_10dd_ed
pt1]
  Unemployment
Current 
account 
balance
Budget deficit/
surplus GDP (relative)
GDP growth -0.009 0.293 0.025 0.326
Unemployment 1 -0.481 * -0.715 *** -0.306
Current account balance — 1 0.314 0.468
Budget deficit/surplus — — 1 0.423 **
Note: Correlations based on Pearson’s r, n = 18, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two tailed).
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Table E.5  Macroeconomic situation of Euro area members 
Source: Eurostat, own elaboration, selection of variables based on Crum (2013: 617). See 
also Table E.2. 
 * GDP growth in Ireland was at 25% due to statistical reasons.  
Note: Grey background colour used for countries with substantially involved national 
parliaments. 
GDP 
growth 
rate, 
2014-15 
(%)
GDP per 
capita 
relative to 
EU28, 2015
Unemploy
ment (%, 
2015)
Current 
account 
balance, 3-
year 
average (% 
of GDP, 
2013-15)
Governmen
t deficit/
surplus (% 
of GDP, 
2015)
Euro area 2,1 106 n/a n/a -2,0
Austria 1,1 130,0 5,7 2,1 -1,0
Belgium 1,4 118,0 8,5 -0,4 -2,5
Cyprus 2,0 82,0 15,0 -3,6 -1,3
Estonia 1,7 75,0 6,2 0,9 0,1
Finland 0,1 109,0 9,4 -1,6 -2,8
France 1,1 105,0 10,4 -0,9 -3,6
Germany 1,7 124,0 4,6 7,7 0,8
Ireland 25,6* 181,0 10,0 4,9 -1,9
Italy 1,0 95,0 11,9 1,5 -2,6
Latvia 3,0 64,0 9,9 -1,6 -1,4
Lithuania 2,0 75,0 9,1 0,4 -0,2
Luxembourg 2,9 267,0 6,5 5,2 1,4
Malta 9,6 93,0 5,4 5,3 -1,1
Netherlands 2,0 129,0 6,9 9,0 -2,1
Portugal 1,8 77,0 12,6 0,6 -4,4
Slovakia 3,9 77,0 11,5 0,4 -2,7
Slovenia 2,3 82,0 9,0 4,9 -2,9
Spain 3,4 91,0 22,1 1,2 -5,3
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Table E.6  Indicators for the macroeconomic situation of Euro area 
members: Group descriptives 
Source: Own elaboration with jamovi 0.9.1 on Ubuntu 18.04. 
  Group N Mean Median SD SE
GDP growth Substantial 8 1.76 1.70 1.06 0.376
  Not substantial 10 5.25 2.15 7.56 2.392
GDP (relative) Substantial 8 103.38 107.00 24.88 8.797
  Not substantial 10 114.70 87.50 62.38 19.725
Unemployment Substantial 8 9.40 8.15 5.55 1.963
  Not substantial 10 9.95 9.55 2.89 0.913
Current account 
balance Substantial 8 2.10 1.05 4.10 1.449
  Not substantial 10 1.92 1.05 3.02 0.956
Budget deficit/
surplus Substantial 8 -1.91 -1.75 1.99 0.703
  Not substantial 10 -1.82 -2.20 1.61 0.511
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Appendix F
Appendix F: List of pre-publications 
This dissertation is composed of an envelope 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
and three self-standing research papers (Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5).  
All chapters/papers are single-authored. 
Chapter 3: National parliaments in the European Semester 
This chapter has been published in the Journal of European Integration:  
Valentin Kreilinger (2018), ‘Scrutinising the European Semester in national 
parliaments: what are the drivers of parliamentary involvement?’, Journal of 
European Integration, 40 (3), pp. 325-340.  1
Chapter 4: National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism 
This chapter has not been published yet.  
Chapter 5: The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance 
This chapter has been published in Perspectives on Federalism: 
Valentin Kreilinger (2018), ‘From procedural disagreement to joint scrutiny? 
The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 
Governance’, Perspectives on Federalism, 10 (3), pp. 155-184. 
 Appendix A (Scrutinising the European Semester in four national parliaments):  1
Sections A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4 have been published as supplemental material to 
Valentin Kreilinger, ‘Scrutinising the European Semester in national parliaments: 
what are the drivers of parliamentary involvement?’, Journal of European 
Integration 40 (3), pp. 325-340.
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